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Class and Justice

Liberty, without the commitment to equality . . . as the history of even the most wealthy capitalist societies reveals, never achieves genuine liberty for all, and threatens its destruction for each, because the people are deprived of real access to practicing *liberty, to exercising their rights and assuming their responsibilities in directing their own social and personal affairs. Liberty becomes the power and privilege of the few, an instrument for the manipulation and exploitation of the many. As the mask for narrow self-interest destructive of community and mutuality of social responsibility, liberty divorced from equality discredits genuine liberty itself and places it in jeopardy to disillusion and cynicism.*

Candid proponents of capitalism no longer make a pretense at honoring the equalitarian tradition. On the contrary, they fear it as the mortal enemy of capitalism.

The capitalist class disowned equality in the interests of exercising the liberty associated with their property rights, and tended to reduce liberty, in their elemental loyalties, to their own marketplace activity.

Martin J. Sklar

The Possibilities of Classlessness *

It has been argued, not implausibly, against those who would tax Rawls with reflecting a conservative/liberal ideological bias, that his

* I would like to thank John Arthur and William H. Shaw for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay. The errors that remain are, of course, mine.

account of egalitarian justice is the most egalitarian form of justice it is reasonable to defend.[1] I shall argue against this claim and attempt to articulate in skeletal form a socialist conception of justice, where liberty and equality are treated as indivisible, that is still more egalitarian and at least as reasonable as Rawls' form of egalitarianism.[2] Indeed, it is my belief that if it were to become a core conception guiding the design of our social institutions, it would guarantee more adequately than Rawls' own account the very values (so important to Rawls and indeed to any reflective human being) of equal self-respect, equal liberty and moral autonomy.

Rawls unreflectively, and without any supporting argument, makes certain problematic assumptions about classes and the possibilities of classlessness. Only if those assumptions are justified will it be the case that Rawls' account is as egalitarian as it is reasonable to be. My arguments shall be that these assumptions are not justified. Rawls has an inadequate conception of what classes are and what classlessness would be. When taken in conjunction with his theory of the primary social goods and the assumptions he makes about human nature, they lead him to adopt a theory of justice which has not been shown to be the uniquely rational one for contractors in the original position to adopt or for fully informed rational and moral agents to adopt after the veil of ignorance is lifted. It is not at all evident that his *difference* principle provides us with enough equality or, more surprisingly, that his two principles together afford sufficient effective liberty to provide the underlying structural rationale for a perfectly just society.

In this section I shall pose problems about the possibilities of classlessness and its relation to egalitarianism. In the next section I shall discuss, working with a paradigm, class and moral autonomy and Rawls' *difference* principle, while in the third section I shall discuss liberty and equality and probe the extent and nature of Rawls' commitment to egalitarianism. Finally in the last section I begin a direct argument for a more radical egalitarian conception of justice, requiring classlessness, and which sees equal liberty as being dependent on equality.

Even in societies that Rawls would regard as well-ordered, in which his two principles of justice were satisfied, there could be considerable differences in the life prospects between the advantaged strata of the society and the least well off. Indeed it may very well be that even in a society where the means of production are socially owned, differences in the whole life prospects of people will persist because of the differences in income, status and authority which remain even after capitalism has been abolished or died the death of a thousand unifying expansions. With differences in status, authority and income remaining, different groups, differently affected, may find that their whole life prospects are still very different indeed.

We plainly seem to require something very like an industrial society to feed, clothe, etc. our vast and, for the immediate future at least, growing world population. I speak now just of meeting subsistence needs. I do not speak of making the springs of social wealth flow freely and

fully. That seems to require a division of labour and with that division of labour, divisions of people along class lines which deeply affect their life prospects. I grant that it is by no means certain that this is inevitable —particularly when the time comes when there is no longer any private ownership of the means of production—but it is, to put it conservatively, not unreasonable to believe that the division of labour is an inevitable feature of industrially developed societies. Yet it is also not unreasonable to believe that the division of labour could be reduced—that we could and should have far more versatile, many-sided human beings doing more varied work and standing in many different social roles and that we should and could, as well, develop various social devices to ameliorate the inequalities and inequities resulting from the division of labour. It is at least conceivable that a state of affairs could develop where there was a genuine social ownership of the means of production, with democratic control through workers' councils with the gradual transformation of state power into a governmental structure which, as Marx puts it, would come to have only simple administrative functions.[3] In that sense the State could wither away and exploitation of others could end, because there then would be no *structural* means of transferring to oneself the benefits of the powers of others. Thus, in that very important sense, there would be no classes, i.e. people who are at higher and lower levels, where the higher levels are the result of or the means to exploiting others, extracting from them surplus value. It is in this way and in this sense that class divisions and the existence of classes most deeply and pervasively affect us.[4] It is because of the existence of classes of this sort that the most appalling and extensive inequalities and injustices arise and persist in our social structures. It is vital to know whether in this sense class divisions are inevitable. If the assumption that they are can be successfully challenged, it makes room for the possibility of a more radically egalitarian form of justice than anything Rawls sanctions.

In seeking to articulate the principles of social justice and to attain an Archimedean point for appraising basic social structures, Rawls does not face the questions raised by the existence of social classes. I do not mean to suggest that he regards our actual class-divided societies as basically just or even well on their way to social justice. He eschews the making of such political judgements, but he does think that capitalist societies with their unavoidable class divisions can still be well-ordered societies which are plainly just societies and he would thus be committed to regarding societies in which class divisions and exploitation, in the sense characterized above, are inexpugnable features, as still societies which could be perfectly just societies.[5] Rawls takes the existence of classes to be an inevitable feature of social life and he, quite naturally, regards justice as something compatible with that unavoidable social condition.

In thinking about justice and class two general facts are very important. The first is that in capitalist societies there are deep class divisions and the second is that, barring some incredible catastrophe, the trend to complex industrial societies appears irreversible. This makes classless-

ness a problematic matter. Yet the very existence of exploiting classes as an integral part of a capitalist order poses evident problems for the attaining of social justice in capitalist societies. I shall argue that because of his unjustified assumptions about classes Rawls a) takes certain disparities in life conditions between different groups of people to be just which are not just or at least have not been shown to be just and appear at least to be very unjust and b) too easily accepts the belief that capitalism with its class relations can be just.

Capitalist societies are and must remain class-divided societies. Talk of 'people's capitalism' is at best fanciful. Rawls is right in seeing class divisions as an unavoidable feature of capitalist societies, but he is mistaken in uncritically accepting the conventional wisdom which maintains that all industrial societies must have class divisions. Rawls, unfortunately, does not examine classes or exploitation. But he does assume, as I remarked initially, the inevitability of classes at least in the sense to be specified in the next two paragraphs.

