

KAI NIELSEN

ON MARX NOT BEING AN EGALITARIAN

I

There has in the Anglo-American philosophical world in recent years been a flood of articles and several books, roughly in the analytical mode, explicating, interpreting, and not infrequently defending Marx and some forms of Marxism. This analytical Marxism, as I shall call it, has had powerful, and indeed importantly differing, statements in the work of G. A. Cohen, Robert Paul Wolff, Jon Elster, Allen Wood and Richard Miller.¹ I want to fasten here on some facets of the work of Allen Wood and Richard Miller which, if these facets are in the main correct, will make us think about both morality and moral philosophy in radically new ways.² Perceptively, they see Marx, while remaining of the party of humanity, as driven by that very humanitarianism to an attempt to not only subvert moralism but also to subvert morality itself and its, for we moderns, characteristically egalitarian commitments. They view Marx, and Engels as well, as critics of morality who reject egalitarianism (and appeals to equality generally), moralism and, going deeper than that, the very moral point of view itself. They argue this thesis in a nuanced way with subtlety and philosophical sophistication and with a thorough familiarity with the work of Marx and Engels.

All that notwithstanding, I shall argue that they are mistaken. Marx and Engels were indeed critics of morality, anti-moralists and suspicious (to my mind rightly) of moral philosophy, but they did not seek to subvert morality; they did not reject morality; and they did not reject the moral point of view or even reject equality. (They could, of course, have done this last thing without doing any of these other things.) It is neither the case (or so I shall argue), on the one hand, that Marx and Engels did these things nor, on the other, that those who take Marx seriously should do those things or indeed that anyone should.³ I shall in so arguing take the viewpoint that Marx and Engels do not reject an egalitarian morality. Indeed, I shall make by contrast the rather more

traditional claim that Marx and Engels, as heirs to the Enlightenment, were committed to a belief in equality. That is to say, they, I shall argue against Miller and Wood, have egalitarian commitments. I shall begin with a discussion of Miller's views and then turn to a somewhat briefer discussion of Wood's views, where they do not overlap with Miller's.

Richard Miller in his *Analyzing Marx* concludes that Marx holds that "morality is not an appropriate basis for political action and social choice" (M 96). Marx realizes that the motivations that lead people to be socialists in the first place and the motivations that sustain them in their socialism are not infrequently moral. Indeed many people "support workers' struggles and socialist goals . . . on the grounds that capitalism is unjust". Yet it is also the case that, at least on Miller's reading of Marx, Marx rejects "justice and allied standards as an irrational basis for socialism . . ." (94). What we need instead is an understanding of how the capitalist system works, an understanding of alternatives, an astute understanding of politics and shrewd and determined political action. But — and this is paradoxical given the above claim — in that very political struggle Miller sees Marx as believing that if "socialism is to be created, people must be led to take on burdens out of a concern for others" (M 94). Moreover, "these others may not be confined to the circle of family and intimate friends" (M94). Speaking of the Paris Commune, it is patently evident that the Communards who risked their necks had no good reason to believe that their families and close friends would profit by their actions. Their actions were not at all analogous to trying to figure out some clever way of having an automobile crash so that your death will look accidental and your family can collect a bundle. Marx urges that in the class struggles to bring on social change people do in fact come to have "a concern for others that motivates the taking up of burdens" (94). Similar motivations must obtain during the process of the consolidation of socialism. Even when we get to Communism where the rule "From each according to ability, to each according to needs" is in order, that very rule presupposes not only circumstances of full abundance but certain human motivations. It assumes that people will care about each other and that Communists, for the most part, will not be free riders. If that does not obtain, the rule cannot work. Human nature is not infinitely malleable, but it is malleable, and, as the springs of social wealth flow

ever more freely with the development of the forces of production and the consolidation of socialism and the slow emergence of Communism, the level of mutual concern will rise and people will increasingly find their self-respect not merely in individual activities but also in various forms of striving for a common good.

This, at least on the surface, looks like Marx claiming a moral base for Communism. But that is not the message Miller wishes to convey. Marx, Miller claims, in spite of the above, rejected taking the moral point of view. Still, he was not skeptical about being able under optimal circumstances to identify a common good. We are not, under all circumstances, Hobbesians who seek to maximize self-interest and to be free riders wherever we prudently can (M95). Here we do have a sharp conflict with contemporary conservative thinkers such as David Gauthier, Milton Friedman and Robert Nozick. These conservatives do think we have, at least if we are rational, roughly Hobbesian motivations. And indeed in our society, particularly among a lot of those who think they are being tough-minded, the belief about that is that this is just the way people are wired.

Marx, by contrast, thinks that this is more ideological than tough-minded and says more about human nature in certain circumstances than about human nature *sans phrase*. One of the things to ask, of course, is whether this is too rosy a picture of human nature. That is surely a possibility, but it is also not inconceivable that the other view is too jaded a view of human nature and is in reality pseudo-realistic rather than realistic.

The above still does not help us to see how Marx is to be taken as rejecting the moral point of view. Indeed, I should think, the above would lead us to conclude (*pace* Miller) that he was affirming it. Be that as it may, assuming for the moment such a rejection, the above remarks about concern for one another and the importance of having non-egoistic motivations, reduces the paradox of speaking, as Miller does, of Marx abandoning morality. It also explains Miller's closing sentences of his section on morality in *Analyzing Marx* where he remarks "decent people do not abandon morality if they believe that the alternative is narrow self-interest, caprice or bloodthirsty *Realpolitik*". (96) Miller argues that here Marx makes a special philosophical contribution. Distinctively, he describes "an outlook for politics that is decent without

being moral". (96—7) Without the above explanations about motivations in political struggle, it sounds self-contradictory to speak of decent people abandoning morality or, to speak, as Miller does 'of an outlook for politics that is decent without being moral' or of a 'humane rejection of morality'. It may still sound paradoxical, as it certainly does to me, but it is not as paradoxical as it would otherwise be.

We should also remember in this connection that Miller speaks of Marx mounting an "attack on the moral point of view as the basis for *social choice*" (M52, emphasis mine). He does not say that Marx is launching an attack on the appropriateness of moral relations in the face-to-face relations between many individuals, e.g. about how I should relate to my students in giving them grades or relate to them in class and the like. Rather the question of abandoning morality comes up in a political context where we are considering how institutions are to be judged. He is talking about a "replacement for the moral point of view in politics". The claim is that reflective and humane people who have a Marxist outlook on how social structures function will come, or at least, if they are clear-headed, should come, to appreciate that the moral point of view is inappropriate in those domains (M7 See also 10). Marx provides us instead with a reasoned critique of morality. He provides us, that is, with arguments designed to show that appealing to morality in political contexts tends to impede working class emancipation which in turn is the basis for human emancipation.

II

We have started at the end of Miller's analysis of Marx on morality. Now that we see where he wants to go and have, at least partially, obviated the paradox and what may even to be the offense of this anti-morality stance, let us now return to the beginning and see how Miller builds up his case.

In *Analyzing Marx* Miller's first page of his first chapter on morality, entitled 'Against Morality', contains his version of the perplexity that almost everyone feels when they start thinking about Marx and morality:

In a very broad sense, Marx is a moralist, and sometimes a stern one: he offers a rationale for conduct that sometimes requires self-sacrifice in the interests of others. That the conduct he calls for will sometimes involve "self-sacrificing heroism" is

epitomized in his praise of the “heaven storming” men and women who defended the Paris Commune. His concern that conduct be reasonable and well-informed is clear when he distinguishes the scientific basis for present-day workers’ struggles from the “fantastic,” even “reactionary” misconceptions supporting workers’ struggles in the past.

At the same time, Marx often explicitly attacks morality and fundamental moral notions. He accepts the charge that “Communism . . . abolishes . . . all morality, instead of constituting [it] on a new basis.” The materialist theory of ideology is supposed to have “shattered the basis of all morality, whether the morality of asceticism or of enjoyment.” Talk of “equal right” and “fair distribution” is, he says, “a crime,” forcing “on our Party . . . obsolete verbal rubbish . . . ideological nonsense about right and other trash so common among the democrats and French Socialists” (M15).

Marx, or at least Miller’s Marx, as we have seen, abandons morality, rejects morality. Yet, as we have already seen, and as Miller remarks initially, it “is not clear in just what ways Marx’s outlook differs from morality” (M 16). Miller, however, thinks that in complete faithfulness to Marx’s texts we can all the same extract from Marx “plausible arguments for a radical departure from the moral point of view, at least as philosophers have conceived it . . .” (M16). It is this claim that I am going to challenge.

In characterizing the moral point of view, which he takes Marx to be rejecting, he is speaking of what he calls “morality, in the narrower sense” in which it is “distinct from self-interest, class interest, national interest or purely aesthetic concerns”. Here he conceives of morality in a sense similar to how morality is construed by Kant, Mill and Sidgwick or by contemporary philosophers such as Baier, Rawls, or Warnock and not in the extremely broad senses advocated by R. M. Hare or H. D. Monro or J. L. Mackie.⁴

Morality, as Miller characterizes it — and this characterization seems to me distinctively modern — has three basic characteristics: *equality*, *general norms* and *universality*. This, of course, needs explanation. In speaking of *equality* Miller has in mind a conception where “to be shown equal concern or respect or afforded equal status is to come under the net of equality” (M 17). A necessary condition for taking the moral point of view is to reason in accordance with that conception of equality. (Note that this makes an aristocratic morality or a Nietzschean elitist morality self-contradictory. That is, to put it minimally, very strange. Consistently Miller refers to Nietzsche as an amoralist. I think Miller should have instead talked of a distinctively modernist concep-

tion of morality. Still, I also think nothing of any considerable substance turns on this.) What exactly, or even inexactly, that standard is is a matter of controversy. Still, Miller would have it, morality requires “some standard of equality . . . to be the ultimate basis for resolving conflicts among different people’s interests” (M 17). The standard may be the minimal one that is not infrequently called ‘moral equality’, a standard at least nominally accepted by radical egalitarians such as Norman and Nielsen, liberal egalitarians such as Rawls and Dworkin and conservatives such as Nozick and Hayek, namely that the life of everyone matters and matters equally.⁵ The radical egalitarians and the liberal egalitarians would then go on to argue for more determinate conceptions of equality, conceptions which the conservatives would reject, but all modernist moralists, radicals, liberals and conservatives alike, would at least nominally accept this minimal conception of moral equality.⁶ It is, as I have already remarked, the belief that the life of everyone matters and matters equally.

