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Introduction

I

THE ESSAYS INCLUDED IN THIS VOLUME WERE written over a number of years and for a variety of occasions. They have, of course, a variety of themes and a battery of distinct arguments. They have, however, a unifying and a central claim. It is the claim, against an array of diverse beliefs and arguments, pre-modern, modern and post-modern, that human beings can still make sense of their lives and still have, without any failure of rationality, a humane morality, even if they are utterly secular in their beliefs and attitudes and, indeed, so secular that they have lost the last vestiges of belief in God or any other religious belief. It is not the case, I shall argue, that if God is dead nothing matters, and it is not the case that we can use a belief in God to give an objective grounding to morality; it is further not the case that no objective grounding of morality is possible if there is no God, and finally it is not the case that, if God is a reality and we believe in Him, we will have a more adequate morality than any purely secular ethic could ever devise.

These essays collectively constitute a reasoned rejection of all the claims I have denied above. They are concerned to show that even in a self-consciously Godless world life can be fully meaningful, and that morality, indeed both a caring and principled morality, can have a coherent rationale acceptable to reflective and knowledgeable human beings even if they are completely without religious belief.

II

Religious believers, particularly Jews, Christians and Moslems, have tended, and indeed sometimes rather vehemently, to think otherwise. Some have thought that the only really adequate morality, capturing both the sinfulness and the dignity of the human animal as a member of a Kantian kingdom of ends, is a morality of Divine Commands. God, on such a view, does not apprehend something to be good, something that would be good whether or not there is a God to apprehend

it. Rather, something is good because God commands it. God creates good and evil by His very commands. It is God's commanding something that makes it good and it is God's forbidding something that makes it evil. It is the burden of several essays in this volume (principally, Chapters 1, 2 and 11) to show that this classical view is mistaken.

Other religious believers would reject a morality of Divine Commands as firmly as I would and would instead articulate and defend a doctrine of natural moral law. According to such a view, morality is not invented but discovered. If we would but honestly reflect and take to heart what we reflect on, each of us, if we are not utterly corrupted by sin, has the capacity to discover the truth of some very general moral beliefs, such as, *ceteris paribus*, truth is to be told and it is wrong to inflict unnecessary suffering. We will, defenders of the natural moral law claim, simply come to recognize that these moral beliefs are objectively true.

These moral beliefs are not just our deeply embedded considered judgments, but are, as well, the ordinances of God given to the reason of human beings so that we can be aware that our very rationality requires us to accept them and to act in accordance with those beliefs. They are not *just* deeply embedded commitments or convictions but are, as well, moral beliefs whose truth we recognize in both our head and our heart. These moral beliefs, that is, are the habits both of the heart and of the head of humankind. (This view is subjected to critique principally in Chapters 3 and 5, and an alternative account of morality, giving a conception of a reasonable measure of objectivity, is provided in Chapters 8 and 9.)

III

I critically probe the traditions of both the natural moral law and the ethics of Divine Command in these essays. Both are classical conceptions in the three sister religions that are the dominant religious traditions of our culture and both, I shall argue, are mistaken. They do not, I maintain, provide an adequate basis for moral belief and there are purely secular accounts of morality which, though also flawed, are more adequate than the accounts given by either of these classical conceptions of religious ethics even in their best rational reconstructions.

In this introduction, I want to state briefly and crudely some of the problems inherent in these classical accounts of ethics emanating from our religious traditions. This is not, of course, intended to replace the probing of these problems in the body of this volume but to provide a general view of the lie of the land. I shall reverse the order of the above

There are, of course, complex relations between law and morality presentation and the presentations in the body of the book and first consider the doctrine of natural moral law, a doctrine whose classical formulation is given in the Thomistic tradition.

The objection frequently made of Thomistic defenses of the natural moral law is that they are ethnocentric, and surely some of its claims to recognize moral laws that are supposedly moral truths are ethnocentric.¹ Not all peoples at all times and places have recognized that premarital sex is wrong or that one ought to worship God. Therevada Buddhists have no concept of God or worship, and many societies do not believe that there is anything wrong at all with premarital sex. Such a notion is not part of their conceptual and moral framework.