There is an important sense of 'class,' developed in the Marxist tradition, concerning which it is by no means evident that classes are inevitable. Rawls largely ignores that conception and generally talks about classes in the way most bourgeois social scientists do, where 'class' and 'strata' are roughly interchangeable terms. Indeed, Rawls is not clear about what he thinks classes are, but it is evident that he believes that institutionalized inequalities which affect the whole life prospects of human beings are inescapable in complex societies.

My counter is that it has not been shown that a society without classes (cohesive groups) which determine the broad life prospects of their members is an impossibility and that thus Rawls unnecessarily limits the scope of his egalitarian claims. Rawls seems principally to think of a class-divided society as a society with social strata in which there are differences in status, authority, income and prestige. He believes, plausibly enough, that some differences will persist in any society and thus assumes that classes are inevitable. But such a belief's evident persuasiveness is tied to the identification of class and strata. If, alternatively, we either think of classes, as a Marxist does, essentially in terms of the relationship to the means of production or as cohesive groups between which there are considerable differences in income, prestige or authority and because of these differences there are radically different life prospects, it is not so evident that we can safely assume, as Rawls does, that classes are inevitable.

It is not, however, clear that Rawls is committed to denying the possibility of a society without classes in the Marxist sense. After all, he admits that it is possible that societies can be both socialist and just. But he does take it to be an inescapable fact that there are and will continue to be classes in the sense that there are and will continue to be institutionally defined cohesive groups whose whole life prospects are importantly different. We cannot design and sustain a society where that will not obtain.

I shall argue that it has not been established that such class divisions

are inevitable or that classes in the Marxist sense are inevitable. With these commonly assumed inevitabilities no longer secured, we are not justified, if we believe, as Rawls does, in the equal moral worth of all people, in qualifying egalitarianism and justifying inequalities in the way he does. But there are many challengeable propositions here that require establishment in a somewhat less conditional manner. It is to this that I now turn.

Class and Moral Autonomy

Rawls argues that for conditions of moderate scarcity, the principles of collective action that rational persons would accept in circumstances in which they were disinterested, uninfluenced by a knowledge of their own particular situation, their natural endowments, their individual life plans or aspirations but in which they did have *general* social science and psychological information about human nature and society are (in order of priority) the following: (1) "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar liberty for all," and (2) "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity." [6] Now (a) above (the *difference* principle, i.e. the principle that inequalities to be just must benefit the least advantaged) has been thoroughly criticized, but it remains a distinctive and crucial element in Rawls' account.[7] I do not want to return to that dispute but to consider against the *difference* principle, in trying to sort out the issue of class and justice, a far less decisive, yet morally and politically more significant candidate counter-example. This example, I shall argue, exhibits how very intractable moral disputes can be and how knowledge and rationality are far less decisive in moral disputes than Rawls and a great many moral philosophers suppose.[8]

Rawls argues that in sufficiently favourable but still only moderately affluent circumstances, where his two principles of justice are taken to be rational ordering principles for the guidance of social relations, it could be the case that justice, and indeed a commitment to morality, would require the acceptance as just, and as through and through morally acceptable, of a not inconsiderable disparity in the total life prospects of the children of entrepreneurs and children of unskilled labourers, even when those children are equally talented, equally energetic and the like. A just society, he claims, could in such circumstances tolerate such disparities.

It seems to me that such a society could not be a just society, let alone a perfectly just society.[9] There might under certain circumstances be pragmatic reasons of expediency for grudgingly accepting such inequalities as unavoidable. In that way they could, in those circumstances, be *justified inequalities.* When people, whose only relevant difference is that one group had entrepreneurs as parents and the other had unskilled

labourers as parents, have, simply because of this difference, life prospects so different that one group's entire life prospects are considerably better than the others, then that difference is unjust.[10] By contrast, Rawls does not direct moral disapprobation toward a society or moral scheme of things which accepts such disparities, not only grudgingly as unfortunate expediencies necessary under certain distinctive circumstances to improve the lot of the most disadvantaged, but as disparities which even a just, well-ordered society could accept. He believes that such a society could still be a just society (perhaps even a perfectly just society). For me, however, the witting acceptance of such disparities just seems evil. It may be an evil that we might in certain circumstances have to accept because we realize that under those circumstances the undermining of that state of affairs will bring about a still greater evil. But it remains an evil all the same. The moral ideal embedded in a conception of a just and truly human society—a perfectly just society—must be to eradicate such differences.

Rawls or a Rawlsian could reply that in making such judgements I am being unnecessarily and mistakenly sentimental and perhaps a little irrational, or at least confused, to boot. It is bad enough that such inequalities in life prospects must exist, but it is still worse by narrowing them to make the children of the unskilled labourers even worse off.[11] It is better and indeed more just to accept the considerable disparities in life prospects and to apply the *difference* principle. Otherwise, in absolute terms, these children of unskilled labourers will be still worse off. It can never be right or just to knowingly bring about or allow that state of affairs where it could be prevented. To achieve greater equality at such a price is to do something which is itself morally indefensible.

Rawls is, in spite of himself, being too utilitarian here. Talk of increasing the advantages of such a group with lower life prospects is not the only thing which is morally relevant, even in those circumstances where Rawls' principles of justice are to hold in their proper lexical order.[12] Even when it is to their advantage, the working class people in such a circumstance, who are or were children, have had, by the very existence of this extensive disparity, their moral persons assaulted and their self-respect damaged. This is true even if in terms of income and wealth the inequality of opportunity will make them better off, and in that sense, enhance their opportunities more than they otherwise would be enhanced. That that is not just rhetoric, envy or resentment can be seen from the fact that they suffer, among other things, with such a loss of equality, the loss of effective equal citizenship.[13] Their continuing to have these formal rights and liberties is cold comfort. Moreover, their effective moral autonomy is undermined by such disparities in power, in their inability to control their life conditions and in their inability (situated as they are) to obtain meaningful work.[14] It is also important to recognize that these disparities are inextricably linked to the different life prospects of children of working class people and the children of the capitalist class and the professional strata whose loyalties by and large are to the capitalist class.