Miller then goes on to speak of what he takes to be the second necessary condition for taking the moral point of view, namely the having of general norms. To believe in general norms or that there are general norms is to believe that there are rules of conduct, to be applied “to the specific facts of the case at hand” which “are valid in all societies in which there is a point to resolving political disputes by moral appeal . . .” (M 17). Such norms have a point and are justified, Miller maintains, in those “societies in which co-operation benefits almost everyone” but where it is still also the case, that “scarcity is liable to give rise to conflicts” (M 17). Someone, taking the moral point of view, believes that the “right resolution of any major political issue would result from applying such valid general norms to the specific facts of the case at hand” (M 17). But this rests very heavily on the very questionable assumption that co-operation, even in class societies, benefits everyone.

The third feature is *universality* which Miller characterizes as the claim that “anyone who rationally reflects on relevant facts and arguments will accept these rules”, i.e., the general norms and the very general standard of equality, “if he or she has the normal range of emotions” (M 17).

In saying Marx is anti-moral, that Marx advances a non-morality, is a

critic of morality, abandons morality, rejects morality and the like, Miller means that Marx “argues against all three principles as inappropriate to choosing what basic institutions to pursue” (M 17). Miller is, however, willing to admit that “there is still a broad sense in which Marx does describe a moral point of view” (M 17). In explaining the above, he stresses the importance that Marx attributed to concern for each other, to class solidarity across national boundaries, to revolutionary self-sacrifice, to distinctions between decency and indecency and to “what ought to be done and what ought not to have a role in a Marxist outlook” (M 17). Marx’s arguments, primarily directed at choices among political and economic systems, “may leave standing most ordinary morality concerning actions toward individuals” (M 17). But, particularly when we think of morality in a social and political context, we think of it as a point of view which impartially adjudicates the interests of everyone alike in the manner Miller describes where there is a commitment to equality as we have characterized it, to general norms and to universalization. Particularly when someone rejects all three of these conditions, he is, Miller argues, clearly rejecting the moral point of view. Moreover, even if morality is taken to be something much more concrete and is not taken as necessarily attaching itself to at least some of these features, Marx still should be seen as attacking very deep-seated and pervasive modernist philosophical assumptions about what morality is (M 18). However, once it is put that way the claim is not nearly so radical or so iconoclastic.

Where we reflectively adopt, as most of us do, morality so conceived with those three essential features, we do so for decent and humane reasons. Marx would persuade us, argues Miller, that if we get clear about what our social world is like, the very motivations that attract us to morality so impersonally and impartially conceived, will lead us to reject morality when we are reasonably clear about the consequences for political decisions of sticking with the moral point of view (M 18).

III

Let us try to get a purchase on this striking claim of Miller. Very often Marx is thought of as an egalitarian as is Engels as well. Miller, like Allen Wood, views both Marx and Engels, as we have seen, as critics of

morality, rejecting egalitarianism and a commitment to equality. To quell the paradox of this, Miller first displays what he calls the “grains of truth that Marx discerns in the demand for equality” (M 19). Without this, as he realizes, his interpretation “will seem perverse” (M 19).

What, Miller argues, superficially looks like egalitarianism is Marx’s advocacy of “social arrangements that would . . . make people much more equal in power and enjoyment than they are at present”⁷ (M 19). During an early transition period to socialism, a standard for an equal right for each to receive according to his or her labor would be the key norm of such social arrangements. But the value of such a standard is that it would “enhance people’s lives, not that it would conform to some ultimate standard of equality” (M 14).

Right here at the beginning, I have to demur, for, though it is indeed true that such a standard of equal right is appealed to to enhance people’s lives, there is also in that very standard an appeal to *fairness*. By this I mean that there is a demand that, as far as possible, social structures be put in place designed to enhance the lives of *everyone*, where it is taken as a fundamental guiding principle that the life of each person counts and counts equally. Marx would no doubt say, in ways I take to be compatible with the above, that proletarians come first, but he also thought that it was proletarian emancipation that would make a general emancipation possible. There could be no truly human society for human beings without proletarian emancipation. Because proletarian emancipation provides the causal mechanisms for a more general liberation and because proletarians are exploited and oppressed, particular attention should be directed to them. But this would be true for *anyone* who is or becomes a proletarian (something that would take a determinate description). For, by universalizability, anyone properly so described must be so treated. This emancipation of the oppressed is, Marx and Marxists believe, the vehicle for the eventual enhancement of the lives of everyone. Proletarians are not simply being picked out as proletarians. They are picked out and given special attention in virtue of what the proletarian class is, what their condition is and what their potential is. Because of this underlying concern with the lives of everyone it seems to me (*pace* Miller and Wood as well) that there is an acceptance by Marx of equality. That is a condition of life that is a

fundamental *desideratum*. Marx was, of course, aware of the ideological uses of talk of equality and sought to counter them. But that does not mean that he did not make the deep underlying assumption (with its attached commitments) to which I have just referred. If what I have said is on the mark then I have undermined the claim that Marx was making anti-moral arguments against equality.

One can argue that way against Miller, and still agree with Miller's important point that

Under socialism and communism, most people are less dominated, more in possession of their lives, since they are better able to develop their capacities in light of their own assessments of their needs. Moreover, people's interactions will be governed to a greater extent than now by mutual well-wishing and concern. In Marx's view, these goods of freedom and reciprocity are what most people have really desired, when they have made "equality" their battle cry (M 19).

I would only demur at saying that that is what they really desired and not equality as well and this for the fairness considerations stated just before that citation. What they want is a *Gestalt* of freedom, equality and reciprocity. They not only want freedom, they want equal freedom for everyone. (What I would call a central element of fairness.) They not only want reciprocity but they want it extended to everyone without anyone stinting or being stinted here. Here egalitarian justice (equality) rides with reciprocity as well as freedom. These are ultimate *desiderata* to be attained by human beings and under normal circumstances they come as a package.

It is only if equality is not taken as being in a *Gestalt* with these things that equality can rightly be taken to be a one-sided ideal. But egalitarians have never, as Miller implicitly recognizes, taken equality to be the *sole* ultimate value.⁸ However, if equality is left out in the articulation of ultimate ethical ideals (if it is not part of the firmament of ultimate values) and if that in turn is translated into social policy, there very well could be a pervasive unfairness in society that will come to there being an extensive freedom for some privileged elite and oppression in various degrees of severity for the many or lack of liberty for a despised minority while there is considerable liberty for the vast majority. If the former situation is thought to be hyperbolic for people in advanced industrial societies with bourgeois democratic traditions, consider first what the lives of the vast majority of people are and what

they could be and how little control they actually have over their lives. However, if we only stress freedom and well-being and do not stress as well that it is vital to consider the distribution of these things then it might well be thought that there is nothing very wrong with such a society. To bring out in a perspicuous way how all is not well in such a society, it is essential to point out how equality is an essential element in the firmament of values.

IV

I have challenged Miller right at the start of his making a case for Marx's rejecting the norm of equality. If I am right, he cannot get his arguments off the ground for he misses a sense of egalitarian justice, a sense of fairness, that is in the thought of Marx and Engels as well as in some liberal thought. (It is in J. S. Mill and John Rawls.⁹) Miller, in effect, fails to recognize that freedom, reciprocity and equality can all be both intrinsic goods and instrumental goods. It is not that equality is of instrumental value *only* to freedom and reciprocity which are in turn only intrinsically valuable. All three of these fundamental values are intrinsically valuable but they are not infrequently instrumentally valuable as well.

However, let us now set those arguments aside, fundamental as I think they are, and examine in some detail Miller's arguments against the various forms of equality he discusses where they are taken, as he puts it, "as ultimate bases for decision in the face of inescapable conflicts in class-divided societies" (20). (This, as my above arguments should have made clear, is not how I think equality or a commitment to egalitarianism should be construed. But I am letting that go for the sake of continuing the argument.)

He first considers, as an "ultimate demand for equality," *equal distribution*, namely a standard that would require "that all possess an equal bundle of goods, resources or opportunities . . ." (M 19). Miller believes that Marx and Engels rightly believe that such a "general demand for equal goods and powers" is a mistaken conception, inappropriate "as the main standard for judging social arrangements . . ." (M 20). Our main concern is, or at least should be, Miller maintains, with well-being and humane social relations, "not with equal distribution

as such” (M 20). Such a demand for equality could, in theory at least, lead to a crude, ‘barracks Communism’ — a Spartan communism, where equality is achieved “by dragging everyone down to a common, low level” (M 20). What we want, or at least should want, instead, Miller claims, is for the springs of social wealth to flow freely. We want, if we would reflect carefully morally, human flourishing and human well-being and not a society where people envy one person having a little more than another. We want a society of mutual concern and respect and we want an end to exploitation; we do not need a society, Miller maintains, where the goodies of the world are equally distributed. We should not want a world where there is a pervasive concern about whether one person has a little more than another. That is, in effect, to place a premium on envy.

