

Reason and Morality

By KAI NIELSEN

"The main thing needed to make the world happy is intelligence."
—Bertrand Russell

IN A profoundly beautiful but disturbingly perplexing passage in the Bible, God speaks darkly of our knowledge of good and evil. The narrative runs as follows: "And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, 'Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.'" Knowledge of good and evil, we are told, will open our eyes and we shall be as gods. Possessing such knowledge, man would become wise. In the biblical narrative there is even the anxiety that man might well take hold "of the tree of life and eat thereof and live forever." The temptation to be "as gods, knowing good and evil," is not only the temptation of Faust, but also man's perennial moral predicament. God cast Adam and Eve from the garden for eating of the "forbidden fruit." Moral knowledge is essential for wise action; yet knowledge of the secrets of the springs of good and evil may bring us, so some have felt, in league with the Devil.

Every age reads its myths differently. Modern man is heir to the perennial moral predicament, but he is heir to it in a unique manner. The secrets of nature are increasingly ours, but the secrets of good and evil

remain hidden. Modern professors of physics would not dream of using the works of Kepler, Galileo, or Newton as textbooks, but in moral philosophy the student goes back much farther to read Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and the Stoic and Epicurean philosophers, whose works are read not as museum pieces but as real sources of wisdom about how we should act, live, and die. The situation is further complicated by the fact that we seem to be gaining knowledge of good and evil from another quite different source. Psychologists, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, social psychologists, sociologists, and cultural anthropologists are slowly winning this knowledge of human nature. Specialists from these disciplines, working singly and in interdisciplinary teams, are slowly amassing reliable predictive knowledge about man and his place in nature. The skeptic might well remark that human nature is too complicated ever to be put in a formula. But we are slowly gaining testable knowledge of the nature of the exceedingly complicated animal we call the human animal. With the sense of fallibility and the modesty that is always a part of true science, some knowledge of why we act as we do is being garnered.

Part of modern man's moral pre-

dicament arises because of his reactions to this new knowledge. Morality is concerned with guiding the actions of human beings. The new science has given us some startling knowledge about man's actions and the varied motives for his actions. In understanding the motives and structure of man's acts through depth psychology and the varied nature and extended range of his actions through cultural anthropology, we seem to have wrested from nature the very secrets of the knowledge of good and evil. But we—and this includes the scientists as well as the rest of us—are ambivalent about this: we want, at one and the same time, both to accept and to reject this knowledge as true knowledge of good and evil. We feel strongly that something is wrong with a scientific account of good and evil which tells us what *is* the case, not what *ought* to be the case. The scientist predicts our actions; he does not tell us what we ought to do. He knows about our decisions, choices, and attitudes, but he does not make our decisions, choices, and attitudes. We feel that we ought to make our own decisions; we may go to someone for moral advice, but we feel we should be responsible for our own attitudes and moral choices. We may confess to a priest; taking him to be an instrument of God, we accept unconditionally his moral advice. But we remain responsible for going to him and for accepting the criterion of this particular church as our criterion of good and evil.

If we are going to be moral agents at all, we cannot avoid personal responsibility for our choices and our actions based on those choices. To make a choice is one thing and to

have scientific knowledge about this choice is another. Science amasses facts, including facts about our moral evaluations, but we must make and be responsible for our own moral appraisals through struggles carried on in the recesses of our own innermost souls. But, if this is the case, the knowledge of good and evil again becomes a "misty thing," an "intensely private" thing that we can hardly understand ourselves, much less communicate.

As we emphasize this facet of our predicament, the other side of our ambivalence comes to the fore. All our knowledge of the nature of human nature cannot be for nought. It must, we wish to say, have some relevance to the basic human questions: What shall I do? How shall I act? How shall I live and die? At one and the same time, we seem to have a knowledge of good and evil and we seem not to have a knowledge of it. We seem to be about to grasp "the tree of life" and, at the same time, it seems as far from us as ever. It is this human dilemma which is a part of your lives and mine, that I would like to discuss. In unraveling this puzzle, we shall begin to unravel man's modern predicament about the "forbidden fruit."

HOW has our increasing knowledge of the nature of man affected our knowledge of good and evil? In the first place, cultural anthropology, the science of man in his varying habitats, has made us increasingly aware that we are but one tribe among many tribes. We can no longer say, with the confidence of the Greeks or of our Victorian ancestors, "There are the Greeks and there are

the barbarians. There are morally developed civilized people and there are wild savages living like beasts."