However, the defender of the natural moral law is perfectly at liberty to respond that, while *such* Thomistic accounts are indeed ethnocentric and, where they are ethnocentric, are to be rejected, there are other defensible natural moral laws that are not ethnocentric and are the basic habits of the human heart. The two I mentioned initially in describing natural moral law are cases in point, as are the beliefs that *ceteris paribus* killing is wrong and *ceteris paribus* caring for one's young is obligatory. That the *Ik* under the most horrendous of circumstances gave a very truncated assent to this last habit of the heart is not a disconfirming instance but shows that there *ceteris* was not *paribus*. Moreover, even in such ghastly circumstances, the very youngest were cared for. What, of course, to take the other example, counts as legitimate and illegitimate killing, when *ceteris* is not *paribus*, varies widely from society to society and sometimes even within a given society at a particular time. This is by now an anthropological commonplace. We can see it clearly when we reflect about infanticide, euthanasia and abortion. Plenty of societies practise all three and do not regard these things as wrong. In our society, not many regard infanticide as justified and not a few would think it altogether morally intolerable, particularly in cases where a newborn can be considered at all normal. We are divided about euthanasia, and about abortion we are even more divided. But it is also important to keep in mind that we all agree that killing is *ceteris paribus* wrong, while disagreeing about when *ceteris* is *paribus*.

All that notwithstanding, it does seem reasonable to believe that there are some very general beliefs centrally placed in our moral lives which are always accepted as beliefs to be held. The four beliefs I mentioned above are cases in point. They take exceptions, as I have illustrated above, but they are always generally required. They are benchmarks from which we start. They are beliefs that I have characterized as moral truisms which are not at all ethnocentric. (Remember, even truisms can be true.)

However, all that notwithstanding, several problems remain with accounts of natural moral law. The beliefs that can be plausibly held to

believing that they are ordinances of His *reason* as distinct from fiats of be panhuman are so very general that they are equally compatible with radically different and indeed conflicting moral practices and habits of the heart, as the above remarks about infanticide, euthanasia and abortion illustrate. There is, as John Stuart Mill saw years ago, no objective way of recognizing what is “natural” and what is “unnatural” here, and there is, as well, no way of settling by an appeal to the natural moral law which of these conflicting practices are the more nearly right.² Moreover, that these beliefs are generally held, even universally held, still does not establish beyond question that these practices are right. That *x* is generally *believed* to be right does not establish beyond peradventure that *x* is right, any more than the fact that the majority of people believe in God establishes that God actually exists.

The general belief that killing is wrong masks a wide divergence in belief about precisely what sort of killing is wrong. A few believe that the killing of any sentient being at all is always wrong. Others seek only to prohibit the killing of beings with a relatively complicated nervous system. Some hold that it is not wrong to kill enemy soldiers in a just war, while others consider that it is always wrong to take a human life. Still others believe that it is only wrong to kill members of their own tribe. So on and on we go with a great divergence of judgments about what killing, if any, is justified and under what circumstances. Similar things can and should be said for those other generally accepted principles of the natural moral law that I have called moral truisms.

However, even if we could in some way counter these criticisms, we would still not get from the acceptance of certain very fundamental moral intuitions certain very fundamental considered judgments that we all accept, to natural moral laws. From the recognition, if indeed there is any such recognition, that there are habits of the heart that we all on reflection accept, it does not follow that the moral beliefs that reflect them are (a) laws (natural or otherwise) or (b) ordinances of reason or (c) ordinances of reason that are proclaimed by God or emanate from God. But it is just such additions that the tradition of natural moral law makes to the bare recognition that there are considered moral convictions deeply embedded in our lives to which all, or nearly all, human beings give assent. (The role and the import of considered judgments and the kind of objectivity they can give us when they are in wide reflective equilibrium — a coherentist form of justification — are discussed in Chapters 8 and 9. There, with my coherentist model of justification, I make plain how far this model is from the intuitionism that underlies accounts of natural moral law.) Considered judgments travel ontologically and conceptually light; natural moral laws do not. Natural moral laws are ontologically and conceptually problematic in a way that considered judgments are not.

the behavior of the characters in the Bible that we come to recognize this. Moral understanding is not grounded in a belief in God; just the reverse and a good system of law will be in accord with the moral point of view, but, all that notwithstanding, law and morality are distinct. We can and sometimes should ask if a certain system of morality is immoral or if a certain moral code is immoral. But it makes no sense to ask if a legal code is illegal or if the legal system as a whole is illegal. "An illegal legal system" is an incoherency, but "an immoral morality" or an "immoral moral code" is not. We might in an anthropological mode perfectly well identify a certain set of practices as the moral practices of a given society and still condemn them as immoral. But it would make no sense at all, having in the same mode identified a set of practices as the legal practices of a society, to go on to say that they were illegal. If we try to say these legal practices embedded in a legal system are practices that are really illegal and the legal system itself is really illegal because they were instituted by an illegal power, we should note that that last use of "illegal" is incoherent, for "legal" and "illegal" only get their sense within a legal system.