I think what is left out here is very like what I have just criticized. When we think about what Marx called a truly human society we realize that it cannot be such without it also being a just society. In such a society we are concerned not only with mutual concern and respect and human flourishing but — and here is where justice comes in — we are concerned, as well, with that holding for everyone and, where possible, equally. We do not want it, as it is in South Africa, at most for whites only or, as it is in more modernizing capitalist countries, predominantly for the capitalist class and its allies. (This includes most intelligentsia.) Marx and Engels wanted classlessness and that entails wanting such conditions of well-being, mutual concern and respect and non-exploitation to obtain for everyone as far as that is possible. Such a sentiment is not, or at least need not be, rooted in envy, in the worry that someone may have a little more than you do. It is rather rooted in a sense of fairness and a concern for humankind. What we see is a *Gestalt* or a bevy of fundamental values all mutually interdependent. But if equality is not a part of that *Gestalt* as an ultimate value we have an incomplete moral scheme and we could not have a fully classless society where, in the firmament of values, there was not, societally speaking, for *everyone*, relations of mutual concern and respect and a concern for their equal well-being as far as this is achievable.

Miller also attacks in the name of Marx the egalitarian conceptions of the classical anarchists (Proudhon and Bakunin) as utopian where ‘being utopian’ is taken as something to be criticized. They aimed to

attain in the world a “sufficient equality of resources and opportunities to guarantee full and equal independence for all” (M 21). What must be obtained, as Miller reads the anarchists, is a society of independent producers none of whom is in a condition of economic subordination such that they must work for others to live. They must not be in that condition and they must not be in a condition of political subordination. But this anarchist conception is an atavistic conception, only possible in a society of independent commodity producers. But such a society, if indeed it ever did or ever could exist, would lose, among other things, all the productive capacity of co-operative social labor. Moreover, such a society is so unstable that it could not sustain itself as “a politically decentralized society of independent producers, sufficiently equal in resources that no one economically dominates others” (M 21). Miller puts Marx’s critique here powerfully and shows clearly, I believe, how commitments to equal distribution cannot, if they are to be construed reasonably, be construed in this anarchist way and, in effect, if they are to be maintained they must be qualified in the light of the remarks of Miller’s I am just about to quote:

In Marx’s view, this ideal is utopian. Sufficient equality of productive resources is ephemeral, at best, in a modern setting of physically interdependent production. The network of production, if carried out by independent units, must be regulated by market mechanisms. Even if the distribution of productive resources is initially equal, luck, if nothing else, will soon create some inequalities. Market mechanisms will magnify the first inequalities, as the rich get richer through economies of scale, thicker cushions against calamity, greater access to credit, and greater capacity to innovate. The eventual result is financial ruin and dispossession of the many and their subordination to the few who come to control the means of production (M 21).

I think this would shipwreck some of Ronald Dworkin’s conceptions of equality as extensively as Bakunin’s. Be this as it may, Miller’s above argument surely shows the folly of any attempt at an equal distribution of productive forces. Indeed it is a crazy kind of individualism, as incompatible with capitalism as it is with the socialist conceptions held in common by Marx and Bakunin. If we want the social conditions essential in modern conditions for the human flourishing of all, productive property, or at least the crucial bits of productive property, must be socially owned in a society of co-operative producers. It cannot be divided up to be individually owned like a cake might be divided up or indeed like many consumer durables can be divided. Equality in the

holding of productive property cannot come in this way if we want to be even remotely reasonable. Where it does come in is over the ultimate control of this productive property, property which under socialism is socially owned. Marx's conceptions are unequivocally democratic here. Control of productive property should be firmly in the worker's hands with, through democratic mechanisms, each worker having, in any final disposition, an equal say in what is to be done. But that is very different from equally distributing productive property. It is rather that, in some indirect and practically feasible way, equally distributing *control* of productive property is the *desideratum*. (Here effective democratic mechanisms are essential.) But this clearly requires a restriction on equal distribution of resources. What we have instead, on the part of an egalitarian, is a claim for the rightness, under conditions of abundance, of an equal distribution of those benefits and burdens that coherently and rationally and indeed rightly can be individually distributed.

What this would come to would, of course, have to take a careful reading, a reading that I shall not try to give here, though it seems to me both that one needs to be given and that there are no insuperable difficulties in doing so. (This, of course, is a promissory note.) There should, of course, be no evading of the fact that we must give such an egalitarian claim a convincing and perspicuous reading to coherently, rationally and rightly make such a claim. It must be a reading, if egalitarianism is to be maintained, that, on the one hand, does not so limit the domain of equal distribution that it becomes trivial and, on the other hand, keeps some determinate content in such appeals. We want, if we are egalitarians and sane, neither equal distribution of productive property nor (*pace* Nozick) an equal distribution of husbands and wives.¹⁰

V

Sometimes egalitarianism and a commitment to equality are cashed in in terms of equal rights. Miller criticizes that account as well, thinking he has justifiably set distributive equality aside. He thinks that "rights-based equality encounters its own distinctive problems" and that Marx rejects it and indeed rightly does so¹¹ (M 22). He thinks this should be

particularly evident in class divided societies such as our own. In such a world there are conflicting interests of different groups. In such a situation there are too many rights. Equally basic rights come into conflict producing disagreements which are irresolvable on a rights-based account, there being no super-right to be appealed to to resolve such conflicts.

We could, of course, resolve such conflicts by “treating rights as means for enhancing people’s lives not as ultimate standards” (M 22). But then we would have departed from a rights-based theory and we would no longer be taking an appeal to equal rights as *the* or even an ultimate standard. To illustrate: the “equal right of all to be left alone by government and the equal right of all to effective participation in government are independent and important aspects of rights-based political equality” (M 23). In our class divided societies they inevitably come into conflict (M 23). As Miller puts it: “Without collective ownership dominated by a worker’s state (with the interference that entails), economic power becomes concentrated in the hands of a few, who dominate effective participation in government as a result. Yet the demand for non-interference is not in general misguided or purely ideological. Individuality and independence are real needs” (M 23). If we stay within a rights-based context with an appeal to the equal rights of people we have no way of resolving such conflicts. We feel attracted to both non-subordination and non-interference. What we should do, Miller argues, is treat both rights as devices for attaining and securing human well-being and see which stress in particular situations would best protect that. But this plainly is not to treat an appeal to rights as ultimate.

The thing, of course, that a rights-based theorist would try by way of response would be to claim that there is a right or a non-conflicting set of rights that is sufficiently pre-eminent “to resolve conflicts without encountering a contrary equally basic right” (M 23). Marx in turn responded that no satisfactory candidate has been brought forth.

Miller, agreeing here with Marx, tries an update on this. He seems to show that contemporary rights-based accounts such as Rawls’s or Nozick’s have not solved Marx’s problem (M 24–6). Rawls’s account in Miller’s judgment is the really serious contender for such a super-right. “In Rawls’s view, we have an ultimate, equal right to be governed by

principles that we would choose in fair deliberations over rules for assessing basic institutions”¹² (M 24). Miller argues that Rawls’s account is too skewed “toward one dimension of rights” to resolve such conflicts of rights in a non-question begging way (M 24).” There are “honest, non-violent people with capitalist inclinations”, potential Horatio Alger types. Under the alleged Rawlsian super-right such Horatio Alger types “will be denied the opportunity to use all the fruits of their self-sacrifice to set up and develop factories and farms” (M 25). The right to non-interference is overridden; the Rawlsian is not operating under the principle ‘To each the results of his or her honest toil and exchanges’ (M 25). It is no answer to them, Miller says, for the Rawlsian to remark “that they would have accepted the relevant restrictions in fair deliberations” (M 25). After all, the Horatio Alger type did not actually consent to the Rawlsian restrictions. The Rawlsian contract is purely hypothetical. Moreover, as Miller puts it, it is not the case “that the honest toil principle derives whatever moral force it has from the hypothetical fair deliberations”¹³ (M 13).

Miller faces an objection that comes trippingly on the tongue. Surely, it will be objected, “the right to be governed by rules that would emerge from fair deliberations has more moral weight than the right to the results of honest toil, at least as those principles affect people’s lives in the real world” (M 25).

Miller responds to this in a way that seems telling but by no means devastating. He argues that we have no rights-based Archimedean point here. We have no scale to weigh those conflicting rights and come out with that conclusion or any conclusion. “No further standard of equal right seems fit to serve as the balance” (M 26). Some people’s reflective preferences, their considered convictions, their firm pro-attitudes, will favor “the results of fair deliberation” as being more in “accord with the judgment that people have a right to co-operate on fair terms when co-operation is inevitable and the stakes are high” (M 26). But there are others who will have equally firm reflective preferences, considered convictions, pro-attitudes, toward it being the case that “people have a right to be left alone in their initiatives if they do not interfere with others” (M 26). People disagree here — have different very basic considered convictions — and there is, Miller argues, no general rights claim, not equally a source of disagreement, that could be appealed to

concerning which there is a rational consensus or any other kind of consensus. This means that we cannot plausibly use a standard of equal rights as an ultimate moral standard in the way some egalitarians would wish.

Perhaps this is right. I share Miller's skepticism about the adequacy of rights-based theories but I think that he moves too quickly. Suppose we argue, as some libertarian rights-based theorists have, "that there is really only one natural right, namely the equal right of all persons to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for other persons, and that all other natural rights are species or instances of the right to liberty."¹⁴ Here 'liberty' is probably being construed in the 'negative liberty' sense but the view *may* be strengthened where 'liberty' is construed in the 'positive liberty' sense as autonomy. But, whichever reading we give it, why cannot such a very general right be appealed to here as a rights-based standard to be utilized in determining, in connection with our appraisal of the facts in the case, the relative stringency of rights to co-operation and rights to non-interference as well as other possible conflicting rights claims? Why can it not be taken to be, if you will, our super-right: the sole natural right, the right we appeal to in assessing the relative stringency of both other rights-claims and other moral or evaluative non-rights-claims?