Rawls, it might be thought, could, in turn, respond that there is no actual conflict with his account even if this is so, for, if such conditions obtain, his equal liberty principle would be violated and his principles of justice would not be satisfied after all. For he does claim that "the basic structure is to be arranged to maximize the worth to the least advantaged of the complete scheme of equal liberty shared by all." [15]

However, that there is in reality no conflict with his theory is not so clear, for I had in mind the *effective* exercise of the rights of equal citizenship and the *effective* moral autonomy of people, while Rawls seems at least to be talking about something which is more *formal* and which could be satisfied in such a circumstance. By utilizing his putative distinction between liberty and the *worth* of liberty—a distinction effectively criticized by Daniels—Rawls tries to account for what I have been talking about under the rubric 'the worth of liberty' and not under the equal liberty principle. But, as Daniels' criticisms have brought to the fore, it is far from evident that anything like this can successfully be maintained.[16] Yet, Rawls might respond that in arguing as I have above, I have not given sufficient weight to a) his insistence that fair opportunity requires not only that no one be formally excluded from a position to which special benefits attach, but also that persons with like talents and inclinations should have like prospects of attaining these benefits "regardless of their initial place in the social system, that is, irrespective of the income class into which they were born," and b) I neglect that part of his second priority rule which lays it down that "fair opportunity is prior to the *difference* principle" and that any "inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with lesser opportunity." [17] Rawls, with a fine moral sense and thorough integrity, seeks to make perspicuous a requirement "which treats everyone equally as a moral person." [18] Moreover, Rawls might add, I am failing to take into consideration his recognition that certain background institutions are necessary for distributive justice. In particular I am forgetting that we need institutions concerned with *transfer* and *distribution*. The institutions concerned with transfer will guarantee a social minimum to the most disadvantaged and will honor the claim to meet basic needs. Taxation will be used by this institution to prevent a concentration of wealth and power which would undermine political liberty and equality of opportunity. Rawls stresses that for principles of justice to be fully satisfied there would have to be a redistribution of income, a wide dispersal of property, and the long-run expectations of the least advantaged would have to be maximized (in a way compatible with the constraints of a fair equality of opportunity and with the constraints of equal liberty). To achieve these things we need institutions of transfer and distribution employing taxation and the like.

Yet right there, with the very conception that there will, in a well-ordered, perfectly just society, be a *social minimum*, there is the acceptance of class divisions as just, even though the life expectations of some groups are quite different than those of others. While Rawls has the welfare state ideals expressed in the previous paragraph, he also believes

that there can be capitalist, and thus class-divided societies, which are well-ordered and in which his principles of justice are satisfied. Yet it is just such societies which have exploitative classes and which, as Rawls himself admits, have class differences which make for the substantial differences in life prospects that we noticed between the children of entrepreneurs and unskilled labourers. Rawls thinks such class differences are unavoidable and he thinks that his principles of justice can be satisfied even when they obtain. But then it is difficult to see how, in such a circumstance, fair equality of opportunity, on which he also insists, could possibly be realized. How (or even that) Rawls' theory can make a coherent whole here is not evident, but what is evident is that he is applying the *difference* principle and claiming an inequality is a just one when that claim is very questionable indeed and when it is not at all evident that a person committed, as Rawls is, to a belief in the equal moral worth of all persons, should not opt for a more radical form of egalitarianism.

There surely is merit in the claim, pressed by Dworkin, that Rawls seeks to translate into a working conception of distributive justice an egalitarian ideal that everyone be treated equally as moral persons. Yet there is also—and at least equally evidently—the stress in his theory that such disparities as I have discussed could be justified even in a just, well-ordered society.[19] Rawls' writings on this topic are reflectively self-conscious of objections and are often so qualified that it is difficult to make sure how the various parts go together. But there is in Rawls a line of argumentation—one which interprets the *difference* principle in terms of income rather than other primary goods—to which my counter-example addresses itself. What I have tried to do so far is to show how very much this line of argument conflicts with some tolerably deep sentiments (intuitions, considered judgements) about justice (including, as we have just seen, some of Rawls' other considered judgements).

However, without trying further to sort this out, I think that Rawls has available a still more fundamental reply, namely the reply that *such* class divisions are *inevitable* and that, since rational principles of justice, whatever they may be, must be compatible with the 'ought-implies-can maxim,' such disparities in life prospects must simply be accepted as something which is just there in the nature of things much in the same way as are differences in natural endowment. Indeed, Rawls suggests that inequalities may be to the benefit of the least advantaged in that they provide incentives to the better off members of society and thereby serve the interests of *all* members. We cannot reasonably complain about them as unjust when it is impossible to do anything about them. One might as well say that the cosmos is unjust.

There is an inclination within me to say that if those are the alternatives, then one should say that the cosmos is unjust. More seriously, and less tendentiously, one can reasonably follow C. B. Macpherson and Benjamin Barber in questioning whether Rawls has done anything more than uncritically and unhistorically to assume the inevitability of there being classes determining differences in whole life prospects.[20] There is,

as I remarked earlier, in spite of the length of Rawls' book, no supporting argument at all for this key assumption and yet it is a governing one in his work and it is the basis for appealing to the ought-implies-can-maxim in this context.

It may well be, as Rolf Dahrendorf argues, that a certain social stratification is inevitable—that there will be in any complex society some differences in prestige, authority and income—but there is no good evidence that these differences must result from or result in institutionalized differences in power—including ownership and control of the means of production—which will serve as the basis of control and exploitation such that the whole life prospects of people will be radically different.[21] It is where such differences obtain that we have the reality of exploitative classes, but Rawls has done nothing at all to show that such class differences are inevitable such that we would just have to accept—as not unjust, since they are inevitable—the differences in life prospects between the children of entrepreneurs and unskilled labourers.

Let us imagine a slight twist in the case I have been considering and suppose that neither disputant believes there is much prospect of achieving classlessness but that one still takes the more egalitarian posture I take and another the Rawlsian position. (Full equality, for the radical egalitarian, now becomes a heuristic ideal to try to approximate.) Yet, given those assumptions about classlessness, is not the Rawlsian position more reasonable and more just? It is, of course, true that there are greater inequalities if we reason in accordance with the *difference* principle, but the *proletarian* or *lumpenproletarian* in such a circumstance is still in a certain plain sense better off—at least in the sense that they have more income. People in such a position also have, it is claimed, the chance, given the way the primary social goods hang together, to achieve a greater self-respect due to the fact that they will have larger incomes and—in that way—more power than they would otherwise have.[22]

However, in another, and more crucial way, they would have less power and not as great a realization of certain of the primary social goods articulated by Rawls, including most fundamentally the good of self-respect. That can be seen if we reflect on the following. In terms of income and power (mostly buying power) that the income provides, it is true that in the more egalitarian society the most disadvantaged would be still worse off than they would be in the less egalitarian society in which Rawls' *difference* principle is satisfied. But it is also true that there would, in the greater equality that that society provides, still be more in the way of effective equal citizenship and in that way a more equal sharing of power and thus a greater basis for realizing the good of self-respect and moral autonomy than in the Rawlsian well-ordered society. In a society in such a circumstance, ordered on Rawls' principles, the least advantaged would have more power *in the sense of more wealth* than they would have in the more egalitarian society, but, in the more egalitarian society, they would have more power in the sense that their equality, or at least their greater equality, would make it the case that no one person would have power over another in virtue of his

greater wealth and greater consequent control of society. In determining how things are to be ordered, everyone, in a radically egalitarian society, stands in common positions of power or at least in more nearly equal positions of power.

