

Toward a Liberal Socialist Cosmopolitan Nationalism

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Abstract

I explicate and defend a form of liberal socialist nationalism. It is also a nationalism which is cosmopolitan. Explication and explanation are crucially in order here, for it is not unreasonable to believe that ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ and ‘liberal socialist nationalism’ and even ‘liberal nationalism’ are oxymoronic. Against that I argue that there is a straightforward understanding of these concepts and their relations to each other that does not have inconsistencies or even paradoxes. Liberal socialism properly understood goes well with cosmopolitanism (both moral and institutional), and there are plausible and attractive forms of both liberalism and socialism that go together. Moreover, the only candidate for a nationalism that would survive careful reflective inquiry is a liberal nationalism: a nationalism which is neither ethnic nor civic. It is widely believed, however, that even a liberal nationalism is incompatible with cosmopolitanism. I contend in a series of arguments that in contexts where nationalism is rightly on the agenda the form that it should take is that of a liberal nationalism, and it is further argued that to be viable, nationalism requires cosmopolitanism.

Keywords: cosmopolitan; liberal; nationalism; socialism; Marxism

I

I want to be and think that I am a Marxian-rooted cosmopolitan internationalist liberal nationalist. That fine *mélange* of labels is likely to be thought by many to contain on the surface a number of inconsistencies or, if not actual inconsistencies, intractable tensions. Given any even remotely standard understanding of these terms, the pairs ‘Marxian’ and ‘liberal’, ‘Marxian’ and ‘nationalist’, and ‘liberal’ and ‘nationalist’ do not, it is commonly thought, consistently go together. It might even be thought, though less plausibly, that ‘rooted’ and ‘liberal’ do not sensibly mix and that even ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘internationalist’ stand in tension.

I shall attempt to persuade you that these various terms go consistently together, that the conceptions they are expressive of are not in tension, and that there is nothing paradoxical here, let alone untoward, about these

linkages. Beyond that, I shall attempt to persuade you that Marxian cosmopolitan internationalist liberal nationalism, in spite of being a mouthful, is an attractive and perhaps even a sound way of viewing things. I shall close with some remarks on Gillian Brock's arguments concerning alleged tensions between cosmopolitans and liberal nationalists and on the alleged inadequacy of liberal nationalism.

I shall not quite do all I have just promised. I shall reserve for another occasion *detailed* argument for how one can consistently be a Marxian (or if you will a Marxist) and, as well, be a liberal and a Marxian/Marxist and a liberal nationalist.¹ (I have argued in some detail for the latter in Nielsen, 1998b and Nielsen, 1999–2000). A Marxian/Marxist will, of course, be a socialist. That is, she will believe in the common and public ownership and control of the major means of production; she will believe in the reality of classes and class conflict and take these notions to be of crucial importance in understanding the dynamics of society; she will believe that justice requires some kind of thorough egalitarian commitment and ethos; she will believe that a socialist society and indeed a socialist world will require both political and economic democracy, and she will believe that some form of historical materialism (as an empirical theory of epochal social change) is at least plausible. She is likely even to believe that it is the best show in town for explaining epochal social change.

Liberals accept what John Rawls calls the basic liberties, namely freedom of speech, conscience, association, and assembly, freedom from violent attack and arbitrary arrest, freedom to live your life as you deem fit as long as you do not harm others or interfere with others living their lives as they see fit as long as they in turn respect the same constraints. Liberals stress as well the freedom of people to leave the country in which they reside, freedom of religion including freedom to be religious or not as they please, freedom from discrimination on the basis of religion, race, sex, sexual orientation, or ethnicity, freedom of all citizens to form political parties, freedom to run for office and, if elected, to hold office. These and similar freedoms are crucial for and indeed definitive of a liberal society. Liberals, in fine, take human autonomy and equality to be essential values. G. A. Cohen, Andrew Levine, Norman Geras, John Roemer, and Erik Olin Wright (among others) are all Marxists who have brilliantly articulated and defended Marxian theory, yet they remain committed to the liberal conceptions listed above, as do I.

Where (if anywhere) is the conflict between Marxians and liberals? You can be a historical materialist and a liberal as non-eccentrically characterized above. You can be for the common ownership of the means of production and be a liberal. In being for the common ownership of the means of production you need not think that it should be *just* forced on anyone, though you may very well think that it should become compulsory as a result of a democratic vote. Though even there it is not written in stone.

It could also be abandoned by democratic vote. I think that once it is securely and democratically in place in wealthy democratic societies (for example, France or Italy) there will be no voluntary reversion to capitalism any more than once capitalism was securely in place there was a reversion to feudalism. But we should not rule that possibility out by legal or normative fiat. Many things – wearing a seatbelt, paying taxes, not going around in public when you have a dangerous infectious disease – are so forced on us in a fully liberal society as a result of legislation voted on in a democratically elected legislature. Why private ownership of productive property should be privileged so that it could not democratically be replaced by public or common ownership is entirely unclear. The same is true – though more paradoxically so – of democracy itself. It can, and legitimately, be forced on us, supposing we did not live in a democratic society, in the same way. And, as John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and G. A. Cohen have carefully argued, equality and liberty belong together. Moreover, even if the claim that they presuppose each other is somehow too strong, still belief in autonomy – particularly autonomy for all – can consistently go with a belief in equality and with the other Marxian/Marxist conceptions listed above. Again I see no conflict *at this level of principle and abstraction* between, say, a Rawlsian political liberalism and the Marxianism and socialism characteristic of Cohen. Even the Marxian belief in the inescapability of class conflict in capitalist and other class-divided societies *need* not, though it might, lead to a belief that proletarians must defeat capitalists on the field of battle for it to be the case that socialism can become a reality: that socialism will not just be a utopian ideal. But, whatever it is plausible to say about this, there is at least conceptual space for a non-violent way to socialism and, even more importantly, for socialism, once achieved, to be sustained in a democratic way in a liberal society. That is, there is no *necessary* conflict between socialism and liberalism or Marxism and liberalism.