If the Marxist *factual* picture of the world is even near to the mark it will generally *not* be the case that where we are honoring such a rights-claim (such a super-right) that a more extensive liberty will obtain for everyone, or at least for more people than otherwise, if the right to non-interference is given pride of place over the right to fair co-operation. If we are in conditions of reasonable abundance, where the productive forces have been developed to the degree they have been developed in late capitalism and we start with the super-right, the, on that theory, sole natural right, namely the equal right of all persons to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for other persons, then, giving pride of place to rights of fair co-operation over the right to non-interference when they conflict is more in accord with that single natural right than the non-interference alternative. Where the right to fair co-operation has such pride of place there will in such a world be more liberty around. Where that right trumps the right to non-interference, there will, as a matter of fact, be more liberty

for more persons. In any social arrangement where there is an appeal to rights, somebody's liberty will be restricted but there will be less restriction of liberty where fair co-operation so trumps than with the alternative arrangement. And this will obtain in a world in which the interests of each is given equal initial consideration.

Presumably Miller would reply that an appeal to such a natural right is arbitrary. It just overrides what is very important to us, namely "to pursue whatever desires one has without interference" (M 26). That conviction is indeed a very strong one, particularly in North America, and it is in part captured in the articulation of this sole libertarian natural right: this putative super-right. But something else is added as well, in appealing to this super-right, namely that our own right to extensive liberty must be compatible with a like liberty for *everyone*. This in addition catches a very fundamental, if you will, brute or rudimentary, sense of fairness. To not so reason and act is not to be fair and to flaunt requirements of fairness is just to reject reasoning in accordance with the moral point of view. There is, that is, no moral alternative to so reasoning. You can no more ask, *within morality*, 'Why be fair when it is not in your individual interests to do so?' than you can ask 'Why be moral?'. There are no *moral* alternatives here.¹⁵

Well then, someone might say, there are non-moral alternatives. An individual or even a determinate group does not have to take the moral point of view. To say that they do is to beg the question. But surely a rights-based theory, or indeed any moral theory, does not have to show how it can defeat the amoralist or immoralist — the person indifferent to morality — in order to defend a rights-based theory. Miller's argument, after all, was that rights-based theories rest on a mistake for there are conflicts of rights that cannot, without a tendentious begging of the question, be resolved within their theories by appealing to some pecking order of rights.

Perhaps that is so, but it is also the case that we have been given some reasons for believing that after all there might be such a super-right capable of such social adjudication. At least we need some further argument from Miller to show that this is not so. We need, that is, a stronger argument than anything that Miller has given us for concluding that all appeals to rights must be an ideological shuffle. That many are does not prove that all must be.

We must recall that Miller takes it to be the case that it is definitive of the moral point of view that we have some kind of commitment to morality and that he takes it that Marx is rejecting morality, as a standard for political and social assessment, and that in doing so Marx is doing it on rational and humane grounds. One of his grounds, as Miller reads him, is to reject an appeal to equality. I have argued that *if* Miller's rational reconstruction of Marx is correct then Marx was not justified in rejecting all forms of distributional equality and that his case is not even conclusive against equal rights.

I turn now to a third type of equality which Miller thinks Marx also rejects, namely what Miller calls an attitudinal equality "requiring that equal concern or respect be shown to all" and a related equality, linked to *impartiality*, "requiring that the general welfare be promoted, without bias toward the good of some" (M 20). In effect, some of my previous remarks have touched on the topic of impartiality. But I wish now to explicate and then face head-on Miller's critique of impartiality.

Suppose we argue for a characteristic utilitarian equality. What is vital in morality, if we take such a perspective, is that we assess things according to their contribution to the general welfare. Our ultimate standard is the general welfare and the general welfare is to be determined without bias toward some people's well-being. But ought implies can and, Miller argues, Marx maintains that such an "unbiased determination of the general welfare is impossible" (M 31). There are in our societies deep and irresolvable conflicting class interests that just in one way or another must be fought out. There is no impartial perspective from which we can adjudicate them. Militant strikes that can improve the condition of the working class may very well "harm the vital interests of factory owners and may drive some into bankruptcy" (M 30). If the aim, as it is for Marx, is the self-emancipation of the working class, there can be no equal concern here and there can be no impartial concern for the interests of everyone alike. Such a concern with impartiality in effect plays into the hands of the *status quo*.

It is at this point that Miller makes a set of remarks which seem to me in the way they add up not to be beyond question. He first, in an innocuous enough way, remarks, as a defender of utilitarian equality could, as well, that making a ranking "for the distinctive institutions of socialism and communism or arguing that they are superior to capitalist

institutions is an activity that humanitarian emotions would sustain” (M 30–1). But we must also have means, Miller continues, which are appropriate to our ends. However, equality, because of the depth of class conflict, will, if adhered to, stand in the way of humanitarian egalitarian ends (M 96). We have something here similar to the paradox of hedonism, namely that to have a good chance at being happy one should not concentrate on making oneself happy. Analogously, to achieve humanitarian equality in a classless society (the only place where we can attain such equality) we must first struggle to achieve classlessness and to do that we must *not*, in sharply class divided societies, show an equal concern for all, but we must seek to further proletarian interests where they clash with capitalist interests or indeed with the interest of any other class. Only by doing that can we attain a more general emancipation. Still, *pace* Miller, I do not see how this is a rejection of utilitarian equality for, as far as anything he has shown is concerned, that remains one of the fundamental ends to be attained. There is only, on Miller’s account, the recognition that because of the class nature of our social world such equality is not to be aimed at *directly*.

Such an attention to modalities no more shows that it is an inappropriate end than hedonism is shown to be an inappropriate end by showing that we are not going to succeed in being happy by concentrating on being happy. The underlying aim, for such an egalitarian, is not just that the general welfare is to be determined without bias toward some people’s well-being, but he wants, as well, to see attained a state of affairs, where, as far as possible, each person’s well-being counts and counts equally in the design of society. We cannot, if there is anything at all to Marx’s sociology, have this without classlessness, but if, say because of residual sexism, classlessness will not give us that, we should, egalitarians argue, push, *pace* Engels, beyond classlessness. Classlessness then, would be a necessary but not a sufficient condition, for human emancipation. What I do not see is how Miller has shown that such a utilitarian equality is either in conflict with Marx’s perspective or an inappropriate moral ideal that humane and knowledgeable people in class societies should reject.

In defense of his denial that such impartial and egalitarian assessments of welfare are possible in class societies, Miller argues that in

class societies such as our own conceptions of the good as well as actual judgments as to what is good are various and conflicting. We do not in societies such as our own rank our preferences in one way; what makes one set of persons happy will not make another set of persons happy. Even if the majority, where they had good access to information, would have preferences of a socialist sort that does not mean that there will not be a minority who would have different preference schedules: preference schedules which could be just as rational as those of the majority. To override the minority here would, with their different, equally rational preferences, cause them — or so Miller claims — acute deprivation. Such overriding can hardly be morally justified and certainly does not square with a commitment to utilitarian equality where the welfare of everyone has equal weight. Some people, perhaps many people, even when they reflect about it carefully with adequate information, will not be socialist persons or rush to be socialist persons. “Some care too deeply, for their own and for others’ sake, that striving for personal betterment, free from direct interference, be allowed, even if lack of resources often makes the prospects dim” (M 34). The institutions of Marx’s classless society allow little scope for purely self-interested competition. But for some this “activity is an important positive good” (M 34). There is no way, Miller argues, to show here that one set of preferences is more rational than another. Some rational human beings will go one way and some another. Even if under conditions of maximally accurate information most people would be socialistically inclined rather than be such competitive individualists this does not show that the majority are right or that the majority are justified in overriding the minority here (M 34–5).

There is, Miller argues Marx argues, no generally acceptable standard for ranking equally intense enjoyments, varying needs or different interests. People socialized in different ways will differ here. And we have no yardstick for measuring or ascertaining the morally preferable preferences or the rational preferences. We cannot make the necessary social discriminations without social bias. Miller remarks

No ranking of all important goods, including, say, leisure as against material income, the enjoyment of competitive striving as against the enjoyment of cooperation, and the chance to occupy the top of hierarchies as against the guarantee of secure, moderately comfortable life, is faithful to the needs or the reflective desires of all — industrial

workers, farmers, investment bankers, housewives, shopkeepers and professors alike (M 32).

It, Miller claims, is a myth — perhaps a liberal ideological distortion — to believe that if we — that is all of us alike — had all the relevant data there is, we would agree on a ranking that all would accept. Such a consensus does not exist among people so variously formed and variously situated and it is not reasonable to expect that one can come to exist in class divided societies.

Mill's solution, which consists in appealing to the preferences of those who have wide experience, in effect, shows a "bias toward the upper strata who are able to practice such connoisseurship" (M 32). Mill's "procedure cannot do justice to the connection of the enjoyment of the individuals at any given time with the class relations in which they live" (M 35).

Marx, I believe, is right to stress the depth and indeed the class nature of the impact of social processes on our basic wants and indeed on our needs as well (M 33). (I do not, of course, say that is the only kind of social influence.) Miller rightly stresses that here. In this connection, Miller argues that if we appeal, *à la* Mill, to what the experienced person prefers — the person who has a great range of experiences and has the leisure to make the comparisons and carefully reflects on those experiences — we do leave the working class and their preferences out and skew things in the direction of the wealthier strata of society.¹⁶ In class struggles and in fighting for social change, we cannot gain such a superior vantage point from which we can, in a rather Olympian manner, make moral evaluations. Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls lead us down the garden path here. There is no such an Archimedean point. We must instead just fight it out in terms of perceived class interests.