Moral notions and legal notions are distinct. I may recognize something to be the law of the land I live in and still despise that law and coherently and perhaps even correctly regard it as immoral. And the considered judgment or cluster of considered judgments that are the basis for my opinion of some legal statutes in my land need not, and characteristically will not, be other laws but just very strong moral convictions, convictions that we need not at all regard as a "higher law." We cannot go from considered judgments or considered moral convictions in or out of wide reflective equilibrium to natural moral laws.

However, even if we could show that they are laws in some sense, we would not have shown that, as the tradition of natural moral law requires, they are ordinances of reason, let alone ordinances of God's reason. They could instead be deeply embedded natural sentiments shared by almost all people. The claim that they are ordinances of reason is obscure and non-explanatory, and from the very fact of these considered convictions we are not warranted to conclude that they are ordinances of reason. (Moreover, to say that they are ordinances of practical reason does not help very much.)

Even if they were, we would not be justified in concluding that they come, as the tradition of natural moral law maintains, from God. No reason at all has been given for bringing God into the picture. Even if we had to construe them as laws proclaimed by a lawgiver, we need not conclude that the lawgiver is God. We could have, instead, merely deeply embedded moral sentiments that normal people in all cultures have and that they have come to enshrine in their legal codes.

Again, even if this is somehow mistaken and they are thought to come from God, as the supreme lawgiver, no reason has been given for

His *will*. So, the natural law tradition, fundamental to the Catholic and Anglican traditions, is an account of morality that is (to put it minimally) very problematic indeed. In Chapters 3 and 4, I thoroughly probe this conception of the basis of ethics and give grounds for its rejection. In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I further argue, against some secular understandings of human rights, that they too are not without a certain cluster of weaknesses characteristic of ethical rationalism and that they may well be secular echoes of traditional theories of natural moral law. Chapters 8 and 9 are designed to show how we can have a measure of objectivity in ethics without ethical rationalism.

IV

The other main tradition of a religious ground for ethics comes from the tradition, particularly prominent in Protestantism, of the morality of Divine Commands. However, it too has what seem at least to be intractable difficulties. I discuss these at length in Chapters 1, 2 and 11, but let me here initially touch on, in a somewhat oversimplified way, central difficulties in a morality of Divine Commands.

Such an account claims that we can know something to be good or that we can know that it is something we ought to do or morally speaking we must do, or that we are at least justified in believing those things, if we know, or are justified in believing, that these things are willed by God. Something is only good or right because God wills it and something is only wrong because God prohibits it. Setting aside skeptical questions about how we can know what God does and does not will, we are still left with the ancient question as to whether something is good simply because God wills it or does God will it because it is good? Leaving aside God for a moment, what is evident is that something is not good simply because it is willed, commanded or ordained; indeed, it is not even, morally speaking, a good thing to do simply because it is willed, commanded or ordained by an omnipotently powerful being. To consider it so is to give an arbitrarily reductive account of morality, reducing it to power worship. But might — naked and unabashed power — doesn't make right.

However, it is not implausible to say that it is *God's* willing it that makes all the difference, for God, after all, is the supreme, perfect good. Of this it in turn needs to be asked: how do we know that? If we say we know it through studying the Scriptures and through the example of Jesus, then the response should be that it is only in virtue of our own quite independent moral understanding of the goodness of His behavior and

is the case: an understanding of the religious significance of Jesus and the Scriptures presupposes an independent moral understanding. If alternatively we claim that we do not come to understand that God is the supreme and perfect good in that way, but maintain, instead, that it is a necessary truth, like “Puppies are young dogs,” which is true by definition, we still should ask: how do we understand that putatively necessary proposition? But again we should recognize that it is only by having an understanding of what goodness is that we can come to have some glimmering of the more complex and extremely perplexing notions of *supreme* goodness or *perfect* goodness. If we did not have some understanding of what goodness is, not derived from any knowledge of God or what He wills, we could not even understand the concept of God, for we cannot understand what perfect goodness is unless we first understand what goodness is. The former concept is dependent on the latter.