Just a word on ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘internationalist’. When I characterize in detail the cosmopolitanism that I defend, it will become apparent that it is internationalist in outlook. The same is true of the major defenders of cosmopolitanism such as Brian Barry, Charles Beitz, Will Kymlicka, David Held, Thomas Pogge, Darrel Moellendorf, Martha Nussbaum, Catherine Wu, and Kok-Chor Tan. ‘Internationalism’ has a more determinately political ring than ‘cosmopolitanism’, and there have been people who are elitists (T. S. Eliot, for example) who regard themselves as cosmopolitans. They are at home all over the world where there are wealthy, highly educated, leisured people with ‘cultivated tastes’. But they are usually anything but internationalists. Still, that understanding of ‘cosmopolitan’ is very different from the understanding of it that goes with the debate about cosmopolitanism and nationalism and the linkage of cosmopolitanism and certain conceptions of global justice.

II

So what is cosmopolitanism, and what is the argument for its compatibility with liberal nationalism? First we should distinguish between cosmopolitanism as a *moral ideal* and *institutional* or *legal* cosmopolitanism. Taken as a *moral ideal* it is committed to the belief, as Charles Beitz puts it,

that we inhabit one moral world, regardless of difference in social position or religion, gender or race, or nationality; any person's standing in that world, as a possible subject of rights and obligations, is the same as anyone else's. At the most fundamental level of morality, your neighbor is not more important than a compatriot who is a stranger, and a compatriot is not more important than the most distant foreigner.

(Beitz, 1994; see also Nussbaum, 1997)

Moral cosmopolitanism here is giving voice to a belief in moral equality – a deeply embedded view in liberal societies – namely the firm conviction that the life of everyone matters and matters equally.

The Stoic claim, revitalized by Martha Nussbaum, that a cosmopolitan will be a world citizen is not to be taken in the literal sense that moral cosmopolitans are committed to trying to set up a world state or a global federation (Nussbaum, 1997, 2000). Moral cosmopolitanism is not even committed to the idea that we should attempt to construct forms of *political organization* that transcend and override local and national forms of political or legal organization in certain circumstances. Moral cosmopolitanism does not commit itself to legal or institutional cosmopolitanism, though it need not deny its possibility either. That is to say, moral cosmopolitans need not be institutional cosmopolitans, though institutional cosmopolitans will also be moral cosmopolitans.

World citizenship, to repeat, is not taken literally by purely moral cosmopolitans, but as an expression of a moral ideal. Moral cosmopolitans have it that we should not give our first allegiance to any form of government or temporal power but to *the moral community made up of the humanity of all human beings*. We should always behave so as to treat with respect the life of every human being, no matter where that person was born, no matter what that person's rank or status may be (Nussbaum, 1997: p. 59). To be committed to such an ideal involves understanding that we are an integral part of a universal community whose ends are the moral ends of justice and human well-being.

Institutional cosmopolitanism, by contrast with *moral* cosmopolitanism, requires something like a world state or a world federation or more vaguely some not very precisely delineated something called world governance – transnational bodies, not very clearly specified, that in some domains could override the sovereignty of nation-states or multi-nation-states.

Nationalism, by contrast, enjoins in some form the right to national self-determination. At least on the face of it, such an *institutional* cosmopolitanism is inherently anti-nationalistic. As Kok-Chor Tan puts it, 'National self-determination calls for the establishment and strengthening of certain major public institutions (e.g. in education, immigration/naturalization policies, official language policies, etc.) at the national level, in order to bring about relatively autonomous political institutions that members might see as "their own" and a public sphere in which the national culture may be expressed' (Tan, 2002). But here there is a conflict between institutional cosmopolitanism and nationalism. As Tan puts it, 'each makes opposing institutional demands – one aiming to concentrate and locate political sovereignty in a centralized world body, the other to keep sovereignty decentralized and dispersed at the national level' (Tan, 2002: p. 15). So it looks as if, after all, cosmopolitanism and nationalism – even liberal nationalism – conflict.

There are, however, three responses to be made to that. (1) *Moral* cosmopolitanism is not committed to any institutional claims, to say nothing about it being committed to institutionalized cosmopolitanism, and moral cosmopolitanism taken by itself is neutral with respect to any of these institutional claims. (2) Most moral cosmopolitans – though this is *not* entailed by the very idea of 'moral cosmopolitanism' – reject, for many of the same reasons as do nationalists, a world state as being thoroughly unworkable and, even if workable, dangerous, for it would, they believe, as well as being very unstable, be inherently tyrannical or at least authoritarian. (3) Sovereignty is no longer a single thing or as absolute as it was taken to be on Westphalian nation-state models. It is dispersed over different domains devolving sometimes into sub-state political entities, sometimes in the residue of sovereignty of the nation-states, and sometimes developing into transnational political bodies. Thus there need be no inherent conflict between the claims of sovereignty of nation-states and the claims of sovereignty of transnational bodies, since sovereignty is no longer the unitary thing that it was taken to be, and perhaps was, under the Westphalian dispensation (Pogge, 1994).

Moral cosmopolitanism takes the high ground – some might say a too utopian ground – of claiming that the individual is the ultimate unit of moral worth and concern, and that how we ought to act or what kinds of institutions we ought to allow to be established or supported should be based on an impartial consideration of the claims of each person who would be affected by our choices (Tan, 2002; Pogge, 1994).²

We should note that 'moral cosmopolitanism' is not concerned *directly* with the question of how global institutions are to be ordered. It need, for example, take no position about David Held's theory of cosmopolitan democracy (Held, 1995; Brock, 2002b). Its concern is with the *justificatory* basis of such global institutions.³ Tan goes on to remark, perceptively, and

correctly, I believe, that nothing in this understanding of moral cosmopolitanism necessitates accepting the idea of the viability or desirability of a world state or even a world federation. ‘On the contrary, a moral cosmopolitan can as well defend national self-determination if she believes that the ideal of equal and impartial concern for individuals is best realized by respecting their claims to national sovereignty’ (Tan, 2002). If we come to recognize that moral cosmopolitanism is distinct from institutional cosmopolitanism and recognize as well that cosmopolitan global justice is premised on moral cosmopolitanism and not on institutional cosmopolitanism, there is no reason to believe that cosmopolitan justice and nationalism make conflicting claims (Tan, 2002).