I am not, of course, claiming that as a matter of fact the worst off will, even in the narrowest of economic terms, benefit by a regime of private ownership. Like other socialists, I do not think that, at this historical stage, capitalism benefits the most disadvantaged. Indeed I think it is plain that it does not. In fact I would go beyond that and argue that it hardly can benefit more than ten per cent of the people in societies such as ours. However, even if some trickle-down theory were correct and it could be shown that the worst off would have greater material benefits under the regime of private ownership of the means of production than in a socialist society, that still would not be sufficient to establish that the capitalist society would be the better or the juster society. In the previous paragraphs I attempted to give some of the reasons for believing that to be so. (I am, of course, speaking, as Rawls is as well, of societies in conditions of moderate scarcity.)

I suspect that, in reflecting on these two possible social orders, some would be more than willing to trade their equal power and consequent equal effective citizenship for greater wealth and some would not. But, particularly given Rawls' own moral methodology, there seem, at least, to be no grounds—no conclusive or even firmly reliable arguments—to push one in one way rather than in another. Reflective and knowledgeable people go in both directions such that it at least appears to be the case that what is the right and through and through just thing to do in such a situation cannot be objectively resolved. And this suggests, and partially confirms, the belief that justice is an essentially contested concept.[23] However, we shall examine in the next section whether this argument can be pushed a little further. Perhaps the disagreement about justice is not all that intractable.

Moreover, this belief could survive a clear recognition on the part of both parties to the dispute that it is unfair that such differences in life prospects exist because there are no morally relevant differences between the children of such entrepreneurs and the children of such unskilled labourers. But the Rawlsian, utilizing the *difference* principle and taking what is, in effect, a rather utilitarian turn, is committed to saying that this unfairness in such a circumstance does not, everything considered, create an overall injustice, for if the *difference* principle is not in effect, it will be the case that in such a society, still more harm and a still greater injustice will result for the least advantaged.

Liberty and Equality

Rawls' bedrock argument here is that the inequality in question is just if the equal liberty principle and the fair opportunity principle are not violated and the existence of such inequalities effecting the sons or

daughters of unskilled labourers is to the advantage of the most disadvantaged stratum of society.

Suppose these children of unskilled labourers are part of that most disadvantaged stratum. Rawls, as we have seen, could argue that indeed their life prospects, given their situation, are already unfortunate enough and then rhetorically ask whether, given that situation, it is right or just or even humane to make them still worse off by narrowing the inequality? Isn't doing that adding insult to injury? This plainly utilitarian argument has considerable force. Yet one can still be inclined to say that such inequalities remain unfair, indeed even somehow grossly unjust. We have two children of equal talent and ability and yet in virtue of their distinct class backgrounds their whole life prospects are very different indeed. One can see the force of the utilitarian considerations which would lead the parents of such children or the children themselves to be resigned to the inequalities, to accept them as the best thing they could get under the circumstances, but why should we think they are *just* distributions? [24]

In a way parallel to the way Rawls himself argues against simply accepting a maximizing of average utility as the most just arrangement, it is possible to argue against Rawls here. Rawls says to the utilitarian that it is a requirement of fairness to consider the interests of everyone alike even when doing so will not produce the greatest utility. To fail to do that is to fail to be fair. I am inclined to respond to Rawls in a similar way by saying that we should—indeed morally speaking must—just reject such acute disparities in life prospects as unfair and unjust even though they do benefit the most disadvantaged. Are not both arguments equally good or equally bad? If we are justified in rejecting utilitarian reasoning in one case why are we not justified in rejecting it in the other?

It is not, as Rawls claims, envy that is operative here, for one can have the appropriate sense of injustice even if one is not a member of the oppressed and exploited class. One might even be a part of the ruling class—as Engels was—and still feel it. The point is that it offends one's sense of justice. Or perhaps, I should say, to give fewer hostages to fortune, it offends my sense of justice and I know it offends the sense of justice of some others as well. I am inclined to say that here Rawls' principles do not match with my considered judgements and the considered judgement of at least some others. Rawls might well counter that they would if we got them into reflective equilibrium. That is, Rawls might claim, if I considered all the facts, the alternative theories and the principles of rationality, my considered judgements would not be what they are now. It is irrational *not* to accept these inequalities as just or at least as justified.[25]

Such considerations push us back to some basic questions in moral methodology. If there is anything to the above parallelism and both arguments are equally good or equally bad, we still, of course, want to know which they are. Here our considered judgements come into play

and, speaking for myself, even when I have utilized the devices linked with what Rawls calls 'reflective equilibrium,' it remains the case that they are not settled on this issue. I am drawn by the teleological 'utilitarian' considerations: why not, where we can, act in such a manner that we are likely to diminish as much as possible the occurrence of misery and maximize the attainment of happiness or at least (if that does not come to the same thing) the satisfaction of desire? What else, everything considered, could be the better, the more humane thing to do? But I am pulled in the other direction as well, for I also find myself asking: but are we to do this when this commits us to doing things which are plainly unfair, i.e. when we in effect, whatever our rhetoric, either ignore the interests of certain people, when considering their interests would not contribute toward maximization, or we simply accept as justified, as 'all right,' given how things are, vast disparities of life prospects between the children—often equally talented and equally intelligent—of entrepreneurs and unskilled labourers when the *difference* principle and an equal opportunity principle are satisfied?

Even on reflection with the facts and the consequences of both sets of strategems before me, vividly and fully, it still strikes me as grossly unfair so to treat the disadvantaged. Yet I can also see the humanity and indeed the rationality in 'utilitarian reasoning' here: why allow any more misery or unhappiness than necessary? If closing up the gap between the classes at some determinate point in history results in that, then do not close it. Still I am also inclined to come back, against such 'utilitarian reasoning' concerning such a case, with something (vague as it is) about fairness, human dignity and being in a better position to control one's own life (effective moral autonomy). Moreover, it is not clear that happiness should be so set in opposition to human dignity and a control of one's life as if being happy were independent of these things. But the concept of happiness also has its more familiar sides as well. Perhaps it too is an essentially contested concept.