The crucial thing to understand vis-à-vis the Divine Command theory is that there are things we can recognize on reflection to be wrong, God or no God — God’s commanding them or not commanding them — and that we can be far more confident that we are right in claiming that they are wrong than we can be in claiming any knowledge of God or God’s order. We may not know that God exists or what, even if He does exist, His ordinances are, but we do know that torturing little children is vile.

Someone, to take up briefly what I take to be a familiar mistake here, might say that, since God is the cause of everything, there could be no goodness or anything else if there were no God. But this confuses *causes* and *reasons*, confuses questions about causally bringing something into existence with questions about justifying its existence. If God, as He is portrayed in Judaism, Christianity and Islam, exists, then everything is *causally* dependent on Him; but, even if there were no God who made the world and created us, it would still be wrong to torture little children. Even if there were no people to be kind, it would be timelessly true that human kindness would be a good thing and that the goodness of human kindness does not become good or cease to be good by God’s fiat or anyone else’s.

In terms of its fundamental rationale, morality is utterly independent of belief in God. To make sense of our lives as moral beings, there is no need to make what may be an intellectually stultifying blind leap of religious faith. Such a moral understanding, as well as a capacity for moral response and action, is available to us even if we are human beings who are utterly without religious faith — or so, at least, it shall be the burden of this book to argue.

V

A religious person might be understandably pardoned for thinking this is all too rationalistic. Without a belief in God and a belief in an afterlife, life will be just too grim. If there is no overarching design to the world and to our lives, life will be meaningless.

The refutation of theories of natural moral law or Divine Command leaves such concerns intact. What is at issue in those discussions does not really come to grips with such concerns. Without God's providential care and the hope of a blissful eternal life, our lives, the religious claim goes, will be out of joint. In the closing pages of this introduction, I want to pursue this reaction to what is taken to be rationalistic secularism.

It is certainly the case that many in what some like to call our post-modern era have a sense of the futility of all things. Our post-modern world is felt to be an age in which nothing very much matters and the best we can do is to become ironists. The modernist Enlightenment dream of progress is a myth; our lives are decentered. Nothing that we might be tempted to hold as precious can withstand critical inspection. Life is meaningless; nothing, if the secular humanist word is the last word, can be seen to be worth doing or having. Nihilism stands there before us as an abyss. The deconstructionists are right: there is no possibility of securely establishing the range of meanings of any human construction. There is no way, many post-modernists maintain, of reasonably viewing history as a progressive process. It is pure illusion to think that we can view history as a coherent narrative with a development toward some time of greater human Enlightenment or some better age where we, in Marx's famous phrase, will finally come to have a truly human society. With the traditional conception of the God of Judaism, Christianity and Islam we have a conception of a providential order that gives sense to history. With the loss of a belief in God, history and life become a confused motley of pointless laments. Deconstructionists see this loss as irrevocable but they also see it as a real loss. Life, with the death of God, is decentered.

A belief in God has for centuries organized experience, grounded thought and guided judgments. Deconstructionists give us to understand that all metaphysical comfort is taken from us if there is no God and they add, almost as an aside, that, of course, there is no God. The very idea of seriously arguing about such matters seems to them laughable. We are alone and decentered and humanism cannot, the story goes, offer us anything to replace this conception. Humanism in reality only disguises a pervasive will to power in which human beings exalt themselves to the posture of lord of the earth. This is Martin Heidegger's assessment of humanism and it stands in sharp contrast to the thought of Jean-Paul

Sartre, Heidegger, and Derrida too, try to show that there is a nihilism that lies at the heart of modern humanism. Modernity's dream of arrival can be nothing but a chimera, and indeed not a chimera to get excited about. If there is to be any hope in the world, we must somehow be able to return to the belief in God given to us in the great Western religious traditions. But deconstructionists join with atheistic existentialists in denying that any such return is possible, though deconstructionists treat with irony and dismissal what they take to be "the tragic posturing" of existentialists over the death of God and the arrival of nihilism.