III

There is another, somewhat related, argument against the compatibility claim between cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism. It has been called by Henry Shue the compatriots first argument (Shue, 1983), and it has sometimes been called the national partiality argument. The claim the argument makes goes like this: *ceteris paribus*, when the needs of compatriots conflict with the needs of non-compatriots and the needs as far as we can tell are of equal or near-equal urgency and they cannot both be met, then the needs of the compatriots should be met. This conflicts – or at least seems to – with the moral equality principle of cosmopolitanism, namely that the life of everyone matters and matters equally. Clearly, the compatriots first principle prioritizes compatriots over strangers and – so the claim is – this is just the kind of arbitrariness – or at least prioritizing – that cosmopolitanism cannot allow. Clearly, moral equality – at least as an abstract moral proposition – is a firmly held considered conviction in liberal societies, but, while not quite as ubiquitously firmly held, so is the compatriots first principle. Where A and B are equally in need and A is a compatriot and B is not and there is no other significant difference between them, the considered convictions of almost all of us favour helping A rather than B, if we cannot help both. We, at least if we are cosmopolitans, have obligations to both A *and* B. Their very humanity so obligates us. But if we cannot help them both, then A’s need, for us, since A is our compatriot, comes (everything else being equal) first.

We, that is, have two at least apparently conflicting considered convictions. However, we can, appealing to other principles, rules, and beliefs (including prominently other considered convictions) get them – or so I shall argue – into wide reflective equilibrium without backing away from either of the above considered convictions. There is a flexible prioritization here. But we are not working with a hierarchical deductionist model of justification, but a coherentist one (Rawls, 1999: pp. 506–14). Moreover, we cannot, and should not, treat any of our considered convictions as absolute

which *categorically* tell us what to do. We never get anything that is both substantive and unconditional. None of our considered judgments, no matter how deeply embedded, have that status. All of them can be overridden in certain circumstances. We need also to get into our pattern of coherently related beliefs the ought implies can principle. We ought, again *ceteris paribus*, to meet both A's and B's need, but where we can't meet both, we cannot be required to do what we know to be impossible. That would be irrational, and we can't be required to do what is irrational. Still we realize that *ceteris paribus* we should meet both needs; but here, this being impossible, *ceteris* is not *paribus*. But rather than meet *neither* A's nor B's need, we should meet one of their needs. Why add insult to injury? It is bad enough that one person's need cannot be met. It is worse if neither is met. Since being a compatriot – being one of us – has some, though not considerable, moral force and there appears at least no other reason to favour one over the other, then we have reason to favour A.

But why, in the first place, favour compatriots at all? An analogy will, I think, help. Suppose it is a 'contest' between your child and someone else's child, who (as far as we can ascertain) are equally talented, equally energetic, equally committed, and the like and both need funds for special music education. That is what the contest is about. Again it is evident that *ceteris paribus* your *first* moral obligation here is to help your child. It is not that you think that your child is more deserving or that she ought to have the help because she is your child or anything ethnocentric like that. You realize, as a cosmopolitan and probably even if you are not, that 'Because she is your child' is morally irrelevant from an agent non-relative impartial moral point of view and you realize, as well, that this is the relevant point of view in making judgments of worth here.

How then, morally speaking, do you get away with favouring your child here? The argument that I shall give is consequentialist, but, being limited in scope, it is as available to the Kantian or the Rossian as to the utilitarian. It goes like this: if I look after the welfare of my child and you after your child and the neighbour down the block after her child, then, where our situations (including our personalities) are not radically different, the three children will be better off so cared for than if all three of us tried to look out for the welfare of all three children considering each of them equally. This is even more obviously so when we generalize to the children of the whole society.

For each of us to set aside all prioritizing would, not to speak of its impossibility, be a recipe for disaster for the children. We have something here like a division of labour. In more standard cases, if the parents of the children place their primary emphasis on caring for their own children, then generally all the children will fare better. When it comes to social decisions, where the following conditions obtain (the situation, the aims, the desires, and the abilities of the children are, as far as can readily be

ascertained, equal), then where you make the case for your child and your neighbour makes it for hers, social agents (say officials authorized to make the decisions here) must do the moral equivalent of flipping a coin. There is, if the situation I described obtains, no basis for making the decision. But what *you* should do remains clear. You should give priority to looking after your own child. But for social agents who must decide who is to get the award, there is no basis, no ground, for doing one thing rather than the other. There isn't *always* something like a morally sufficient reason for doing one thing rather than another. To believe that there is is rationalism running wild.

However, the situation certainly isn't always, or even standardly, like the one described above. It is seldom the case that the children are equally talented, equally motivated, and the like. And some parents are too crazy or too oppressed or too ignorant or too impoverished or more typically many of these things together to be able to look after their children properly, and then the emphasis has to change and the obligations, with varying degrees of urgency, will move to others. But, if it were not generally the case that the emphasis was for parents to prioritize caring for their own children and that they would usually have the ability to look after their own children reasonably well, then there would be little flourishing of children in society. (That there is often a deficit in flourishing suggests that these conditions do not obtain as typically as we tend to assume.) For a sensible and realistic (if that does not come to the same thing) attempt to bring into being circumstances where concern and respect will obtain as equally as they reasonably can for all children, we should abide by the following rule: *ceteris paribus* put the needs of your own children first, for in that way we shall both maximize and equalize, as much as we can, the flourishing of all children and best approximate the realization – though still perhaps not very well – of the principle that the life of everyone matters and matters equally.