I think that what is happening here is that very deeply embedded but, in this context, conflicting moral sentiments are being appealed to and our conflicting considered judgements are being matched with these conflicting sentiments.[20] On the side of a socialist conception of justice, more radically egalitarian than Rawls', we have a clearer recognition of and accounting for the danger to liberty of inequalities of economic power and the effects of concentrated wealth and power under capitalism (particularly modern monopoly capitalism) on the moral autonomy and sense of moral worth of such disadvantaged people. There is the recognition that, given the realities of social life, we are not justified in believing, as liberals do, that we can rightly treat as separate the political and economic spheres of life and still serve best each person's human flourishing or even, more prosaically, his welfare, by maximizing political freedoms while tolerating extensive economic disparities. Moral autonomy for all, the socialist believes, is simply not possible under such circumstances.

In circumstances of moderate scarcity, Rawls believes that we can and

should act in accordance with the *difference* principle, while still acting in accordance with the equal liberty principle, i.e. the principle laying it down "that each person has an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all." [27] But talk of the priority of the equal liberty principle over the *difference* principle should not obscure the fact that in such circumstances reasoning in accordance with the *difference* principle, even when placed in its proper lexical order, will make for less moral autonomy—and in that crucial sense less liberty—than will reasoning in accordance with the more egalitarian socialist principles. That is so because the socialist always aims at diminishing morally irrelevant inequalities, inequalities in the primary social goods or in basic human goods. With fewer such inequalities, there would be less control of one group over another and thus there would be greater moral autonomy. By contrast, Rawls' *difference* principle has the unfortunate unintended effect of limiting the scope of his equal liberty principle.

This greater moral autonomy afforded by the socialist principles would most plainly be so if classlessness, or something far closer to classlessness than Rawls allows, were possible. Most crucially, that should be taken to mean the possibility of there being a complex society in which there are no radical differences in life prospects between different groups of people because some have far greater income, power, authority or prestige than others. Where there is such a class society there will be less moral autonomy than in a classless society where the more radically egalitarian socialist conceptions can be satisfied. Moreover, in spite of what Rawls may think, what we speak of here is not something which goes 'beyond justice,' for such considerations concern the fairness of distributions and relations between human beings. So some justification of Rawls' assumption that classlessness is not possible becomes crucial. However, if the division of classes is indeed inevitable, then, perhaps, for those who find a Nozickian trip neither very intellectually challenging nor morally acceptable, a Rawlsian egalitarianism is the best thing that can be had, if one cares about liberty (particularly equal liberty), equality and human well-being. But, given the choices, we ought to be tolerably certain that classlessness is impossible.

Would Rawls be justified in assuming that institutional inequalities rooted in class structures are inevitable? What Rawls must do, to establish that classlessness is impossible or unlikely, is to show that it is impossible or unlikely that a society can come into existence where there are only rather minimal differences in income and authority and where none of the differences that do exist result from or are the means to exploiting others. (Note, given its characterization, it is a conceptual impossibility that such an egalitarian society would be authoritarian.) That is, as Macpherson would put it, the society would be so organized that there would be no way to transfer "to oneself for one's own benefit some of the powers of others." [28]

Whatever we may want to say about the division of labour, it is plainly not necessary that there be private ownership of the means of production.

Yet it is the private ownership of the means of production which is the principal source of one human being's ability to extract for his own benefit some of the powers of others. Such exploitation is unavoidable in a capitalist organization of society, but there is nothing necessary, given our position in history, about the continued existence of a capitalist social order. Perhaps, as Dahrendorf believes, some social stratification is inevitable, but that is another matter. What we have no good grounds for taking to be a fixed feature of human life is the sorting of human beings into socio-economic classes in which one class will exploit the other. Unless it is a mistake to believe that it is these socio-economic class divisions (or something rather like them in statist societies) which make for such radical differences in life prospects, there is good reason to believe that a form of egalitarianism more radical than Rawls' is both feasible and morally desirable and that the principal human task will be to struggle to attain classlessness.[29]

Radical Egalitarianism

I want, at this juncture, to make a disclaimer. I do not claim for these views a support in Marx or the Marxist tradition, though I do hope that they are compatible with that tradition. What Marx's or Engels' views are on these matters is subject to considerable debate.[30] They do not systematically treat this subject and indeed they sometimes talk, when justice-talk is at issue, derisively of ideology or false consciousness.[31] To develop any kind of explicit Marxist theory here would require extensive injections of rather contestable interpretation. I will only remark that my radical socialist egalitarianism is in accord with Engels' claim, in a famous passage on the subject in his *Anti-Dühring*, that "the real content of the proletarian demand for equality is the demand for the *abolition* of classes." Significantly, he then goes on to remark that a "demand for equality which goes beyond that, of necessity passes into absurdity," thereby in effect rejecting what have become straw-men forms of 'radical egalitarianism' easily knocked about by philosophers.[32] Neither Marx nor Engels was a complete egalitarian in the sense that he thought all human beings should be treated exactly alike in every respect. No thoughtful person, egalitarian or otherwise, believes that everyone old and young, sick and well, introverted and extroverted, should be treated the same in every respect: as if all people had exactly the same interests, aspirations and needs.

I cannot here specify fully, let alone extensively defend, the form of 'social justice' or, as I would prefer to call it, 'radical egalitarianism' which I have argued is at least as reasonable as Rawls' account. In fact I would go further than that and contend that it is a superior conception, at least from someone who starts out with moral sentiments similar to those of Rawls, in that it squares better than Rawls' theory, both with what we know about the world (particularly with what we know about the need for meaningful work and the conditions of moral autonomy) and with some of Rawls' deepest insights—insights which led him to reject

utilitarianism and to set out his conception of justice as fairness. Here I have in mind his Kantian conception of human beings as members of a kingdom of ends, the weight he gives to moral autonomy, self-respect, equal liberty and to moral community. My contention has been that such things are not achievable under even a liberal capitalist order with its resultant class divisions. Given the way political and economic phenomena interact, liberty and moral autonomy cannot but suffer when there are substantial differences in wealth.[33] It is not only, as is now becoming more generally recognized and apologized for (see the Trilateral Commission's Task Force report: *The Governability of Democracies*), that capitalism is incompatible with equality, it is also incompatible with equal liberty and moral autonomy for all humankind.[34] Equal liberty is impossible without people—all people of normal abilities—being masters of their own lives, but with the differences in power and control between classes within capitalism, this is impossible for most people.