A central underlying thrust of this collection of essays is in effect an opposition to such deconstructionist claims. Without assuming an ethical rationalism, without turning either to language or to the self to find some substitute for the salvational certainty that religion promises but cannot provide, I seek, without such a longing for a substitute, in the spirit of a thoroughgoing fallibilism, to show that (a) there is no turning back to pre-modernity and (b) life can be seen to have sense and morality can be shown to have a point and an intelligible rationale even in a Godless world. Heidegger and Derrida are mistaken; there need be no nihilism at the heart of humanism.

I shall not try to anticipate here the many-faceted and diverse range of arguments I deploy in the body of the book. Rather, I shall content myself with two very general observations. First, if there is no overarching purpose *to* life, it does not follow that there cannot be perfectly intact purposes *in* life: goals, representing our reflective desires and intentions and with them potential structures affording us (in optimal circumstances) what we need and much of what we want. And these goals can, if we so wish and resolutely choose, be coherently arranged in a comprehensive cluster answering to our interests, in accordance with which we can reflectively and reasonably order our lives. It is such things that we need and not some obscure purpose to life that makes problematic our very autonomy.³

Second, in discussing the claims of the natural moral law tradition, I noted that there are very general, and somewhat diverse, moral truisms, such as killing is wrong, autonomy is good, promises are to be kept, integrity is to be preserved, kindness and friendship are desirable things and the like. These moral truisms are, of course, a motley, but I also argue that, with the use of the method of wide reflective equilibrium, they can be rationalized into a coherent cluster of moral conceptions and principles that we can use to give sense to our lives as human beings. Though the tradition of natural law was mistaken in taking these moral truisms to be laws, having no exceptions and emanating from God, it was not mistaken in stressing that they, as considered convictions, have a wide acceptance across cultures. We should not, in rejecting natural law, throw the baby out with the bath water. We may not be able to show that

these considered convictions are “principles of pure practical reason,” but the fact that they have such a wide acceptance, including an acceptance that is sustained upon reflection, should make us loath to think that they are merely arbitrary constructions. It does not follow that what everyone assents to, even under conditions of undistorted discourse, is true or is the thing to believe. But surely the burden of proof is on any potential critic who would challenge its truth or justification? Moreover, it is highly unlikely that we will be able to get “behind” these considered judgments and obtain principles of morality that are more objective than the principles (typically themselves rather abstract considered convictions) we can sustain through arranging our considered judgments and such principles into patterns of coherence that will reveal that they have a rationality and that morality has a point. They are not, that is, just a helter-skelter motley slapdashed together without rhyme or reason.⁴

Nihilistic or utterly subjective counter-arguments do not undermine that. In fine, against both pre-modern nostalgia for the Absolute and post-modern nihilistic decenteredness, I argue, generally in the tradition of the Enlightenment, that even in a Godless world life can make sense, morality can have a point and society can be reasonably and humanly ordered, given the development of productive forces, if we have the political will.

I do not, in this collection of essays, tackle questions about social evolution and progress, questions that indeed need to be tackled, given the deconstructionist and, more generally, post-modernist challenge to modernity and to the values and general conceptual stance of the Enlightenment. I do, however, intend on some future occasion to deal with questions of social evolution, progress, etc. I do not think it is the morass that deconstructionists and the like take it to be. I, as such a remark suggests, regard myself as a child of the Enlightenment and I take it, as I take Marx takes it, that the values of the Enlightenment are values worth defending in the modern world.⁵ Indeed, to be *ad hominem* for a moment, I regard the Derridian and Heideggerian stance against these ideals to be, in effect, an atavistic nostalgia for what cannot be obtained and a romantic refusal to face resolutely the question of what can be made of the human condition where such assurances are not to be found.

Be that as it may, we are still very much in need of a coherent critical theory of society and a carefully stated theory of social evolution. Jürgen Habermas, it seems to me, has made an important start here, as have, in a somewhat different way, the analytical Marxists in their efforts rationally to reconstruct Marx and the Marxist tradition and in a rigorous way to work from and build on that tradition, correcting or rejecting where that is called for, and building, in a unified manner, on the best social science knowledge and theory and the most astute philosophical understanding we have.⁶ (This, of course, involves taking things from all kinds

of sources — Marxist and non-Marxist.) Without at all wishing to endorse the details of either approach, it does seem to me that both Habermasian critical theory and analytical Marxism have given us useful models of how we can, and should, proceed in the face of post-modern skepticism, nihilism and playfulness.