If that is all that Miller means in claiming that Marx rejects egalitarianism and, as well, the moral point of view in political struggles, then Miller's claim is *perhaps* on the mark. However, it does seem to me that the Marxist can and should make the following kind of *Gedanken-experiment* — perhaps it is better to call it a Pascalian wager — namely that if we come to have a classless society, with the clarity about ourselves and our social relations that that would bring, that, under

such circumstances, the prediction goes, people would come to have egalitarian utilitarian preference schedules. They will come to have attitudes which will favor that, from a societal point of view, an equal concern and respect be shown to all, and they will come to have pro-attitudes toward the general welfare being promoted in such a way that the interests of everyone will be considered and will be considered equally. The *Gedankenexperiment* comes to a prediction that this is the way people's preference structures will go when they live in conditions of security and abundance and under conditions of undistorted discourse.¹⁷ It seems to me that Mill, Rawls and Habermas, in various compatible ways, have indicated ways in which we can simulate and approximate impartiality without jettisoning the empathetic understanding that will help us adjust for class biases and the like. When we conscientiously attempt to do this, we will, I believe, come to have such egalitarian attitudes and this will, I am predicting, become stronger, more pervasive and more entrenched the closer we come actually to living in conditions of undistorted discourse under conditions of abundance.

This is not with me a matter of some kind of persuasive definition but a prediction. It grows out of some hunches and some empirical assumptions that are quite fallible. It seems to me that there is something to the Humean-Smithian-Westermarckian conception of natural sympathies and to Westermarck's belief that, as our tribal myths get eroded, something that goes increasingly with modernity (Weber's progressive de-mystification of the world), the range of our sympathies, as a matter of fact, tends to be gradually extended.

I take it to be a fact that we do tend to care for one another and that our sympathies, with our increased understanding and our experience of the world, do get extended. I also take it as a fact that, with all our differences, there are also similarities between us sufficient to make it rather compelling, or at least not unreasonable, for us to say, and justifiably believe, that, where circumstances make it possible without continued oppression of the underclass, we all should be objects, viewed from the point of view of society's concern, of equal concern and respect. Where we come across a particularly depraved individual or a particularly nasty sort, we can hardly avoid acknowledging, if we are reflective and not too neurotic, that there, but for the grace of God,

go we, which, de-mythologized, comes to believing that there, but for better fortune in social upbringing or genetic wiring, go we. When we reflect along these lines, and when we have natural sympathies, we will go in an egalitarian way. If we are both Marxists and egalitarians, we will recognize that generally we must favour proletarians over capitalists. But this is principally an instrumental thing with perhaps, for some of us, a bit of justice in restitution thrown in. We want a world in which the proletarian and the capitalist can no longer be viewed as, or indeed be, either capitalist or proletarian, but will be viewed just as human beings in a producer's society where all adult able-bodied persons prior to their retirement are in some broad sense producers. (I qualify in this way because, among other things, the service sector grows.) The class perspective is instrumental. It is the engine for attaining the classlessness that is necessary for attaining equality and its closely related ideals: autonomy and fraternity.

Equality with these elements is not a one-sided ideal. It is a *Gestalt* which, when the concept of human flourishing is thrown in as well, will give us the central elements in the firmament of values, elements that Miller has given us no good grounds for believing the Marxist tradition should reject. (See here, counting for this, Miller's own remarks on page 36.) Miller reconstructs Marx as saying that our preferences "among social arrangements must be a preference among needs, and the bias cannot be removed in the Millian style" (M 38). I have argued that Miller has not sustained that claim.

Miller in effect responds to this by arguing that utilitarian equality does not operate with the relatively weak premiss with which I am operating, namely to 'Give everyone's satisfaction some *prima facie* weight' but with the stronger premiss 'Give everyone's interests equal weight'. But my appeal is to neither but to 'Give everyone's interests *prima facie* equal weight'. We want as egalitarians that morality should come to be, as we move to classlessness, so structured that we will want, in the way I have explicated, to weigh "the satisfaction of desires without bias toward desires of certain people . . ." (M 37). It should, however, be put in the way I put it with a phrase like *prima facie* or *ceteris paribus*, for we run into situations where everyone's desires cannot be satisfied or everyone's needs cannot be met, and it is there where we need to make hard choices and indeed sometimes tragic

choices. Fairness (justice) requires that we start out considering everyone's interests alike. But where two interests cannot both be satisfied in a given situation we must look for morally relevant grounds for favoring one person's interests over another's. Hence we should not say 'Give everyone's interests equal weight' but 'Give everyone's interests *prima facie* equal weight'. But this gesture in the direction of realism is not a departure from equality. It is not to abandon equal concern and respect. For we must consider everyone's interests, give equal initial weight to each person's interests, and we must, at least in conditions of abundance, satisfy the interests of everyone and satisfy them equally where we can. It provides us *Lebensraum*, where we cannot satisfy the interests of everyone, though, of course, the principle itself does not provide the criteria for deciding which interests are to be favored when not all interests can be met.

I think what is important to stress is that Marx, and Engels as well, and indeed Lenin, had as an ultimate aim universal human emancipation.¹⁸ However, I think that this needs to be given a careful reading. On the one hand, it does not mean *just* the emancipation of the immense majority, though it does, of course, have their emancipation as a central objective. And, on the other hand, it should not be read so literally that Marx is taken to be claiming that everyone in class societies would be helped by the coming into being of socialism or Communism. I think that is plainly a flight from reality. There is about 1% of the current population of North America that definitely would not be helped, though everything considered, they need not be harmed as much as they are wont to believe. If Marx's empirical picture of the world is even roughly right there is a far greater thwarting of interests under capitalism than under socialism. But, there still are some — though I think that that some is very small — whose interests would flourish under capitalism more than they would under socialism (M 39). Class interests are essential: firmly protecting proletarian class interests is a strategic instrumental modality that cannot be set aside by anyone who is actually interested in human emancipation. Where the forces of production are sufficiently developed to make socialism a real possibility, there can be no blinkering at the fact that what is in the interest of the proletariat is frequently in sharp conflict with what is in the interest of the *haute bourgeoisie*. But still, such class interests are instrumentalities to human

liberation, whose ideal remains the liberation of every single human being where in the classless society of the future we are simply regarded as human beings and not as personifications of economic categories, where, viewed now simply as individuals, the life of every human being matters and matters equally. It is a luxury we cannot afford in the midst of class struggle but it is what in the end the class struggle is for. Thus we are concerned in such a circumstance, where that circumstance is the ideal to be aimed at, with the satisfaction of human interests as such. Furthermore, and vitally, where, even in such a circumstance, not everyone's interests can be satisfied, we are to aim at the most extensive satisfaction of interest possible for as many people as possible, where the interests of everyone must *prima facie* be given equal consideration. We seek, in short, the greatest compossible satisfaction of interests for as many people as possible where everyone's interest has an equal initial weight, i.e. each is to count for one and none to count for more than one. (This is a core egalitarian notion.) Alternatively, put in terms of wants, the underlying ideal to be realized in a classless society is: Everyone is to have as much as possible of whatever it is that she or he wants, and would continue to want with adequate information, reflectively taken to heart, that is compatible with as many people as possible having their wants satisfied in exactly that manner.¹⁹

I do not want to be misunderstood here. I am not turning Marx into a utopian socialist. Miller has quite properly shown Marx to be a through and through revolutionary socialist who clearly sees the necessity of class conflict leading in most circumstances from disguised civil war to open revolution, where the proletariat is to overthrow the bourgeoisie and begin laying the foundation for a new society — the foundations for what Brecht called the new kindness. This, as Miller nicely puts it, is “not the statement of someone who believes that all resistance to socialism rests on misinformation” (M 40). Neither Miller's Marx nor my Marx is an economic Marx. And indeed I do not think Marxists should take an economic turn. In such revolutionary struggles “the state in transition from capitalist to classless society ‘can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of proletariat’” (M 40). The state, in the circumstance of consolidating a revolution, must be concerned, as Marx puts it, with “intimidating the mass of the bourgeoisie” (M 40). It is clear from this that Marx believed that the

interests of the bourgeoisie “would be offended, deeply and on balance by socialism” (M 40).

All that is vital to keep steadfastly before our minds, but, as I have been at pains to argue above, except in the most literally wooden way, this does not mean that Marx was not a believer in universal emancipation in the way I have explicated above. His aim is to see a world in which the interests of as many people as possible would be satisfied. That a few capitalists continue to have intransigent interests, interests which are antithetical to the fulfillment of the interests of the vast mass of humankind, does not mean that the compossible interests of everyone are not to be satisfied.

We can stress, as Miller rightly does, that Marx was a thoroughly political creature who would never acquiesce in economism; he was without question a thorough revolutionary. Along with that, we should emphasize, as well, Marx’s sensitivity to the social determination of needs without coming to the conclusion that Marx was rejecting equality and the moral point of view. Some sorting out will help here: it is correct to say that Marx rejects the moral point of view in politics, if what is meant by that is that Marx, as a historical materialist, rejects the historical-idealist thesis that we could, in any fundamental way, change the world by making, no matter how convincingly, the moral case for the wrongness of a social system (say, capitalism).²⁰ Marx most certainly does not believe that any class-divided social system could in any fundamental sense be changed by such a moral critique. However, there is also a more telling and sophisticated way in which Marx rejects morality in politics. He realizes that in the midst of class struggle there are not infrequently clashes of class interests that cannot in that context be rationally resolved and where sometimes what is the fair thing to do is not obvious and perhaps even, in some instances, indeterminate. It will hurt proletarian emancipation to insist that the revolutionary or the worker struggling for her liberation must always, or even typically, avoid taking any militant action, until she has some tolerably clear idea in the context of her struggle of what fairness comes to here or of what morality requires. That is a sure recipe for inaction. It is a mistake to maintain that she must *in that way* always seek to be fair and impartial, to consider the interests of everyone, capitalist and worker alike. Such well-meant moralizing will in fact stand in the way of proletarian

emancipation and, by this impeding of proletarian emancipation, stand in the way of universal human emancipation. In the name of that very universal emancipation, the workers and their militant allies, cannot, Miller argues, afford to take the moral point of view and must in certain respects reject morality.