Furthermore, given the control of the forces of production by one class and the consequent authoritarian allocation of work, meaningful work must be very limited under capitalism. Meaningful work, as Esheté well argues, must be autonomous, though this does not mean that it cannot be cooperative; it must, that is, bear the mark of our own making in the sense of our own planning, thought and our own decisions about what is worth doing, making and having.[35] But this is only possible where there is effective, cooperative, democratically controlled workers' social ownership of the means of production. For anyone who sees the plausibility of Rawls' 'Aristotelian principle' or thinks about the conditions of self-respect and thinks carefully about the role of work in life, it should be evident that under a capitalist organization of production these values and with them full moral autonomy are not achievable.

It is a very deep moral assumption of both Rawls' account and my own that all human beings have a right to equal respect and concern in the design of social (including political and economic) institutions. We must, that is, if our normative ethic is to be adequate, and our reactions as moral agents are to answer to that theory, treat all human beings with an equal moral respect. We must regard it as morally required that equal moral concern be given to everyone. What sort of principles of justice do we need to match with that underlying moral assumption and with the related conception that a good society will provide the basis for equal self-respect for all people? Rawls sees that it is true that in bourgeois societies, such as those in North America and Western Europe, relative wealth, to a very considerable degree, provides for most people the psychological basis for self-respect. (No claim need be made that these are the only societies so affected.) Given his belief that classlessness is unattainable and that important differences in wealth and power will remain and indeed are important in providing incentives for the accumulation of material wealth, which in turn will better everyone's circumstances, Rawls understandably tries to break the psychological connection between wealth and self-respect. I argued in the earlier sections that there is a tight link between wealth, power and autonomy and that equal moral

autonomy cannot be sustained without something like a very near equality of wealth and power. It is a simple corollary of that to see that equal self-respect cannot be achieved without equal moral autonomy. If that is right, and Rawls is right in assuming that classlessness is impossible, one should draw some rather pessimistic conclusions about the very possibility of a moral order.[36] However, I have argued that we do not have good grounds for rejecting the empirical possibility of classlessness. Given the fundamental moral beliefs that Rawls and I share, I think that in looking for the basis for stabilizing—indeed making it something that could socially flourish—equal self-respect and equal moral autonomy, we should look again at a principle of justice which would stress the need for an equal division of wealth.

I want now to state my more radically egalitarian principle of justice. I shall do so in a somewhat Rawlsian manner for ease of comparison, though I am not particularly enamoured with its formulation and I am confident, if there is anything in it at all, that it will require all sorts of refinements, clarifications and (no doubt) modifications. Moreover, I do not offer it as a candidate eternal principle of justice, *sub Specie Aeternitatas*, but rather as a principle of social justice, for conditions of relative abundance (imagine present-day Sweden as the world). This still fits in the upper end of Rawls' situation of moderate scarcity, where considerations of distribution would still be important.[37] For conditions of full abundance, as Marx stressed, questions of distribution would be very secondary indeed.[38]

What I want to capture, in some rough initial way, with my radically egalitarian principle of justice, is a distributive principle committed to *equal division with adjustments for differences in need.* I am under no illusions about its being a magic formula, and much of its plausibility (if it has any) would depend on the reading given to its various constituent elements—a task not to be undertaken here.[39] But I hope the previous discussion has made evident the need to attempt an elucidation of the often cavalierly dismissed principle of radical equality. My formulation has two parts and is expressed as follows:

> 1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties and opportunities (including equal opportunities for meaningful work, for self-determination and political participation), compatible with a similar treatment of all. (This principle gives expression to a commitment to attain and/or sustain equal moral autonomy and equal self-respect.)
>
> 2. After provisions are made for common social (community) values, for capital overhead to preserve the society's productive capacity and allowances are made for differing unmanipulated needs and preferences, the income and wealth (the common stock of means) is to be so divided that each person will have a right to an equal share.

I am making no claims about priority relations between 1 and 2. I am

saying that in a perfectly just society, which is also a relatively abundant society, these two principles will be fully satisfied. It should be noted that such principles can only be so satisfied in a classless society where, in Marx's famous phrase, the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all. Furthermore, such principles require democracy for their realization, taken here to mean "the people's self-determination in political, economic and social affairs" and such a democracy, it is plain to see, requires socialism.[40]

Even in the circumstances where this principle can have a proper application, it is not the case that this is the conception of justice that any rational person would have to adopt who was constrained to reason impartially about what principles of action are collectively rational. I do not believe that my principle, or any other principle, including justice as fairness or average utility, can attain even such an atemporal rational Archimedean point.[41] I do not think that it can be established that there is a set of principles of collective action which are uniquely rational, even in a determinate historical epoch. *A Theory of Justice* is just the latest in a long line of distinguished failures to achieve such an Archimedean point.

What I think can be shown is that in the situation described, for persons with certain moral sentiments, a conception of justice of the type formulated above would be the rational choice. The sentiment I have in mind is the one that leads Rawls to what Ronald Dworkin regards as his deepest moral assumption underlying his commitment to justice as fairness, namely "the assumption of a natural right of all men and women to an equality of concern and respect, a right they possess not in virtue of birth or characteristic or merit or excellence but simply as human beings with the capacity to make plans and give justice." [42] I do not know how anyone could show this belief to be true or self-evident or in any way prove it or show that, if one is through and through rational, one must accept it.[43] I do not think a Nietzschean, a Benthamite or even an amoralist who rejects it can thereby be shown to be irrational or even, in any way necessarily, to be diminished in his reason. It is a moral belief that I am committed to and I believe Dworkin is right in claiming that Rawls is too. What I am claiming is that, in the circumstances I described, if one is so committed and one has the facts straight, reasons carefully and takes these reasons to heart, one will be led, not to utilitarianism or to justice as fairness or even to a form of pluralism, but to some such form of radical egalitarianism.[44]

Notes

1. Ronald Dworkin, "The Original Position," *The University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 40, No. 3 (Spring, 1973), p. 533, and Thomas M. Scanlon, "Rawls' Theory of Justice," *The University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, Vol. 121 (1973), p. 1064.

2. It tries to capture in what is, I hope, clear argumentative discourse something

of what Marx had in mind with his conception of a classless society where the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all. An account, at core very close to my own but given a more political and historical expression, and closely related to the contemporary political scene, is given by Martin J. Sklar, "Liberty and Equality, and Socialism," *Socialist Revolution,* Vol. 7, No. 4 (July–August, 1977), pp. 92–104. Evan Simpson, "Socialist Justice," *Ethics,* Vol. 87, No. 1 (October, 1976) argues, much more abstractly, to similar conclusions, but I find his argumentation, as distinct from his conclusions and depiction of the liberal/socialist division, obscure.