I want now very briefly, as a kind of coda, to turn from grand theory and programmatic articulation to what I would rather not mention at all but for the fact that some, though thankfully not all, religious people raise the issue and make what seem to me perfectly absurd claims concerning it. There is a traditional claim made by some religious theoreticians and even more frequently by religious apologists that religious people probe deeply while atheists are superficial and frivolous. Even Terence Penelhum, a very cautious and able Christian philosopher, who certainly ought to know better, allows himself to observe: "I've always felt more comfortable in the presence of committed believers. When I spend too much time with skeptical people there's an atmosphere of superficiality and frivolity that has always troubled me."⁷ This volume of essays, I hope, mistaken on many points though it no doubt is, should give the lie to such an utterly ethnocentric and superficial observation. The social reality of the situation plainly is that there are superficial and frivolous skeptics and superficial and frivolous believers. There seem to be no reasonable grounds for laying that charge of frivolity and superficiality at either door and denying depth to the best exponents of either group, though doing so is often a rather cheap apologetic trick. Augustine, Pascal, Newman and Kierkegaard were profound and deep believers, though with very different orientations to their belief. But Spinoza, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud were equally deep and probing non-believers as well as being non-believers who saw things rather differently. Penelhum, rather blindly, seems to have in effect identified being a skeptic with being a certain sort of Oxford don or their imitators in the provincial universities. Such remarks about who is superficial and frivolous and who is not belong with the worst sort of T.V. apologetics. Let us grant seriousness and reflective astuteness to some figures on both sides and get on with the business of trying to ascertain, if we can, whether we need some form of religious belief to give the deepest and fullest meaning to our lives.

NOTES

1. A beautiful, and indeed saddening, illustration of it came in the Vatican position on *in vitro* (test-tube) fertilization (1987). In the medical process as currently practised in hospitals equipped to do it, eggs collected from a woman are fertilized in a laboratory using sperm and then are allowed to develop in that laboratory. Some or all of the resulting embryos are then transferred to the woman's uterus and after that a normal

pregnancy hopefully ensues. The Vatican position is that this is wrong and in violation of the natural moral law. Any procreation achieved outside normal sexual intercourse, it maintains, is not morally permissible. *In vitro* fertilization is wrong even if the eggs and the sperm collected are from husband and wife. This is regarded as wrong because it is unnatural and thus in violation of the natural law and, in the Vatican account, the most unnatural and wrong thing about it is that it involves masturbation on the husband's part to produce the sperm, an activity that separates the unitive and procreative functions of coitus. Even though this is done for a good end — the production of a child by the couple — it is still wrong because it is categorically wrong to masturbate, since masturbation is an unnatural act that violates the natural law. This Catholic doctrine is the plainest form of ethnocentrism. There is nothing wrong with masturbation, particularly under these circumstances. It is widely practised (sometimes publicly) in some cultures and not thought to be at all wrong in many others. The Catholic judgment that it is wrong has everything to do with what happens to be in the Bible and nothing to do with what we can discover to be the natural law or in accordance with human nature.

2. John Stuart Mill, *Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society* (Toronto, Ont.: University of Toronto Press, 1969), pp. 373–402.

3. Kurt Baier, "The Meaning of Life," in E. D. Klemke (ed.), *The Meaning of Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 81–117.

4. Kai Nielsen, "Teaching Moral Philosophy: Method in Moral Philosophy and the Influence of John Rawls," *Aitia*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1982), 20–29 and Kai Nielsen, "On Sticking with Considered Judgements in Wide Reflective Equilibrium," *Philosophia*, Vol. 13, No. 3–4 (1985), 316–21.

5. Sidney Hook, "The Enlightenment and Marxism," *The Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 29 (January–March 1968), 93–108, and also his *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx: A Revolutionary Interpretation* (New York: John Day, 1983).

6. Terence Ball and James Farr (eds.), *After Marx* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1984); John Roemer (ed.), *Analytical Marxism* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Jon Elster, *Making Sense of Marx* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1985); G. A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History* (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1978); Allen W. Wood, *Karl Marx* (London, U.K.: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981); Richard W. Miller, *Analyzing Marx* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Andrew Levine, *Arguing for Socialism* (London, U.K.: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984).

7. As interviewed in *Calgary Magazine* (March 1987), p. 63.