All of this notwithstanding, there is an equally important way, a way I have been concerned to specify above, in which Marx is not rejecting the moral point of view, but is guided by that very point of view in specifying the higher stages of Communism and in showing why it is desirable. And that conception, far from involving a rejection of equality, is firmly committed to it, as I have shown, in a number of important ways, though I also think Marx is right in rejecting morality in the two rather less central ways I have just specified. But that in those ways he rejects morality does not show that, in the deeper sense I have been concerned to specify, Marx does not stick with morality and indeed an egalitarian morality at that.

VI

Richard Miller is not alone among the important interpreters of Marx on morality in arguing that Marx and Engels are not egalitarians. Allen Wood, most extensively in his 'Marx and Equality', also takes that line.²¹ There is a considerable overlap with Miller and I will not step in the same river twice. But, since I want to read Marx and Engels as egalitarians, and since I think such a conception is important to a Marxist conception of morality, it is incumbent on me to look at Wood's distinctive arguments. (His essay also has the independent virtue of helping us get clearer about what is at issue in arguing for or against egalitarianism.)

The first paragraph of Wood's essay would lead one to believe that he is going to articulate a position bearing a close family resemblance to the egalitarian Marx I have defended. Wood remarks:

A capitalist society for Marx is essentially a class society, a society whose fundamental dynamics are determined by the oppression of one class by another. And of course Marx was always an uncompromising foe of oppression in any form. The fundamental mission of the proletariat as Marx sees it is to abolish class oppression, by abolishing class differences which make it possible. The division of society into classes, however,

and especially the oppression of one class by another, always involves striking social inequalities, of wealth and opportunity, of power and prestige, of freedom and self-actualization, of fulfilment and happiness. A classless society, by contrast, would seem to be above all a society of equals, where all share equally in the burdens and benefits of social life. Fighters against oppression in many forms have often viewed their fight as a fight for social equality. They have framed their demands in terms of ideals or principles of equality, whether it be equality of formal legal rights or of their *de facto* recognition by society, or equal opportunity for education and achievement, or an equal share of wealth or well-being (W 195).

However, like Miller, Wood regards it as a mistake to believe that Marx is an egalitarian, “a fighter for equality and a believer in classless society because he is a believer in a society of equals” (W 195). Wood first points out that there are “no explicit and unequivocal endorsements of the notion of equality in Marx’s writings” and he finds “in the writings of both [Marx and Engels] . . . explicit disavowals of egalitarianism and criticisms of it” (W 195). On the basis of Marx’ texts the correct conclusion to draw, according to Wood, is that Marx is an opponent of the ideal of equality, despite the fact that “he is also and not any the less an opponent of all forms of social privilege and oppression” (W 196).

In discussing Wood’s argument that Marx was no defender of equality, I will try to show against Wood that to make the most sense out of Marx in these domains it is important to see him as accepting equality as a *goal*: an end to be achieved. Wood points out helpfully that we can regard equality as a goal or equality as a right and that in many discussions of equality, including some defenses of egalitarianism, these conceptions, unfortunately, get confused. He then remarks:

Toward equality as a goal, I believe Marx’s attitude is one of indifference. We find in his writings no specific criticisms of the attempt to achieve equality in people’s status, wealth or well-being. Yet I think it can be shown that Marx does not frame his own conception of a classless society in terms of any goal of equality. Further, I think it is at best highly doubtful that Marx regards social equality as something good or desirable for its own sake (W 196).

This claim by Wood seems to me a very tendentious claim. It is clear enough that Marx and Engels are against the oppression and servitude of class society. It is also clear enough that they want this social curse, as one of them put it, lifted from all humankind and that they believe that to achieve this we need a classless society, where eventually this

classlessness will be a world-wide phenomenon. Moreover, it is not enough that the vast majority achieve that condition of life but that, as far as possible, *everyone* does so. The important thing is for human society, that is the whole world, literally to be classless. They want a world in which no one would be oppressed or dehumanized or live in conditions of misery. They want a world in which people, that is everyone capable of it, could control their own lives, that is be autonomous, and in which human flourishing, including human well-being, will be general. But to have such ideals is to be committed to equality as a goal. That other matters, such as autonomy and well-being figure centrally here, does not mean that social equality is not being regarded as something good or desirable in itself (something wanted in itself as von Wright would put it), though it does mean, what is patently evident anyway, that it is not the *sole* intrinsic good. But the recognition that fairness requires, where classlessness is achieved, autonomy for *everyone*, as far as that is possible, and not just widespread autonomy, shows that fairness is thought to have an intrinsic value. Since fairness amounts, in some aspects, to treating people equally in certain ways, equality also has an intrinsic value, insofar as it is implied in fairness.

It is important not to forget that things can have both intrinsic value and instrumental value.²² That is so of the *Gestalt* of values-fairness, equality, autonomy, fraternity and well-being. They all have both intrinsic value and instrumental value. Egalitarians have wanted that *Gestalt*.²³ They have not treated equality as the *sole* intrinsic value but as a member of this cluster of fundamental values where, if all people are securely to have any of them, they must come together as a package. It seems to me evident that Marx and Engels, as heirs of Enlightenment, took the achievement of these ideals to be an ultimate *desideratum*.²⁴

This is also, of course, a bourgeois ideal shared with Marxists by progressive bourgeois thinkers. What Marx and Engels do is show (a) that it is unattainable in class societies, (b) that to try directly to attain it in class societies is a mistake, (c) that a necessary condition for its achievement is the attainment of classlessness, and (d) that the primary thing now is to struggle to destroy capitalism, for only with its destruction can we attain classlessness and only with classlessness can we attain that cluster of values that, as I see it, define egalitarianism. But

these matters I have just mentioned are all instrumental modalities whose value lies precisely in that they can finally produce a world in which this *Gestalt* or cluster of values can possibly be achievable by humankind. But to see things in this way and to have these values is clearly to treat equality as a goal.

Engels did say in a famous passage in his *Anti-Dühring*, which Wood quotes and then comments on, that “the real content of the proletarian demand for equality is the demand for the *abolition of classes*”.²⁵ I have, in the way I have argued above, taken that to be a partial specification of what Engels took to be a correct articulation of equality.²⁶ Wood says that is a natural reading but a mistaken one all the same. The demand for the abolition of classes, Wood argues, is

... not a demand for equality: the notion of equality is not used to formulate this demand. Instead, it is a demand formulated in terms of the Marxian concept of class. Engels' view is that the demand for equality is a confused and outmoded demand, because it is a demand framed in terms of concepts which have been superseded by the more scientific and realistic ones of Marxian social theory. Before this theory existed, and especially during the time when the bourgeoisie was the most progressive social class, the concept of equality may have been the best one available for the purpose of attacking oppressive social relations (especially feudal ones). But now there is no longer any place in the proletarian movement for the notion of equality or for demands framed in terms of it (W 201).

It seems to me that there is both truth and falsehood in Wood's claim here. There is truth, and not just scientific bias, in the recognition that the concept of class is a more determinate notion, more clearly linked with a determinate social reality and better integrated into Marx's overall theoretical machinery, than talk of equality which is purely moral talk. There is surely that reason in many contexts for substituting talk of class for talk of equality. It is also true that the notion of equality is not used in the formulation of the demand for classlessness. Rather, as Engels puts it, the notion of classlessness is “the true rational content” of demands for equality. But then demands for equality are not dropped, and, since they can mean so many things, they are given a more precise formulation in demands for classlessness. But this does not mean, *pace* Wood, that egalitarianism is rejected or the demand for equality dropped. It is not like the move from talk of God to talk of an unconscious projection of a father-figure.

We should also demur at the last passage I quoted from Wood. Marx

and Engels did not write, even in their most scientifically demanding work, in a normatively neutral vocabulary. They speak of the misery of the workers, of ways in which they are oppressed, of inhuman working conditions, of their servitude and virtual enslavement. If these evaluative terms are quite in order, as Wood assumes that Marx and Engels assume, and as they (to put it minimally) certainly appear at least to assume, then, unless we can show that such evaluative terms are out of place in such a work of social critique, the use of such normative appraisal conceptions can be perfectly in place in their work even though they are not scientific conceptions. Such talk is not thereby ruled confused. Moreover, Wood does not argue that proper social description and critique cannot use evaluative concepts.

Talk of equality does occur in Marx and Engels and it occurs in Lenin as well. And it is not always talked about by them in a derisive or ironical manner as ideological. And Wood himself cites Engels as describing Communism as real equality. They do not in so speaking make either an explicit or implicit use of scare quotes (W 198 C.W. 3. 393). Why not take this talk as being just as legitimate as talk of inhuman conditions and oppression? After all, they are also clearly evaluative conceptions. Indeed Marx and Engels wished to create and did create, a scientific social theory in which they appeal, as theoretically central concepts, to concepts such as class and surplus value, concepts which are indispensable to their systems. But they also continue to use, quite un-self-consciously, ordinary language terms of an evaluative sort as well with no suggestion that the concepts they express are confused or are in any way untoward. I see no reason why talk of equality should be excluded from their ranks. Moreover, talk of equality has the added advantage of being clearly linked in their specifications to talk of class. But, as well, if someone were to ask, what is so hot about classlessness, the answer from Marx and Engels would be in terms of the emancipation of the working class. There would with classlessness be an end to oppression, the achievement of autonomy, humane reciprocal human relations and, generally, the enhancement of well-being for vastly more people than obtains under capitalism. Oppression, inhumane conditions, human misery and the undermining of autonomy go with the existence of classes. A classless world *under conditions of abundance* makes for almost everyone a greater human

flourishing without being destructive of the life of anyone or setting anyone into conditions of misery or making their well-being impossible. However, the *haute bourgeoisie* might, at least by some lights, have a lesser well-being. After all, they would no longer rule society and run things in their own interests and they would no longer be able to live in great splendor. Still the former *haute bourgeoisie* need not at all in the transition society be brought into conditions of misery or servitude making their well-being impossible. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that they are only a miniscule part of the society though it is the core of the capitalist class without which the capitalist class could not sustain its class integrity and hegemony.