3. Irving Fetcher, "Karl Marx on Human Nature," *Social Research,* Vol. 40, No. 3 (Autumn, 1973), p. 461.

4. I am here indebted to the work of C. B. Macpherson. His own important critical essays on Rawls have unfortunately been neglected. C. B. Macpherson, *Democratic Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), Chapter IV, and "Rawls's Models of Man and Society," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences,* Vol. 3, No. 4 (December, 1973). I have in my own "On the Very Possibility of a Classless Society: Macpherson, Rawls and Revisionist Liberalism" (forthcoming) attempted to elucidate and critically assess the force of Macpherson's critique of Rawls. Elizabeth Rapaport, "Classical Liberalism and Rawlsian Revisionism" and Virginia McDonald, "Rawlsian Contractarianism: Liberal Equality or Inequality," both in *New Essays on Contract Theory,* Kai Nielsen and Roger Shiner (eds.), (Guelph, Ontario: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy, 1977) have extended and developed, essentially along Macpherson's lines, a socialist critique of contractarianism.

5. Wesley Cooper has spotted some of the inadequacies in Rawls conception of a perfectly just society. Wesley E. Cooper, "The Perfectly Just Society," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* forthcoming.

6. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 302. That there is, or even can be, such general knowledge of society is challenged by P. H. Nowell-Smith, "A Theory of Justice?", *Philosophy of the Social Sciences,* Vol. 3, No. 4 (December, 1973), and Robert Paul Wolff, *Understanding Rawls* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), Chapter XIII. A powerful theoretical underpinning for the kind of claim made impressionistically by Nowell-Smith and Wolff is brilliantly articulated by Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," *The Review of Metaphysics,* Vol. XXV, No. 1 (September, 1971).

7. Robert Paul Wolff, *op. cit.,* pp. 67–71, Brian Barry, *The Liberal Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 50–51; David Copp, "Justice and the Difference Principle," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy,* Vol. 4, No. 2 (1974); and the essays by R. M. Hare, David Lyons and Benjamin Barber in *Reading Rawls,* Norman Daniels (ed.) (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975).

8. I have, in various ways, argued this against Rawls in several different contexts. Kai Nielsen, "The Choice between Perfectionism and Rawlsian Contractarianism," *Interpretation,* Vol. 6, No. 2 (May, 1977); "On Philosophic Method," *International Philosophical Quarterly,* Vol. XVI, No. 2 (September, 1976); "The Priority of Liberty Examined," *The Indian Political Science Review,* Vol. XI, No. 1 (January, 1977); and "Rawls and Classist Amoralism," *Mind,* Vol. LXXXVI, No. 341 (January, 1977). It has also been argued in various ways by Steven Lukes, "An Archimedean Point," *Observer* (June 4, 1972), and in his "Relativism: Cognitive and Moral," *Aristotelian Society Proceedings, Supplementary Volume,* XLVIII (1974); by Andreas Esheté, "Contractarianism and the Scope of Justice," *Ethics,* Vol. 85, No. 1 (October, 1974); and by William L. McBride, "Social Theory *sub Specie Aeternitatis*," *Yale Law Journal,* Vol. 81 (1972).

9. It is clear enough that Rawls would regard such a society, in conditions of moderate scarcity, as a well-ordered society, if certain conditions are met. Whether he would say it is a perfectly just society is less clear, though there is at least one passage (p. 102) that suggests that. Cooper, *op. cit.,* brings out very well the inadequacy of Rawls' conception of a perfectly just society.

10. Joel Feinberg expresses clearly the standard and, as far as I can see, a perfectly adequate rationale for such a belief as follows: "Let us consider why we all agree . . . in rejecting the view that differences in race, sex, IQ or social 'rank' are

the grounds of just differences in wealth or income. Part of the answer seems obvious. People cannot by their own voluntary choices determine what skin color, sex or IQ they shall have, or which hereditary caste they shall enter. To make such properties the basis of discrimination between individuals in the distribution of social benefits would be to treat people differently in ways that profoundly affect their lives because of differences for which they have no responsibility. Differences in a given respect are relevant for the aims of distributive justice, then, only if they are differences for which their possessors can be held responsible; properties can be the grounds of just discrimination between persons only if those persons had a *fair opportunity* to acquire or avoid them." Joel Feinberg, "Economic Justice," in Karsten J. Struhl and Paula Rothenberg Struhl (eds.), *Ethics in Perspective* (New York: Random House, 1975), p. 421.

11. Brian Barry, *op. cit.*, convincingly argues that there are good empirical reasons to doubt whether the narrowing of such inequalities would in fact have the effect of making the worst-off parties still worse off.

12. Yet it is clear enough that Rawls is not insensitive to these problems. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, pp. 298–301.

13. Rawls makes far too much play with envy here. Besides envy and jealousy, the disadvantaged, as Rawls recognizes himself, could feel "resentment from a sense that they are unfairly treated." *Ibid.*, p. 540.

14. Andreas Esheté, "Contractarianism and the Scope of Justice," *Ethics*, Vol. 85, No. 1 (October, 1974).

15. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p. 205.

16. Norman Daniels, "Equal Liberty and Unequal Worth of Liberty," in Norman Daniels (ed.), *Reading Rawls* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975).

17. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, pp. 73-74, 275-79, and 512.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 98–102, 511–12, 530–41 (most particularly 534, 536, 537 and 539). See also John Rawls, "Distributive Justice" in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.), *Philosophy, Politics and Society*, third series (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1967), pp. 66–70. For a perceptive discussion of this see C. B. Macpherson, *Democratic Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 88–92.

20. C. B. Macpherson, *op. cit.* and Benjamin Barber, *op. cit.*

21. Rolf Dahrendorf, *Essays in the Theory of Society* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 151–78.

22. Benjamin Barber powerfully probes whether they do so hang together. Barber, *op. cit.*

23. This leads us back to the literature cited in footnote 8.

24. Paul Taylor, "Utility and Justice," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (March, 1972) has very forcefully argued, in a manner plainly influenced by Rawls' root conception of justice as fairness, how distinct questions of justice are from those of utility.

25. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, p. 546. Rawls, as some have thought, seems to have confused 'just inequalities' with 'justified inequalities'. It may not be just to sanction such inequalities but it may still be justified on utilitarian grounds. It may be one of those cases, *pace* Rawls, where considerations of utility outweigh considerations of justice and where what we should do, through and through, is not identical with what justice requires. To claim this would require a rather considerable change in Rawls' system, but it would give him a rather more plausible justification for his *difference* principle.