Remember, however, that *ceteris* is not always *paribus*. All the same, we should have concern first, though surely not anything like sole concern, in normal circumstances, for our nearest and dearest. This enables us (where 'us' is taken collectively) best to realize our cosmopolitan commitments to humanity. If most people act this way, and allowances are made for those who do not, and there is special provision for children who are disadvantaged in various ways, the result will be the most extensive and most equally distributed flourishing for all that can be managed. Or at least this rule turned into a social practice makes for the most general flourishing that is obtainable. Putting our nearest and dearest first does not conflict with cosmopolitanism, but in any feasible world, most extensively achieves cosmopolitan ends. Nothing, of course, will enable us to achieve them fully – there never will be equal consideration and respect for all – but this will result in the best approximation to it. We should keep heaven in mind while keeping our feet firmly on the ground.

Similar considerations – though less obviously – obtain for the compatriots first rule (Beitz, 1983; Shue, 1983; Pogge, 1994). We live in a world of nation-states, multi-nation-states, and nations seeking to be nation-states or to be states within a multi-nation-state system or at least aspiring to have some form of self-governance. This was not always the case – the groups of peoples were not always grouped into nations – and perhaps it will not always continue. But that is our situation now.

Suppose – being so situated – that we normally value cultural membership (something we surely do), which in our situation is *partially* constituted by being members of distinct nations. Suppose further, to move now to the counterfactual idealization, that the whole world is composed of wealthy liberal nation-states or multi-nation-states (it is like Switzerland, Luxemburg, and Sweden), and suppose further that our states, relative to each other, are equal in wealth and power and are equally decent politically and socially; and suppose further, to be very, very counterfactual, that this obtains between the citizens in the states as well as in the relations between these states themselves. Here in this very artificial situation the compatriots first rule clearly obtains. The well-being of the citizens generally will be best realized if the Swedes look after the Swedes and the Swiss after the Swiss and so on. Normally compatriots have a better understanding of their own situation and what needs to be done. Things are roughly parallel with what I said about parents and children. For cosmopolitans and for liberal nationalists as well this does not mean, and indeed cannot mean, that any one nation is favoured or that the people prioritizing their compatriots believe that they are the favoured *Volk*, superior, more deserving, better, or anything of that sort. They just realize that, in such idealized circumstances, the citizens of each nation, generally speaking, will fare better if each nation-state operates on the compatriots first rule. In *the* idealized situation (counterfactual just because it is an *idealization*) I have characterized, equality and human flourishing would be more adequately met in a world so ordered containing those three countries than by alternative arrangements. Now assume, wildly counterfactually, that situation throughout the whole world (i.e. that the nations concerned were related to each other as we hypothesized that Switzerland, Luxemburg, and Sweden were related to each other). Should we not also, if that were so, apply the compatriots first rule there as well? Would that not be the best way under the circumstances of maximizing and equalizing human flourishing? It seems, at least, that it would, given those simplifying assumptions.

However, the objection comes trippingly on the tongue, we do not live in such a world or even in a remotely near approximation to it, and there may well never be a world which even remotely approximates to it. Between different nation-states there are often vast differences in wealth, power, education, territory, population, military strength, and social provision. In

such a world the compatriots first rule plainly cannot be so *simply* applied. But remember, it was a *ceteris paribus* rule – as perhaps all substantive moral rules are – and that *ceteris* is not always, or indeed even very frequently, *paribus*. There are desperately poor countries (Sierra Leone, Haiti, or Chad, for example) very much in need of considerable transfers of wealth from the rich nation-states. If we are to have a world which is even approximately decent, strangers *sometimes* in certain important respects must come before compatriots. The imbalance between conditions of life in the North and the South is – to remind ourselves of the moral realities – simply obscene. Cosmopolitans, as I and others have characterized them, are egalitarians, and no egalitarian can accept with equanimity the vast disparities of life conditions that obtain between countries (Pogge, 2001). Fifty thousand people starve each day, but rarely, if at all, in the rich capitalist democracies. Here some considerable qualification of the compatriots first rule is in order.

When such matters are brought vividly before us, it is easy to panic and to have a sense that we are in an intractably and tragically desperate moral situation. There are, we are likely to say to ourselves, where we are living with relative comfort in affluent societies, so many of the desperately poor – the starving, the chronically malnourished, people with very short life expectancies living in wretched conditions – compared to so few of us, the moderately and comfortably affluent. We would have, we are inclined to believe, to be saints to commit ourselves to the transfers that would need to be made to make life even minimally decent for the mass of the world's impoverished. Nation-states in forming policies which would even minimally answer to the needs of the world's impoverished, as well as morally concerned individuals trying to do their fair share to turn the world situation around, would find themselves in triage situations. It leads Richard Rorty to talk in this way. We are in the horrible circumstance, he has it, of needing to engage in triage (Rorty, 1996). Henry Shue, whose information is better and whose feet are more firmly on the ground, describes this common reaction well:

It is frequently suggested, more or less strongly, that to acknowledge 'global principles of justice' would be to commit oneself to duties to transfer wealth from oneself or one's community in such enormous amounts that one would have to commit a kind of financial hari Kari in the fulfillment of the duties.

(Shue, 1983: p. 600).

And this, of course, few people will do. It would break for most of us what John Rawls calls the strains of commitment. Most people will see such a commitment as insane. It is not something we can build a theory of global justice on, or even root a coherent belief in global justice in,

whether we are cosmopolitans or subscribe to some other form of egalitarianism or are liberal nationalists. But – distressing as it is – there is no logical incompatibility between cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism here. Moreover, as several intellectuals have pointed out (Shue among them, but perhaps most powerfully Thomas Pogge and Harriet Friedman), all this talk of inescapable triage situations or financial hari kari, however deeply and honestly felt, is in reality uninformed romantic warble (Pogge, 1994, 1996, 2001 and Friedman, 1982). The portions of the GDP of all the rich capitalist democracies devoted to foreign aid are minuscule. With a modest increase from these democracies (though it would not be modest in relation to what is actually given) – say 5 per cent of their GDP – starvation, malnutrition, lack of clean drinking water, lack of education for the children of these impoverished populations, and other aspects of the most dreadful conditions so pervasive in parts of the world could be completely eradicated and these societies made viable with little in the way of sacrifice from the populations of the rich capitalist democracies. The standard of living in these rich countries need hardly be affected at all. To the governments of the rich countries, such modest and easily achievable but such humanly imperative transfers are a matter of indifference. If they actually cared, a persistent and accurate educational effort directed to their own populations would be made that would turn things around, though perhaps not overnight. The fears of financial hari kari rooted in the ignorance of their electorates could be allayed. The information is readily available and no doubt the governments of the rich capitalist democracies have it, yet no such effort is made. Why?