In such a world — that is in a world without classes — human autonomy would be much more extensive: equal liberty would no longer have institutional impediments as it has in class societies. What is good about classlessness is that it enhances human well-being, increases autonomy and makes these things possible for everyone, barring certain physical or unalterable psychological impediments.

It is important to recognize that this not only in fact will become the case but that it is also a good thing that it will become the case that this will obtain for everyone. But, with this very stress on classlessness, we get a commitment to equality as we do, as well, in another way, with the more extensive autonomy of classlessness necessarily requiring a greater equality since autonomy is undermined where some have power over others. To avoid that, in those domains closely related to power (such as wealth), people must stand to each other in conditions of rough equality. The rationale for that is not envy, as conservatives believe, but the attainment and preservation of human autonomy for as many people as possible. In these ways classlessness carries with it a commitment to equality. Someone, unless he is confused, who thinks classlessness is important will also think social equality is important. Unless we want to attribute a very extensive confusion to Marx and Engels, we cannot say that they valued classlessness and did not value equality as a goal.

There *may* be status, sexual and racial inequalities, in a way neither Marx nor Engels anticipated, that will remain after the abolition of class distinctions.²⁷ However, it may still be possible eventually to eliminate them. And classlessness, it is reasonable to expect, will create the conditions in which their elimination is more readily achievable.

Engels may very well be mistaken in believing that the elimination of

classes will give us *all* the equality we might reasonably want. Still when he says, rightly, that “the ‘elimination of social and political inequality’ is . . . a very questionable phrase *in place* of ‘the abolition of class distinctions’”, it is the ‘in place’ that does the work (SW 339–40, my emphasis). The former will only obtain if the latter obtains. A necessary condition for the elimination of social and political inequalities is the attainment of classlessness. What is so very valuable about the latter is that it makes possible the former along with autonomy and widespread human flourishing.

Wood in discussing Marx’s *The Critique of the Gotha Programme* agrees that Marx explains how with the development of the productive forces and with the transition from socialism to Communism the distribution principles of the society will change. But, Wood claims, Marx is not saying, as would some egalitarians, that the distribution scheme of Communism is superior to that of socialism and that the distribution system of socialism is superior to that of capitalism and he, above all, is not saying of the distribution system of Communism that it is “an end in itself or . . . one of the long-term goals of the movement” (W 203). Marx, according to Wood, is not up to anything like this in his *The Critique of the Gotha Programme*. Rather, Wood claims, the “general purpose of the description of communist distribution is to reject the distributive orientation as a whole” (W 203).

I think that Wood has not shown this at all and that Marx (*pace* Wood) was concerned in *The Critique of the Gotha Programme* with the justice and, more generally, with the moral adequacy, of different distributive schemes that go with different modes of production. What Wood actually shows instead is not that Marx is not concerned with the justice of various distribution schemes but that he is not concerned with the justice of their distribution *independently* of considering how they are organized in production.

The mode of production fixes the general types of distributions that are possible. But one way of coming to see what is rotten about a whole mode of production is to see the distribution it results in. This is particularly relevant when other modes of production are historically feasible with better distributive schemes: that is, fairer distribution schemes that would make for a greater amount of well-being for more people.

Marx is concerned with whole social formations and he is concerned

to show in those social formations that some productive-distributive systems are better than others. He is concerned to show, when the conditions for their stable existence obtain, that certain of them make for a greater need satisfaction for more people than their alternatives and that that brings with it, among other things, a fairer, because more equal, distribution. So there is gain in equality here and Marx, as well as Engels and Lenin, takes that to be an unequivocally good thing.²⁸

One can say what I have just said, and still agree with Marx, that “right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby”. Translated into the concrete this last remark means that if you were a prescient moralist living at the height of the Middle Ages you would not, if you knew what you were about, try to apply any bourgeois conceptions of justice to the distributional arrangements of your society, though you would, in certain circumstances, point out to people that better ways of arranging things could be envisioned and that they could find an institutional embodiment as the wealth of the society increased. You would, that is, if you were very prescient, have envisioned different distributional principles from those that could possibly apply in the world in which you were living. You could come to see that these distributional principles, which would become applicable in the world in which the productive forces were more developed, would be better, morally speaking more adequate, distribution principles than the ones that were possible during the time in which you lived. Similarly, Marx envisions different distribution principles for Communism than those that could possibly apply in a time when capitalist relations of production are firmly in the seat. (To be imprisoned by a mode of production for a time stably in place does not mean we are conceptually imprisoned, though, given the way ideology works, there is a tendency for us to be so imprisoned. Karl Mannheim and Karl Marx are different characters.)

To try to put those principles in place, when the productive forces are not sufficiently developed, is bad utopianism. But we can envision several social formations, with their distinctive systems of production and distribution, which we can rank as higher and lower along several dimensions, including saying of these whole social formations that a world in which one was exemplified rather than another would be a more just world than the other and that *one* of the reasons that it is a

more just world is that it has a greater equality of condition in it. It seems to me that Marx is reasoning in this way in *The Critique of the Gotha Programme* and Engels in his *Anti-Dühring*. They picture a number of possible worlds only one of which at a particular time can be actual. Concerning all of those possible worlds they are considering, their historical materialism leads them to believe that, barring externalities such as thermonuclear wars, certain determinate ones will one day be actual. (They need not, and indeed should not go beyond probability judgments here.²⁹)

Picturing these worlds now, one of which is already actual, they believe they can say which are more truly human and, I believe, (*pace* Wood) more just. To say this they do not have to say that they should try in the world they are in, where a certain mode of production is stably entrenched, to apply the moral principles of a future society. But they can say, without the slightest contradiction or intellectual or for that matter emotional jarring, that the future society will be a better moral order than the present society. *One* of the reasons why it will be a better society is that there will in that society be a more extensive equality of condition and because of that more liberty will be abroad where people can achieve greater autonomy and more self-realization.

If we try to make a Mannheimian sociology-of-knowledge point — a conceptual imprisonment point — and say that our very understanding is so very culturally skewed that we can make no such judgments of higher and lower, then we should reply that the deep conceptual relativism implicit in such a sociology-of-knowledge vantage point may possibly be justified but it surely is not Marx's viewpoint we are explicating now, for he perfectly confidently thinks that we could make such judgments of higher and lower.³⁰

However, we should not let matters rest here for I must confront Wood's reading of the guiding slogan for a higher phase of Communist society, namely 'From each according to his ability to each according to his needs'. Woods thinks that this is neither a principle of justice for such a society nor an egalitarian slogan³¹ (W 211). He thinks Marx chooses it for such a society "precisely because it is *not* an egalitarian slogan" (W 211). Wood attempts to justify his claim as follows: the slogan does not advocate treating people "equally from any point of view, but instead considers people individually, each with a different set

of needs and abilities". (W 211) I agree that the principle does importantly stress that each person is to be treated individually and that one's particular needs are, where possible, to be satisfied. But I think it is *also* an egalitarian slogan. We are *all* to be treated equally in that way. The *desideratum* is that for each and everyone of us our needs are to be satisfied. We cannot rightly or fairly ignore *anyone* here. This is to give expression (in a partial way) of what it is to have a society of equals.

It is not (*pace* Wood) just that this is what *will* happen in this future society but that it is *appropriate* that it will happen. It is something that, with wondrous productive abundance and the withering away of bourgeois conceptions, we can finally both inscribe on our banners and make an actual social reality. Marx is not *just* making predictions. He is indeed making predictions but he is also stressing that the needs of everyone *are to be* satisfied. In doing this he is setting out a central normative conception of the egalitarian.

Wood forgets what he had stressed a few pages earlier, namely that Marx would have been more "deeply disturbed by unequal need satisfaction" than by unequal wealth. Seeing the point, well stressed by Wood, that, if "people have unequal needs, then one cannot expect them to have both equal wealth and equal need satisfaction", we should then go on to say that, since they in fact have different needs, Marx would not consider "unequal wealth a defect *if* no one's needs", including their needs for autonomy, "were left unsatisfied" (W 206, italics mine). Where we have a productively advanced society, what then becomes humanly and morally appropriate, is a commitment to the satisfaction of the needs of everyone, where we are equally concerned with the needs of everyone alike. This will mean, since people have different needs, they will not have exactly equal resources. This egalitarian claim, or at least what I take to be this egalitarian claim, gives us a more determinate reading of equality of condition, namely that, where possible, the needs of everyone are to be satisfied as fully as possible.

What is crucial to stress is that for everyone their 'needs are to be satisfied as fully as possible' and that we add, as well, the vital qualification: 'To each according to needs that are, as far as possible, compatible with a similar satisfaction of needs of everyone'. What we want is that all people's needs be satisfied and indeed satisfied as fully as possible as

is compatible with everyone having such a satisfaction of needs if they are capable of it. It is where the satisfaction of a particular need of mine may be antithetical to a need satisfaction of yours that a *question* is rightly to be raised about its satisfaction. There are indeed difficulties here but so arguing is in the spirit of Marx and it is also surely radically egalitarian.