26. I have discussed problems about matching and problems of Rawls' conception of reflective equilibrium in my "On Philosophic Method," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (1976), pp. 358–68.

27. John Rawls, "Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion," *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 64 (1974), p. 142.

28. C. B. Macpherson, "Rawls's Models of Man and Society," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December, 1973), p. 341.

29. The conception I use of statist societies is clarified, applied and defended by

Svetozar Stojanović in his *Between Ideals and Reality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), Chapter III.

30. William L. McBride, "The Concept of Justice in Marx, Engels, and Others," *Ethics,* Vol. 85, No. 3 (April, 1975); Lucien Goldmann, "Is There a Marxist Sociology?", *Radical Philosophy 1* (January, 1972); Derek Allen, "The Utilitarianism of Marx and Engels," *American Philosophical Quarterly,* Vol. 10, No. 3 (January, 1973); George Brenkert, "Marx and Utilitarianism," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy,* Vol. V, No. 3 (November, 1975); Derek Allen, "Reply to Brenkert's 'Marx and Utilitarianism'," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy,* Vol. VI, No. 3 (September, 1976); Robert Tucker, *The Marxian Revolutionary Idea* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), Chapter 3; Allen Wood, "The Marxian Critique of Justice," *Philosophy and Public Affairs,* Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring, 1972); Michael P. Lerner, "Marxism and Ethical Reasoning," *Social Praxis,* Vol. 2 (1974); Kai Nielsen, "Class Conflict, Marxism and the Good-Reasons Approach," *Social Praxis,* Vol. 2 (1974); Derek Allen, "Is Marxism a Philosophy?" and Marlene Gerber Fried, "Marxism and Justice," both in *The Journal of Philosophy,* Vol. LXXI, No. 17 (October 10, 1974); and Nancy Holmstrom, "Exploitation," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy,* Vol. VII, No. 2 (June, 1977).

31. We need in this context to face questions which arise about moral ideology. See here W. L. McBride, "The Concept of Justice in Marx, Engels, and Others," *Ethics,* Vol. 5, No. 3 (April, 1975); Andrew Collier, "Truth and Practice," *Radical Philosophy 5* (Summer, 1973), and "The Production of Moral Ideology," *Radical Philosophy 9* (Winter, 1974); Tony Skillen, "Marxism and Morality," *Radical Philosophy 8* (Summer, 1974); Peter Binns, "Anti-Moralism," *Radical Philosophy 10* (Spring, 1975); and Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, "Moral Relations, Political Economy and Class Struggle," *Radical Philosophy 12* (Winter, 1975).

32. F. Engels, *Anti-Dühring* (New York: International Publishers, 1939), pp. 117–18. For one recent such effort to refute egalitarianism, splendidly made into a straw man, see H. J. McCloskey, "A Right To Equality?", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy,* Vol. VI, No. 4 (December, 1976). Other such efforts include: Robert Nisbet, "The Pursuit of Equality," *Public Interest,* No. 33 (1974); Isaiah Berlin, "Equality," in *The Concept of Equality,* William Blackstone (ed.) (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Burgess Publishing Co., 1969); and Hugo Bedau, "Radical Egalitarianism," in Hugo A. Bedau (ed.), *Justice and Equality* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971).

33. Evan Simpson, *op. cit.,* p. 2.

34. The provisions and ideological transformations of the concept of democracy are interesting to observe in the literature of the Trilateral Commission. See, for example, Samuel Huntington et al. (eds.), *The Governability of Democracies,* and the Trilateral Commission's publication *Trialogue,* particularly the Summer issue 1975, the Winter issue 1975-76 and the Spring issue 1976. Note particularly the writings of Huntington, Crozier, Watanuki, Dahrendorf and Carli. For trenchantly critical remarks about the Trilateral Commission see Noam Chomsky, "Trilateral's RX for Crisis: governability yes, democracy no," *Seven Days* (February 14, 1977), pp. 10–11.

35. Esheté's comments on work are particularly important here. See Andreas Esheté, *op. cit.,* pp. 41–44.

36. These conclusions are drawn about the attainment and sustaining of genuine moral relations in *class-divided societies.* See the references to Lerner and Nielsen in footnote 30 and to Collier, Skillen and Binns in footnote 31. The steadfast and probing recognition of this is captured in the deepest way in the work of Bertolt Brecht.

37. A rejection of a) the possibility of attaining such eternal principles and b) an argument that they are unnecessary for attaining a basis for rational social critique is made by William L. McBride, "Social Theory *sub Specie Aeternitatis,*" *Yale Law Journal,* Vol. 31 (1972); Andreas Esheté, *op. cit.;* and Boris Frankel, "Review Symposium of *Anarchy, State and Utopia,*" *Theory and Society,* Vol. 3 (1976), pp. 443–50.

38. See Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme.* For a perceptive discussion of issues arising from this and of Marx's slogan "From each according to his ability and to each according to his need," see Edward and Onora Nell, "On Justice Under Socialism," in Karsten J. Struhl and Paula Rothenberg Struhl (eds.), *Ethics in Perspective* (New York: Random House, 1976).

39. I turn to this task, among other things, in my "The Indivisibility of Liberty and Equality," forthcoming.

40. Martin J. Sklar, *op. cit.*, pp. 96 and 103. The arguments in the above paragraph, as well as Sklar's essay, should make it evident why my two principles require socialism. We cannot have industrial democracy of the type characterized or classlessness with any kind of capitalist organization of society. There simply will not be democracy in the workplace under capitalism. People will have to sell their labour and they will be controlled by others in their work.

41. My articles cited in footnote 8 were, in part, directed to establishing this point.

42. Ronald Dworkin, *op. cit.*, p. 532.

43. My "Scepticism and Human Rights," *The Monist*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (October, 1968) was meant to go some of the way toward establishing this. For two more general arguments which provide a theoretical underpinning for such type arguments, see my "Why There Is a Problem about Ethics: Reflections on the Is and the Ought," *Danish Yearbook of Philosophy* (1978) and "Principles of Rationality," *Philosophical Papers*, Vol. III, No. 2 (October, 1974).

44. In this last section I have peculated from, and turned to my own purposes, points often made in different contexts and for different purposes by Martin J. Sklar, *op. cit.;* Andreas Esheté, *op. cit.;* William L. McBride, *op. cit.;* Henry Shue, "Liberty and Self Respect," *Ethics*, Vol. 85 (April, 1975); Lawrence Crocker, "Equality, Solidarity and Rawls' Maximin," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Spring, 1977); and Derek L. Phillips, "The Equality Debate: What Does Justice Require?", *Theory and Society*, Vol. 4 (1977), pp. 247–72.