It is no exaggeration to say that such behaviour and attitudes on the part of our governments are (morally speaking) criminal. What we have (making it even worse, given the hypocrisy of it) is some pious hand wringing, constituting as gross a form of moral *ideology* as you can ask for, and in reality a firm commitment in the world of action to facilitate the greatest possible capital accumulation for their multinationals and the like with the savage exploitation that goes with it. On the part of the populations of these countries we have ignorance, prejudice about the peoples needing help, and again indifference. What we can see is that there is no morally or even prudentially sustainable ground – unless being prudential requires a thorough selfishness – for not giving a generous everything else being equal reading to the compatriots first rule. What we get instead is a very stringent application of it, leaving very little room for any consideration of strangers. What we are witnessing in the world of actually existing politics is a good rule manipulatively and ideologically applied to rationalize the suffering in the world (Pogge, 1994, 1996; Nielsen, 2002; Shue 1983). Like G7 resolutions about poverty, it is thoroughly hypocritical.

There remains another other turn of this dialectic. It is plain that, morally speaking, we cannot ignore our nearest and dearest or even our compatriots, who are for the most part strangers to us, though not so culturally distant as many others. We have special obligations to them, broadly similar to the obligations we have to our children, that, morally speaking, we have to acknowledge. This is a firm, considered conviction. But we also have obligations to people far away and from cultures strange to us, as cosmopolitans in the tradition of the Stoics and Kant stress, in our very humanity and theirs and in our sense of that humanity – a sense that we are a worldwide moral community. Both cosmopolitans and liberal nationalists must acknowledge that. So in this way their views are compatible, and where our nation must struggle for self-governance, we who are cosmopolitans committed to cosmopolitan principles of global justice should also be liberal nationalists.

Still, it may be thought, a cosmopolitan commitment and a liberal nationalist commitment can still conflict. *Ceteris paribus*, compatriots come first. Sometimes, perhaps even most of the time, we can agree when *ceteris* is *paribus*. But not always. And it is plain that we do not have anything like an algorithm here to yield a decision procedure. Reasonable and humane people, carefully using the method of wide reflective equilibrium, may not in some instances agree about how much weight to give to ‘cosmopolitan considerations’ or to ‘local considerations’. Reasoning and reflecting as hard and as carefully as they can, they sometimes do not achieve a common reflective endorsement, and a person carefully reflecting may herself remain a ‘divided soul’ unable to determine what she should do and what she should reflectively endorse. Most cases are not like that, but *some* are. And here cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism can conflict. Suppose that the Quebec government sees, reasonably, that there is a drastic need to revamp its school system and needs money – indeed, a considerable amount of money – for that, but also sees the need for a lot of aid to make education possible at all for many children in (say) Tanzania. Both are vital projects, but Quebec does not have enough money for both even with a feasible increase in taxes. Should things be tilted toward the compatriots first rule side or go more ‘cosmopolitan’? There may be no consensus on that. And reasoning as carefully as we can and attending to the facts may still yield no agreement between reasonable, informed, clear-minded, reflective, and humane people. People tilting toward the more ‘nationalist side’ may go one way and people tilting toward the more ‘cosmopolitan side’ may go the other. So *here* cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism seem at least not to go consistently together.

First we should note that that is not something distinctive of or unique to cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Whether, if we were to carry out our inquiry long enough and carefully enough, we would come to agreement, we do not know. We do not even get convergence in the natural sciences.

Why should we expect it in morality? Throughout the domains of morality and normative politics we get such disagreements on occasion. If we required complete absence of disagreement there would be no agreement at all concerning large normative matters, and indeed sometimes factual matters as well. But in many normative matters, including those that come up about the compatriots first rule, (a) there is considerable agreement substantively and (b) there is a method (wide and general reflective equilibrium) that will help us widen our agreement or focus our disagreement, if that is what results from reasoning and reflecting together. If the choice is between (a) spending a million dollars on new dress uniforms for the military and more flags or new jets for the prime minister and his top cabinet ministers and (b) spending that million dollars on safe drinking water in Chad, it is clear, if we are reasoning morally, where the money should go.

More generally, it is clear that there should be more transfer payments from North to South. But other cases are less clear. For example, it is not obvious exactly how much money should be transferred from the richer provinces in Canada to the poorer ones. There are always moral situations in which we do not know what to say or do or even what attitude to take toward what is to be done. But this also takes place against a background of agreement. It does not make *everything*, or even every important thing, an arbitrary matter of decision, and it does not make cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism incompatible. *Sometimes* in moral questions there just are matters which are, or at least certainly appear to be, rationally irreconcilable. But it should not be claimed that that is normally the case.⁴

IV

At the start of this paper, I advertised myself with the mouthful ‘Marxian cosmopolitan internationalist liberal nationalist’ and announced rather rashly that I would show that the several elements of this position that sound oxymoronic (for example, ‘liberal nationalist’) actually felicitously go together. I briefly argued for the consistency and coherence of ‘liberal Marxian’ and ‘cosmopolitan internationalist’ while concentrating on what it is most important to argue *here*, namely ‘cosmopolitan liberal nationalist’. In this section I shall turn to a segment of that not pursued in the previous section, namely ‘liberal nationalist’. I (sometimes with Jocelyne Couture) have devoted considerable attention to it elsewhere, arguing that it is the only attractive nationalist position (Nielsen with Couture, 1996; Nielsen, 1998–9, 2000). It is not only a coherent liberal political stance but, or so I argued, compatible with a liberal socialism as well (Nielsen, 1998, 1999–2000). I shall return to explaining and arguing for its coherency and integrity here.