Wood contends, as I have already mentioned, “that Marx does not consider social equality as something good for its own sake” (W 211). That is, he does not consider it something to be wanted in itself. I have already tried to show how Marx’s stress on classlessness and its value involves an appeal to social equality as both an intrinsic good and as an instrumental good. I think Wood is right in believing that there is not much stress in Marx on anything like a Rawlsian egalitarian acceptance of something approaching equal benefits and burdens, though even here I think ‘From *each* according to his ability’ stresses that we all should — without exception should — shoulder our fair share of the work that needs to be done in society. Contribution according to our ability is equally required of each of us, though, since our abilities are different, we will in fact make unequal contributions. It is part of an egalitarian conception to stress that contribution according to our ability is equally required of each of us and that none can freeload. This is a part of what it is to establish equal conditions of life.

Wood rightly stresses that Marx “favours the abolition of classes because he thinks it will lead to other things he values, such as increased human freedom, well-being, community, and individual development of self-actualisation” (W 212). This is all true but also importantly incomplete, for Marx wanted these things not only to be increased but he wanted them, as far as feasible, for everyone. That is where the equality and the related conception of egalitarian justice comes in and forms, as I argued, a *Gestalt* of ideals with autonomy, freedom, self-realization, well-being, fraternity and community. This is both a fundamentally egalitarian conception and this is very distant from the Spartan minimum of ‘crude Communism’ (W 212).

Wood sees Marx, in the domain of normative argument, fastening on working class oppression. Indeed he thinks Marx too exclusively stresses oppression, but as a Marxological point he thinks that Marx attributes no intrinsic value to any form of equality, including social

equality, and only regards equality as valuable when it is an effective instrument in fighting class oppression (W 213–5). I have tried to argue that this is neither Marx nor right, though I would not for a moment deny Marx's claim, supported by Wood, that "oppression . . . may thrive on *formal* equality" (W 216, italics mine).³³

NOTES

¹ G. A. Cohen, *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence*, Oxford, England, Clarendon Press 1978. Also Cohen's 'Reply to Four Critics', *Analyse & Kritik* 5 (2) (1983), pp. 195–222 and 'Reconsidering Historical Materialism', in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds.), *Marxism, Nomos XXVI*, New York, NY, New York University Press 1983, pp. 227–251. Robert Paul Wolff, *Understanding Marx*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press 1984; four publications by Jon Elster: 'Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory', in *Theory and Society* XI (1982), pp. 453–483, *Explaining Technical Change*, Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press 1983, *Sour Grapes*, Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press 1983, and *Making Sense of Marx*, Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press 1985. Allen Wood, *Karl Marx*, London, England, Routledge & Kegan Paul 1981 and Richard W. Miller, *Analyzing Marx*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press 1984. The texts of Miller and Wood I most frequently cite are Miller's *Analyzing Marx* and Wood's 'Marx and Equality' in John Mepham and David Hillel Ruben (eds.), *Issues in Marxist Philosophy IV*, Sussex, England, Harvester Press 1982, pp. 195–221. They will be referred to in the body of the text as (M_) and (W_) respectively. All other references will be given in the normal fashion in the end notes.

² I do not mean to suggest that their views are the same. In fact Miller, while acknowledging important similarities, produces an important critique of Wood's views on justice (see M 78–96). There is, however, common ground in their views on what they take to be Marx's and Engels's critique of appeals to equality and in their characterizing Marx and Engels as critics of morality. (The latter could hardly be denied by anyone who knew anything about Marx and Engels.)

³ I take it that this is also the stance that Miller believes should be taken toward morality. Wood, by contrast, is more Marxological.

⁴ For a comprehensive elucidation of the views of Monro, Mackie and Harman, which brings out their complex, often mutually supporting arguments for a sophisticated form of subjective ethical naturalism, see Russell Cornett, *Subjective Ethical Naturalism*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Calgary, 1983.

⁵ For this conception of *moral* equality see Thomas Nagel, *Mortal Questions*, Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press 1979, pp. 106–127.

⁶ Kai Nielsen, *Equality and Liberty: A Defense of Radical Egalitarianism*, Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Allenheld 1985.

⁷ Richard Norman argues that such things have in fact been stressed by egalitarians. Richard Norman, 'Does Equality Destroy Liberty?', in *Contemporary Political Philosophy*, Keith Graham (ed.), Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press 1982, pp. 83–109.

⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 99–108.

⁹ This is brought out convincingly for J. S. Mill by Fred R. Berger in his important interpretation of the moral and political thought of J. S. Mill in *Happiness, Justice and Freedom*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press 1984, pp. 96–204. Berger also makes clear that there is less distance between John Rawls and J. S. Mill than is usually thought. Indeed Rawls himself fails to see the closeness of their views.

¹⁰ I have tried to make a start here in my *Equality and Liberty*.

¹¹ See also Richard Miller, 'Rights and Reality', *Philosophical Review* (July 1981), pp. 383–407; 'Rights or Consequences', *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, Peter French (ed.), Vol. VII (1982), pp. 151–174 and 'Marx and Aristotle: A Kind of Consequentialism', in Supplementary Vol. VII *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* (1981).

¹² See here, as well, an earlier essay of Miller on Rawls. Richard Miller, 'Rawls and Marxism', in *Reading Rawls*, Norman Daniels (ed.), New York, NY, Basic Books, Inc. 1973.

¹³ It seems to me that Miller's argumentation here is rather inconclusive. At the very least it needs to be extensively filled out. I shall not pursue the issue here but there should, I believe, be a return to the argument, concerning which there has been considerable discussion, about whether there must be *actual* consent. Why is there not considerable moral force, if we can really make it stick (that is, if we have good reason to believe that people in such circumstances would consent), in such a claim of hypothetical consent? Suppose, for example, that I know that I probably will take the bribe if the rich man makes it attractive but I also recognize that if I were capable of acting in an impartial manner I would not. Is not the recognition of what I would do if I were capable of acting impartially of a not inconsiderable moral import?

¹⁴ Thomas Hurka, 'Rights and Capital Punishment', *Moral Issues*, Jan Narveson (ed.), Toronto, ON, Oxford University Press 1983, p. 121.

¹⁵ Kai Nielsen, 'Why Should I Be Moral?', *Methodos XV* (1963), 'On Being Moral', *Philosophical Studies XVI* (January/February 1965) and 'Why Should I Be Moral Revisited?', *American Philosophical Quarterly* (1984).

¹⁶ I think we should be more cautious here. Parallel to the considerations gestured at in note 13, we should also consider what people, including working class people, would prefer if (to use Habermas' jargon) they were in an ideal speech situation. Moreover, and distinctly, working class people have a range of experiences not readily available to people from the professional strata or to members of the capitalist class. It is an elitist myth to think that they do not make comparisons and reflect on their experience.

¹⁷ Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, Boston, MA, Beacon Press 1976, Thomas McCarthy (trans.), pp. 1–68.

¹⁸ I document this in my 'Marx, Engels and Lenin on Justice: *The Critique of the Gotha Programme*', *Studies in Soviet Thought* 32 (1986).

¹⁹ Kai Nielsen, 'On Liberty and Equality: A Case for Radical Egalitarianism', *The Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice*, Vol. 4 (1984), pp. 121–142, and 'Justice and Ideology: Justice as Ideology', *Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice*, Vol. 1 (1981), pp. 165–178.

²⁰ Allen Wood clearly explicates the concept of being a historical idealist and contrasts it with being a historical materialist in his *Karl Marx*, pp. 88–90 and 117–122.

²¹ He argues the same point more briefly in his *Karl Marx*, Part Three. See also his 'Marx and Morality', Arthur Caplan and Bruce Jennings (eds.), *Darwin, Marx and Freud: Their Influence on Moral Theory*, New York, NY, Plenum Press 1984, pp. 131–144.

²² W. K. Frankena, *Ethics* (2nd edition), Chapter 5. For more extended discussions,

see C. I. Lewis, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, LaSalle, IL, The Open Court Publishing Company 1946, Chapters XII–XIV, and Georg von Wright, *The Varieties of Goodness*, London, England, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1963, pp. 1–39.

²³ See Richard Norman, 'Does Equality Destroy Liberty?', and Kai Nielsen, *Equality and Liberty*.

²⁴ For some documentation of this see my 'Marx, Engels and Lenin on Justice: *The Critique of the Gotha Programme*', *Studies in Soviet Thought* 32 (1986).

²⁵ Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Emile Burns (trans.), New York, NY, International Publishers 1939, pp. 117–118.

²⁶ Kai Nielsen, 'Engels on Morality and Moral Theorizing', *Studies in Soviet Thought* 26 (1983).

²⁷ Mihailo Marković, *The Contemporary Marx*, Nottingham, England, Spokesman Books 1974, pp. 130–7 and Kai Nielsen, *Equality and Liberty*, pp. 57–60.

²⁸ Kai Nielsen, 'Marx, Engels and Lenin on Justice', *Studies in Soviet Thought* 32 (1986).

²⁹ Maximilien Rubel, *Rubel on Karl Marx: Five Essays*, Joseph O'Malley and Keith Algozin (eds. and trans.), Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press 1981, pp. 58–66.

³⁰ See the exchange between Martin Hollis and J. L. Mackie in Stephen Körner (ed.) *Explanation*, Oxford, England, Basil Blackwell 1975, pp. 185–197, 205–216.

³¹ See also the two essays reprinted in M. Cohen *et. al.* (eds.) *Marx, Justice and History*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press 1980. This includes his response to Ziyad Husami. In this context see also the criticism by Gary Young, 'Doing Marx Justice', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supplementary Volume VII (1981) and G. A. Cohen's review of Wood's *Karl Marx in Mind* (1982), pp. 440–445.

³² Kai Nielsen, *Equality and Liberty*.

University of Calgary