You will object that you cannot compare us to disease-ridden savages who can neither read nor write, who lack cars, thermostats, refrigerators, and the other joys of chastely sealed, sterilized, comfortable living. But without challenging the values of our science or entering into a one-sided diatribe on the inadequacies of our culture, let me compare and contrast our moral predicament with the moral predicaments of those other tribes that we choose to call "barbarian." You may see how our scientific knowledge of other moralities, or other ways of life, raises moral questions for us about the adequacy of our own morality.

We turn with just pride to our science and our complex culture with its economic and technological development. But sometimes we forget that we pay a human price for this. To have the values of technological advance we must give up some other values. Just as one frequently must choose between an extended vacation and a new car, so one cannot have a modern success-oriented industrial civilization without its corresponding pressures. American sociologists have made much of our success ethic. David Riesman puts it aptly when he writes:

... In America, "success" is central; we are provided with a catalogue of what is success and what is failure, and nothing matters except achieving the first and avoiding the second.¹

If we are to have better scientists, the work, the mastery of skills, the rush of daily living will, nay must, increase.

¹*Individualism Reconsidered and Other Essays*. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1954, p. 56.

We channel our young people into the increasingly long disciplines of science, medicine, and law by holding before them a success morality. But everyone does not have the ability or fortune to get to the top, and even those who do often do not find happiness there. Somehow the striving which started as a means to an end has become the end. One seeks restlessly for success after success even after one has found a place in the sun.

This drive of our success-oriented culture invades even contemporary middle-class attitudes toward leisure. Leisure is the free use we make of our spare time. To do something leisurely is to do it deliberately, slowly. It is both a semantic and psychological paradox that in our success-oriented culture leisureliness is pursued with such a dogged determination that it is quickly destroyed by the very conditions that we set for attaining it. Likewise, the forced gregariousness of modern suburbia breeds "the lonely crowd" with an emotional life that David Riesman has well described as "characterized by a pervading anxiety." A Crestwood Heights, schooled to pursue a gregarious version of "the good life," lacking any clearly defined goals of achievement, too often loses itself in perpetual directionless "other-directed" striving.² Or, there are others who never quite make this happy, happy state but, taking to heart our success morality, as the family in *The Death of a Salesman*, spend life in anxiety-ridden, totally unrealistic behavior. There are even a few unfortunates

²*Op. cit.*, Chap. 13. For a full, carefully documented study of American suburbia, see John R. Seely, R. Alexander Sim, and Elizabeth W. Loosley, *Crestwood Heights* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1956).

who, though they share our success ideals, are cut off in the very beginning from any possibility of realizing those ideals. Sharing success ideals with those of us who are more fortunate, they are doomed to live a life of purposeless neurotic frustration. Recall for a moment Mig in Carson McCuller's *The Heart Is a Lonely Hunter*, or Bigger in Richard Wright's *Native Son*. Or call to mind the motion picture, *On the Waterfront*. Or if all these fictional examples seem vaporous to you, I ask you to recall in memory or, better still, go and see the pitiful imitations of our success ideals in Harlem or its adjoining Puerto Rican district. It is not only that we have poverty and squalor there, but also that we have masses of people setting their sights on goals they can never achieve and living lives of hopeless frustration.

I have overdrawn the picture deliberately so that the marks of some of the frictions of our success morality may be seen vividly. Our mental hospitals are jammed; divorce rates, alcoholism, juvenile delinquency flourish like the green bay tree. And, an increasingly large number of people have—at least at times—a strange sense of emptiness or hollowness in their lives. Why the new house; why the new car; the woods are burning and there are new worlds to be conquered, but so what? Yet somehow we feel that it is right to strive, right and good to make something of ourselves and perhaps of our world.

BUT other tribes, other experiments in living, have not taken this to be so self-evidently right. Let us take one example. The

Polynesians, except where Western values have been imposed on them, do not take our success morality as a guide to life. Rather, they are basically concerned with what our social scientists like to call "interpersonal relations"; one finds one's place in a large family. Once we get beyond the romantic stage of dreaming and saying something like "How nice it would be to be a Polynesian," or "How nice it would be to have been a Greek in the time of Pericles," we come to see—our wishes to the contrary—that as there is no "golden age," there is no "promised land." The Polynesians have leisure and a freedom that we find appealing, but, as Margaret Mead has remarked, one Polynesian is rather like any other Polynesian. Nothing happens in Polynesia. But even to expect something to happen is to project Western goals on the Polynesians. They do not want or expect anything to happen. There is no Middletown sense of progress to a bigger and better Polynesia. The old ways are perfectly all right. But there is a cultural choice here and for this choice one must pay a price. The Polynesians do not have radio or television, and lacking a developed science, a Polynesian must bear a toothache with equanimity.