In seeing a little more clearly what liberal nationalism consists in and that it is not an oxymoron, it is necessary first to recognize that there are nationalisms and nationalisms and that most nationalisms are bad, some terribly, even obscenely, bad. Nationalisms have been extremely violent and even genocidal. Think of the acts of the Nazis, the Serbs, and the Hutus and in earlier times of the genocidal acts of settlers against aboriginals, seeing them as 'blocking the sweep of civilization'. Settler countries such as Australia and the United States exemplified this well. Ethnic cleansing, sometimes utilizing genocide, is as old as the hills. But where nationalism was not genocidal or so overtly violent, it was typically xenophobic and racist, or at least, in its milder forms, ethnocentric and chauvinist. Nationalists in such cases have the sense that they are the chosen people. They confidently see themselves as living and behaving in the way that all right-thinking and right-living people ought to.

Such nationalisms are oppressive, though in varying degrees, and harmful to people, though sometimes in different ways, typically both inside and outside their societies. This is the nationalism we have learned to despise, and rightly so. A liberal nationalism, by definition, cannot be that or anything like that. If there are only nationalisms like the ones described above, then there are no liberal nationalisms, and indeed it is to be hoped, if nationalisms must be like that, that they will disappear as soon as possible.

The usual variety of such bad nationalism is ethnic nationalism: a nationalism that traces membership of a nation by descent. It is who your ancestors were that determines your membership, not cultural and linguistic attunement and willingness to live by the basic rules of the society. Ethnic nationalisms are closed racist societies. Germany, Israel, Croatia, and Serbia have ethnic conceptions of the nation. Where they are nationalisms, they are ethnic nationalisms. A Volga German, not knowing a word of German and having no cultural attunement to Germany, can on crossing the German border claim German citizenship and be accepted as German, while someone born in Germany whose parents were 'guest workers' in Germany and who speaks fluent German (and perhaps no other language), went through the German school system, is otherwise culturally attuned to Germany, and thinks of herself as a German is not regarded as German either by the law or (generally) by German society. She has no right to German citizenship. This is plainly ethnic nationalism. By contrast, there is a purely political and cultural nationalism where what entitles one to membership of a nation is cultural attunement, speaking the language or at least one of the official languages of the nation, having an understanding of the basic structures of the society, and in the case of immigrants and refugees, if they are to become citizens, an affirmation of loyalty to the nation of which they are to become citizens. There is no requirement, as there is in ethnic nationalism, of ancestry in the nation of

which one becomes a citizen: no connection of blood and soil (Nielsen, 1996–7).

Liberal nationalisms, to repeat, cannot be ethnic nationalisms; they are political *and* cultural nationalisms. However, being such nationalisms is not sufficient to make them liberal nationalisms. A thoroughly non-liberal nation – say an authoritarian one – could have a political and cultural nationalism without being at all ethnically nationalist, without linking nationhood to descent. However, if most of the members of a nation think of themselves as being superior to the members of other nations – ‘We’re the best’ – with a sense of manifest destiny that rightfully gives their nation predominance and determining control over the world – Britannia, rule the waves – or at least rule over some ‘backward nations’, their nationalism will certainly not be a liberal nationalism, but it need not be ethnic nationalism either. It could just be a crude illiberal chauvinistic political and cultural nationalism. Arguably the United States today has such a nationalism, as did England, France, and Germany in the past. These nationalisms, along with the ethnic nationalisms, are the bad nationalisms that I characterized earlier.

When – to put it in simple terms – we speak of a nation, we are speaking of a people organized as a political and cultural community (Kymlicka, 1999). And a political community, as distinct from a merely cultural community, will either have or be seeking some form of self-governance and sovereignty – that is, the individuals in question (the people forming the nation) becoming a people having control over their own lives, including, very centrally, control, as far as humanly possible, over what their society is to be like and how it will develop. But, while remaining individuals – what else? – with all the value that accrues to individual autonomy, they are also members of a nation (in some instances nations), and their very identity is tied up with that (Nielsen, 1999–2000, 2000).

Perhaps some day both nation-states and multi-nation-states will wither away, destroyed by globalization, and we shall have some form of world governance instead. However, while capitalist globalization is transforming the nation-state into an ever more efficient facilitator state for global capitalism, the nation-state is not disappearing, though its lack of sovereignty is becoming ever more apparent (Schulte, 1997; Nielsen, 2002). Organized into nation-states or multi-nation-states as we now are, to avoid an even greater deficit in democracy than the very considerable one we now have, we should realize that in our state system, given the present strategic importance of nations, democracy is best attained or approximated by a liberal nationalism or by a people, generally with social liberal commitments – socialist or social democratic commitments – that will carry with it a cosmopolitanism organized in a nation-state or a multi-nation-state, which will be nationalistic if their nations are threatened or insecure. Both realize democracy more adequately than other forms of political

liberalism, including its anti-nationalist cosmopolitan forms. A *socialist* cosmopolitan nation-state or multi-nation-state that is also a liberal nationalism (where nationalism is in order) would be even more democratic than a social democratic one, or so I have argued elsewhere (Nielsen, 1999–2000, 2002). However, I do not argue that here, but limit myself to claiming that among the democracies and pseudo-democracies on offer in our capitalist societies, liberal nationalisms (where nationalism is in order) which are also social democracies have the fewest democratic deficits.

With all of democracy's discontents, nations remain crucial to democracy under conditions of modernity – under, that is, foreseeable conditions for us. Where a nation lacks self-governance, where people cannot be *maître chez nous*, to that very important extent democracy is weakened. Indeed, this comes close to being a tautology, but it still has significance.

A nationalist of whatever stripe is someone who cares for her nation – the nation she identifies with – and who, seeing, or at least believing, that its independence is threatened or realizing that it has not yet been achieved, seeks to sustain securely or achieve, as the case may be, some form of self-governance for her nation. But the nation the liberal nationalist seeks to sustain or achieve must have a certain form. A liberal nationalism must be a *reiterable* nationalism, and the nation-state to be sustained or achieved must be a liberal state – 'liberal' not in the sense of 'neo-liberal', but in the sense of 'social liberal' described above and coming from the tradition of John Stuart Mill, T. H. Green, John Dewey, John Rawls, and Ronald Dworkin.