My point here is not to rank tribal moralities. Rather, I wish to point out that our scientific knowledge of other ways of life has posed a problem for us in our quest for a knowledge of good and evil. We can no longer so easily or so confidently say our ways are right and the ways of the foreigner or outlander are wrong. We have become aware of strains and tensions in our own moral life, and see that

other ways of living, strikingly different from our own, have something to be said for them. We have a marvelous technology and the commodious living that goes with it, but, as Erich Fromm has pointed out, we pay for it with a marked tendency to what Hobbes long ago called "the struggle of power after power that endeth only in death." And we have not learned, nearly so well as other societies, how to live with each other. The Polynesians excel in that, but they have not written great epics, they have not subdued the entire world, and they have not developed a science with the healing wonders of medicine. Everything is up to date in Kansas City; but Polynesia, until we arrived, had hardly changed in centuries. But one cannot reasonably or automatically place a positive value on change, or even on development. In saying that the other tribe is less civilized or is barbaric, we are saying it is different from our tribe and are expressing our feeling of superiority to that tribe. But knowing something about the moralities of other cultures, we can no longer just so simply assert that ours is the right way. Knowledge of the tree of good and evil seems to strike at our moral confidence.

THIS failure of nerve seems to be intensified by the following considerations. We see these different cultures selecting different criteria for acts that are to count as right and desirable. But to grade these various criteria we must ourselves assume some standard of evaluation. One might hoist up the world, but first one must have some place to stand. Similarly, in recognizing the need for

some standard with which to evaluate the moralities we observe, we are faced with the unnerving question, Whence comes this standard? If we have a ready standard, how do we justify it? If we do not have a standard but are looking for one, how could we possibly know when we had the right one? And, there is the disturbing question: Is this standard that seems to us categorical only an expression of a cultural preference after all? Is this seeming absolute just a whim or fancy? If we are clear-headed, do our moral choices, like our choices between beverages, become just a matter of "paying our money and taking our choice"?

There are many elements in our intellectual life that push us in that direction. Let me mention just one. The existentialists talk of moral and political obligations as basically a matter of non-rational commitment or decision. They think we choose without a rational basis and then passionately live that choice, not asking about the absurdity or non-absurdity of the basis for the choice. In fact, there is no rational basis for the choice. One flips a coin and on that flip one lives one's life.

Albert Camus, a contemporary French literary philosopher, gives us a clear example of a philosophy of life based on this notion of arbitrary choice or arbitrary commitment. Camus believes that moral ideas are projections onto the world of our own innermost wishes. In reality the world is an absurd, irrational world and not the rational world of our personal or culturally inherited fairy tales. There is no purpose in nature; and neither man nor history, Christian and Marxist mythology to

the contrary, is going anywhere or has anywhere to go. If one believes moral ideas have a rational basis, one only gets taken in by a myth.

Camus at one time spoke of a kind of man he called "the absurd man," who lived without illusions about the rationality of this world or the objectivity of moral valuations. He smiled and watched the human comedy. He stood back and watched, indifferent to the gyrations of man. He was truly an outsider. But in his later works Camus begins to emphasize increasingly that, psychologically speaking, one cannot live without commitment; that is, one cannot live indifferent to good and evil without having feelings of guilt or without feeling a sense of responsibility for one's actions. Like Sartre, Camus is keenly aware that men cannot escape commitment. Yet Camus does not back down on the discovery of his absurd man; that is, the discovery that objectively speaking, each man lives a meaningless life in an irrational world. But fully accepting these conclusions, a man living without illusions can give purpose to his own acts by rebelling against the established order. One's acts, however, do not then, by some kind of magic, become instances of some supra-personal moral truth or public philosophy. But by acting, by involving one's self, by attacking pretense and stupidity from the political right, the political left, or from the fake pillars of one's community, one can give a kind of purpose to one's actions though one still does not rob them of their vanity.³ But to many ordinary

people and to many philosophers, this existentialist kind of solution is no solution at all. Morality still remains a matter of paying your money and taking your choice. Riding hard our personal choice does not help one iota.

AS WE reflect on this, the other side of our ambivalence about knowledge of good and evil begins to reassert itself. We—though with an effort of will—regain our nerve. We want to say, "But any argument that leads to the absurdity of asserting that moral assessments are merely a matter of arbitrary choice must be wrong." Here I think our native courage or common-sense dogmatism (call it what you will), though confused and confusing, is fundamentally right. However, it is very difficult to show in a philosophical sense how it is right. At least some ethical arguments are reasoned and are not just expressions of what a nineteenth-century English poet called "the whims of mortal will."

There have been a number of traditional attempts to meet this problem of moral skepticism. I cannot possibly in this essay describe these traditional theories, much less adequately criticize them. It will have to suffice for me to remark that none of the traditional answers to this problem of justification in ethics has been able to achieve anything that even remotely approaches general acceptance by philosophers. There is a great deal of talk among philosophers today about "the deadlock in ethics" or "the *impasse* in ethics." There is even some fairly loose and confused talk about the "failure of communication in ethics." But there is no general agreement about which theories, or even which approaches to

³For a judicious critique of these general existentialist claims see W. D. Falk, "Moral Perplexity," *Ethics*, LXVI (January, 1956), pp. 123-31.

ethical theories, are the most adequate. There is, however, a widespread conviction that the traditional theories are inadequate.

There seems to me to be a way out of this so-called *impasse* in modern ethics. What I have to say is less designed to meet other philosophical theories about morality than to show that any over-all skepticism about the validity of all (not just some) of our moral judgments is plainly absurd. My basic argument is that if we understand the kind of functions or rôles that morality (any morality, not just yours and mine) plays in the life of any culture, we will come to see that there are natural criteria or standards for moral appraisals. They are more Protean than has generally been recognized, but there still are objective, natural criteria. There are some moral evaluations that it does not make any sense at all to doubt. If we understand what morality accomplishes in a community of people, if we are committed to try to reason morally rather than amorally or non-morally, certain reasons can be shown to be good reasons and certain reasons can be shown to be bad reasons, morally speaking.

I shall now try to unpack this bald and controversial contention. People frequently appeal to "divine revelation" as a basis for their moral appraisals. But then there is the immediate paradox that if we go beyond our tribe we find literally thousands of distinct divine revelations all claiming to be "the divine revelation." We need some way of differentiating the real thing from the counterfeit. One way of avoiding this difficulty is to appeal, in a reasonably common-sense manner, to what are called by some philosophers

"natural moral laws." These natural moral laws are supposedly given to us by God, but none the less they are moral laws that we can discern with our unaided reason, laws we just directly intuit to be true and universally applicable to all mankind. They are self-evident moral laws; that is, moral laws that cannot be doubted. This argument was fully stated by St. Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages, and it has been restated by contemporary scholastics. Most recently, Walter Lippmann and the new conservatives have set it at the center of their "public philosophy" as a dam against the "moral chaos" of the twentieth century. But what is a basic "moral law" in one culture is not a basic moral law in another. What is a "self-evident" moral truth in one tribe is not at all self-evident in another.

It is natural at this point to appeal to our science of human nature, but scientific theories and explanations can never be self-evident. Forsaking self-evidence, to look carefully and objectively about us we will find, as a matter of empirical fact, that there are a few very general moral rules that are accepted universally by all cultures and all tribes. Certain basic motifs are common to all cultures and are accepted, though with varied applications in varied contexts, by all men. The late Ralph Linton commented: "As the social scientist's acquaintance with a large number of cultures improves, he cannot fail to be more impressed with their similarities than with their differences."

SCIENCE grows out of common sense. When we spoke of natural moral laws in a common-sense context, we were appealing to certain

fairly obvious moral criteria that no man, except in his study, could reject. We discover scientifically that certain of these natural moral laws are operative in all cultures. Our science of human nature, far from refuting natural moral law theories, has in fact supported them.