It must be reiterable in the following way. Group identity and cultural membership being key goods for all human beings (arguably, in Rawls's sense, primary goods), they are things that, morally speaking, must *not* be recognized (acknowledged and accepted) *only* for the nationalist's own nation but for all human beings, whoever they are and wherever they are, who live in nations, and similar things must obtain for people not organized in nations. In that respect human beings are not relevantly different. And if national identity is characteristically the form that group identity takes under the conditions of modernity, then sustaining or obtaining, as the case may be, a secure national identity for the members of a nation should obtain not only for her nation but for all nations. This reiteration assumes only the minimal and unproblematic conception of universalizability that says that if *x* is good for *A*, then *x* is good for anyone relevantly like *A* in situations relevantly like those of *A*.

A liberal nationalism will not only be reiterable, but will be tolerant of all other nationalisms that accept and practise reiterability themselves and are similarly tolerant. As a social liberalism, liberal nationalism will have substantively egalitarian cosmopolitan principles of justice that acknowledge the equal standing of all human beings, the importance of coming to

have the necessary means actually to have equal standing, the necessity of designing programmes and policies aimed at achieving or approximating that, recognizing the great value of a commitment to equal respect for all human beings, and honouring, as was noted earlier, the considered conviction – the deeply embedded liberal belief – that the life of everyone matters and matters equally (Nagel, 1979: pp. 105–27).

However, so that this will not be a sham, a liberal nationalist should also argue for the necessity of there being the material conditions for its realization in place so that the ideal can become a reality and not simply remain an ideal. Here liberal nationalists would do well to follow Rosa Luxemburg.

We should keep firmly in mind, along with a recognition that cultural membership is a primary good, that this primary good must (in the moral sense), where this is empirically possible, be available to everyone (Couture and Nielsen, 1996). Where it can be done, not making it so available would be arbitrary and deeply morally unacceptable, for it is something all humans need, since, as a primary good, it is something necessary for the meeting of whatever ends or aims we – that is, anyone – happen to have. Different as people are in some important respects, they do not differ in this. Some income (or its equivalent in societies that do not have a money economy) and wealth, health, education, and some recognition and acceptance as well as cultural membership are *all-purpose means* – I do not say that that is all they are – necessary for the realization of the various ends that we humans have and the life-plans (whatever they may be) that are ours. Primary goods, in fine, are something we all need. We shall not, and morally speaking cannot, privilege (whoever we are and however situated) our own people with respect to them, but must argue that this egalitarian treatment should obtain for everyone, recognizing that the people of our nation are not relevantly different from anyone else in this respect (Couture and Nielsen, 1996).

A *liberal* nationalist, like *any* nationalist, will care for her nation and struggle to sustain it and to see it flourish, and, where it lacks self-governance, she will seek to help achieve that for her nation. But she cannot *privilege* her nation in these respects. This is something that as a *liberal* she must acknowledge to be necessary and legitimate for *all* nations and for all people and peoples. She cannot, morally speaking, deny or override this in other nations, desiring it to obtain *only* for her own nation and acting to fulfil this desire and to limit other nations where they are not expansionist. She will want it and seek it for her own nation, certainly, but she will acknowledge – and must acknowledge to be consistent – that this should obtain for all other nations as well that will make and live by the same acknowledgement.

So there is nothing contradictory about liberal nationalism. Indeed, more than that, it is inescapable for a cosmopolitan in the sense that she must

acknowledge its fit with cosmopolitanism and she must be prepared to defend the cause of liberal nationalisms where liberal nations are under threat in any way. Any morally acceptable nationalism must be (to be pleonastic) a liberal cosmopolitanism, and, where a system of nation-states or multi-nation-states is justifiably in place, a sound cosmopolitan will also accept the legitimacy of liberal nationalism and actually be a liberal nationalist herself where the nation of the liberal nationalist is in any way threatened or insecure.

V

I shall now briefly engage with with some of Gillian Brock's contentions and arguments on these subjects. Brock maintains vis-à-vis liberal nationalism that 'cosmopolitanism currently enjoys the weight of the better argument' (Brock, 2002a). But that just assumes that they are in competition rather than being mutually supplementary. I have argued, by contrast, that in their most adequate forms they require each other. An adequate form of liberal nationalism requires cosmopolitanism, and an adequate cosmopolitanism (in contexts where we have nations and a system of nation-states or multi-nation-states firmly in place) requires liberal nationalism where any of these states are at risk or are impeded from coming into existence. There is no plausible assertion that either cosmopolitanism or liberal nationalism enjoys the weight of the better argument if they simply belong together. We could only say that if they were alternatives.

However, Brock could argue that they are actual alternatives in two ways. First, there could, she might claim, be a cosmopolitanism that was not a liberal cosmopolitanism. But that would not be any of the cosmopolitanisms that are contenders with us or that she describes or are part of the cosmopolitan tradition. They all take thoroughly social liberal forms. Moreover, I very much doubt that Brock would want to claim that non-liberal forms of cosmopolitanism would be the most adequate forms of cosmopolitanism or even adequate at all. Indeed, I think that she should, and probably would, deny that they are cosmopolitanisms at all.

Secondly, and more plausibly, Brock might argue that while an adequate form of cosmopolitanism must be liberal, it should not be a liberal *nationalism*. But then she would have to face squarely the arguments for liberal nationalism and its relations to cosmopolitanism developed in this paper. Perhaps she can counter them, but they do need countering. To begin with, how, in conditions of modernity, could we have the good of cultural membership without nations and, even if we can manage something like cosmopolitan democracy, have the good of cultural membership without nation-states or multi-nation-states or at least nations that have some measure of self-governance? And liberal nationalism would

be in order here – that is, in any of these situations – where these nations are threatened or their existence denied or their demand for some measure of self-governance rejected, ignored, or in any way blocked.