But as a logical basis for a so-called science of morality, this "scientific" natural law theory has a basic flaw, which makes a purely scientific morality based on a unified science of man not only mistaken in detail but mistaken in principle. For example, it is frequently held that it is a natural moral law that "murder is wrong." Anthropologists have discovered that what is called unjustified killing, that is, murder or wanton killing, is regarded as wrong in all cultures. But just what will count as "unjustified killing" and what will count as "justified killing" varies from culture to culture. Killing by capital punishment is legal and is regarded as moral by some groups. But in some groups it is not legal or moral, and the use of capital punishment would be called murder and not justified killing. Where the line is drawn between killing and murder (wanton killing) varies from tribe to tribe. The fact that a certain kind of killing is regarded by all people as wrong does not by itself make this killing wrong. In confusing factual statements about moral appraisals with the moral appraisals themselves, a scientific morality goes astray. Scientific facts are needed, but the basic flaw in such an approach is that science tells us what people say is good or evil, not what is good or evil, the first being an *is* statement about what people regard as wrong, the

second an *ought* statement admonishing one not to do certain things. These are of different logical orders. From a statement of fact, no moral statement can be derived by the rules of valid deduction in formal logic. If we do not have an ought in the premises of an argument, we cannot get an ought in the conclusion. Because it fails to note this logical difference between moral appraisals and statements of fact, any appeal to facts about human nature as a basis for morals is inadequate.

These negative considerations do not augur well for my positive claim that there are good reasons in ethics. Let me now try to right the situation. We have seen we cannot, by the use of the forms of valid inference in formal logic, derive an *ought* from an *is*. We have also seen that we cannot disregard, if we are to be reasonable, information about human nature in making moral appraisals. Thus we have a paradox; we seem to have moral knowledge, but when we analyze it we find we have only factual knowledge. The *ought* seems elusive. But once we note that moral knowledge is not a theoretical knowledge about what is the case but is a practical kind of knowledge or reasoning used to guide actions, the philosophical paradox will disappear. If we note carefully the kind of job moral reasoning is designed to do, we can see that it is as reliable as theoretical reasoning or scientific reasoning, though it is of a radically different nature. Like scientific knowledge, it will give us reliable objective knowledge, but such moral knowledge is not self-evident knowledge. In either science or morals, to search for self-evidence is to search for a will-o'-

the-wisp. Let me develop my conception of moral reasoning.

MMORAL knowledge is not knowledge that will give us a final book of moral rules. Such a book of rules constituting all of moral knowledge is impossible in principle, in view of the kind of activity that morality is. It is impossible for the same reason that it is impossible to produce a driver's manual that could cover every situation and constitute a knowledge of driving. A man can no more learn to be moral from reading a book of rules or studying a scientific treatise than he can learn to drive from reading a driver's manual. Moral knowledge is practical knowledge. It is a matter of *knowing how*. This is a distinct kind of knowing from *knowing that*, or knowing theoretically. Morality plays a certain rôle in human life, and by understanding this practical rôle, we will find there is no extraordinary puzzle about how some (though, of course, not all) of our moral appraisals are rationally justified.

In saying this I do not become an apologist for the mores of our tribe any more than I become an iconoclast attacking such mores and urging a complete "transvaluation of values." I am only attacking the contention that all moral utterances always are merely expressions of human weal and woe, with no possible rational justification.

There is another consideration. When we make moral claims, we seek to guide actions and alter behavior. If you say that a given alternative is the best among several, you have already committed yourself to try to act on this alternative. If you say something is good or something ought

to be done and then you yourself do not try to do it, people do not believe that you really meant what you said. Moral utterances are designed to guide conduct and alter behavior. They are only incidentally scientific predictions. They have a kind of dynamism and moving appeal that scientific statements usually do not have. If there could be a person who was totally unfeeling, moral language would be quite meaningless to him.

Another feature is important in trying to understand the function of morality in our life. When we make a moral judgment, we are certainly concerned to guide conduct, in a particular way. Not all judgments of practice are moral judgments. We are concerned to guide conduct so that we all can live together in relative peace and harmony. We seek an abundant and harmonious life for ourselves and for our neighbors. And in times like ours when various cultures are in close association, our neighbors are the world.

Let me put this general point in a somewhat different way. All of us have many wants, desires, needs, wishes, interests, and goals that we seek to satisfy. Some of these we call social, some asocial, and some antisocial. I may have a desire to burn up New York City because I would like to see the red glow against the night sky. From the sea it would make a good sight. But to affectuate such an antisocial desire is regarded (to put it mildly) as morally wrong. The reason for this, and the reason why antisocial desires are classed as wrong, is not mysterious. To know this does not call on us to appeal to revelation, or to a mysterious

natural moral law, in the manner of Aquinas or Lippmann. Very simply morality is the kind of activity that is concerned with regulating and mediating between desires and interests. Its function is to guide conduct so that we can all realize as many of our individual desires as are compatible with the desires of our fellow men.

This does not make all good desires only those desires which the great majority of men seek. It leaves room for unique and individual desires. I am peculiar enough to like harpsichord music, but the realization of my desire is not wrong. Asocial desires are not antisocial desires. But it is wrong if I play my harpsichord music so loud at two o'clock in the morning that my neighbors cannot sleep.

From this general conception of the functions of morals we can—assuming we wish to be moral—get a general standard for evaluating moral rules. We have an activity called morality because people under most circumstances wish to live and wish to live together peacefully. Because we have such desires, we have an activity or *form of life* called morality which has the practicalistic function of guiding our conduct so we can live together without, as Hobbes put it, fearing constantly a violent and hasty death. This is the basis for judging moral rules and with these justified moral rules we have the basis for judging moral acts.

What I have just said does not imply that all moral decisions or moral choices are clear-cut or easily resolvable. Anyone who has experienced the anguish of a serious moral decision knows that any philosophical theory

making claim that moral decisions are easily resolvable must be false. Our non-textbook moral problems arise in unusual situations and usually involve a conflict of moral principles. Often it is difficult to decide which desires are compatible with other desires; often it is difficult, almost to the point of impossibility, to determine just what our real desires are. Freud has made us well aware of this. In resolving the two objections just mentioned, our scientific information about human nature becomes most important. But it does not make ethics a science. Rather, ethics is a *practical activity* that *uses* scientific information in guiding conduct.

In an unusual situation an individual must weigh the various considerations and decide for himself just what to do. And, as Aristotle taught us long, long ago, no book of rules can make it unnecessary to make this effort. But man does not decide baselessly on the flip of the coin, as Camus and our existentialists suggest; rather, in virtue of the kind of activity that morality is, man has reliable and objective guiding principles in his quest for moral wisdom. These guiding principles, together with the ability to apply them intelligently in unique situations, constitute our knowledge of the tree of good and evil.

SUCH hard won and indispensable knowledge of good and evil is, of course, essential in a rational life; and a discussion and clarification of these basic ideals of reasonable living is crucial in the educational program of the college. By now it has become a platitude that the development of

[Continued on page 294]

elementary courses. In addition, specialized departments will find that students come to their advanced courses with a lively interest generated through the realization that academic knowledge has personal and social significance. The university as a whole benefits from the general-education program. Through the post-campus study students remain in contact with the university after graduation and continue to support its educational endeavors. As universities grow larger and specialization becomes narrower, it becomes increasingly difficult to keep open the channels of communication between the specialties, the administration, and the students who eventually become important social agents. The general-education department facilitates this communication while preparing students more adequately to meet the challenge of modern living.

[Vol. XXVIII, No. 5]

Reason and Morality

KAI NIELSEN

[Continued from page 274]

skill and technical intelligence without the acquisition of wisdom and some measure of self-understanding is hardly an education at all. In logic courses we study and learn (or supposedly learn) the correct forms or modes of reasoning or argument in certain specific areas of discourse; in ethics we study and learn the far shiftier forms or modes of moral reasoning. We try to understand the structure of that conceptual area. The student thus attains some understanding of the very canons of moral reasoning that he hitherto had only half-consciously and perhaps fum-

blingly used or operated with. I have tried to suggest that he can most readily come to understand the unscheduled inferences involved in moral reasoning by gaining some insight into the characteristic functions of moral discourse.

However, an informed morality cannot ignore other kinds of knowledge. In order to make rational moral choices a vastly greater and deeper knowledge of "the nature of human nature" is desperately needed with a social implementation of this knowledge in the form of more psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, psychiatric social workers, counselors, and sociologically and psychologically sophisticated clergymen and teachers. Informed practical choices must be based on scientifically ascertained or ascertainable facts even though it is in this very relation of morals to science that many of our current intellectual moral perplexities find their source. The goal of moral knowledge remains practical wisdom in human conduct; and, in this it unites itself with the ultimate aims of education.

[Vol. XXVIII, No. 5]

The Lost Generation of College Youth

CHARLES I. GLICKSBERG

[Continued from page 264]

insurgent minority of "rebels"—are feverishly obsessed with the dialectics of death and the specious cult of Nothing, it is because at heart they are so eager to salvage their life and to redeem the time. It is only those who know they are lost who will make a "religious" effort to find the way.

[Vol. XXVIII, No. 5]