To make this response plausible, she would have to argue that at least in ideal conditions we could and should have a world without nations. People might still have a sense of cultural membership. But their cultural membership would be just that: a purely cultural membership. They would just be people with a sense of forming a cultural unit, but with no aspirations to self-governance. She would have to argue that a people might exist, and legitimately so, without the right to some measure of self-governance. She would have to maintain that a properly globalized world, which as Held believes, and probably she does too, would have to be a globalized capitalism, that this world, as neither Held nor Thomas Pogge believes, would also have to be a world without nations having some reasonable measure of self-governance (Held, 1995; Pogge, 1994). We would have to have either a world-state or world-federation cosmopolitanism governing things from above or somehow world-governance without some superstate entity or entities that does the governing. All of these conceptions – a world-federation less so than the others – seem at least to be bad news for democracy, and the third of dubious coherence as well (Couture, 2000).

I doubt that Brock would be happy with any of these alternatives. She remarks, correctly, that whether nationalism and cosmopolitanism are compatible ‘depends on how much is packed into one’s cosmopolitanism and one’s nationalism’ (Brock, 2002a). Well, of course. But I explicitly denied that all cosmopolitanisms and all nationalisms were compatible. Non-liberal nationalism is plainly not compatible with cosmopolitanism, and non-liberal cosmopolitanism is compatible with neither liberal nationalism nor non-liberal nationalism. But neither such nationalisms or cosmopolitanisms were being argued for by me, and they are not argued for by those intellectuals who are part of the cosmopolitan tradition. She would have to show, against my arguments, that liberal nationalism was inconsistent, in some other way untoward, or in some way impossible, or that a non-liberal cosmopolitanism was in some way desirable or at issue here. In doing any of these things she would have to show that my cosmopolitanism was too demanding. She suggests this in her remark that it is an egalitarianism advocating the meeting of all basic needs. But this is to be taken, as it repeatedly is by cosmopolitans, including me, as a heuristic, to be approximated (Nielsen, 1985). Taken in that way, it is not too demanding. And her claim that my ‘nationalism seems particularly innocuous, and is more a concession to what he [Nielsen] identifies as a fundamental need for self-definition’ (2002a), is mistaken on at least two accounts. First, I argue in my ‘Cosmopolitan Nationalism’ (2000) that in addition to issues of self-definition, cosmopolitan liberal nationalism is

sometimes crucial in attaining self-governance under conditions of modernity. That is, it is important under those conditions for those of us who favour democracy. Secondly, liberal nationalism is hardly innocuous, for it gives principled grounds for firmly rejecting the nationalisms that have almost universally been found to be bad at least by intellectuals, while still, Herder-like, arguing for the centrality of nations and a form of nationalism in our political and social life. We can rightly have neither illiberal nationalism nor a *rationalistic* Enlightenment cosmopolitanism. Herder must supplement but not supplant Holbach. Herder (and liberal nationalists generally) provide a necessary humanizing of Enlightenment rationalism.

Finally, she says that my ‘commitment to cosmopolitanism is clearly prioritized’ over liberal nationalism (Brock, 2002a). This would be correct if she qualified ‘cosmopolitanism’ by adding the word ‘liberal’, as she probably would. Taking it that way, note what she goes on to say:

Cosmopolitanism is clearly prioritized [between cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism] as the first and more important one, so it is clear which is to be preferred if the two propose conflicting courses of action, say. Whether being a cosmopolitan nationalist is likely to prove a successful combination depends on such clear prioritization.

(Brock, 2002a)

Again I say ‘Of course, what else?’ It does not show at all that there is anything wrong with my conception of ‘cosmopolitan liberal nationalism’ with such a clearly articulated and rationalized articulation yielding a non-*ad hoc* prioritization, any more than John Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness is shown to be defective because he has a strict lexically ordered prioritizing of his fundamental principles of justice. The distinctiveness and importance of his position is shown in that very ordering and its rationale. There is nothing in the least inconsistent or conceptually untoward in Rawls’s prioritizing. Where criticism could come in is in the justification of and rationale for his prioritizing. Perhaps it could be shown that the whole package is mistaken or importantly flawed. But just the bare fact, *taken in itself*, that the equal liberty principle has priority over the difference principle does not show that anything is wrong with justice as fairness (it was set up to have such a structure). Similarly the bare fact that liberal cosmopolitanism has priority over liberal nationalism does not in itself show that there is anything either wrong with or particularly innocuous about ‘cosmopolitan liberal nationalism’. What needs to be shown is that there is something wrong with that conception, and that Brock has not done. Rawls’s prioritized principle of justice has (or at least arguably has) certain intellectual virtues that Rossian pluralistic deontology lacks:

Rawls's account gives us a rationale for deciding what is to be done when two courses of action conflict, rather than just leaving us intuiting, without guidance, what is suitable in the situation. So, as I show, sometimes at least my account, with its prioritizing, gives us some reason to choose in a certain way when two proposed courses of action conflict without abandoning either cosmopolitanism or liberal nationalism. It is not the strict prioritizing that we have in Rawls's account, but it is a prioritizing.

It is exactly right to say that whether cosmopolitan nationalism will prove such a successful combination depends on such a prioritization. But what needs to be shown is that there is something mistaken or arbitrary so that combining cosmopolitanism and nationalism somehow undermines or weakens either or both. But this has not been shown, and I have extensively argued in the body of this paper that it does not weaken either but in fact strengthens both.

Brock's use of 'particularly innocuous' and her talk of nationalism being 'onto tribalistic and infantile ways of thinking' (Brock, 2002) lead me to conjecture that she, like Brian Barry (by implicit and arbitrary persuasive definition), takes *real* nationalism to be either ethnic nationalism or cultural and political nationalism of the illiberal chauvinistic sort (Barry, 1987).⁵ But that is plainly arbitrary. There are clear articulations of liberal nationalism and models for it. My efforts aside, there is the work in the articulation and defence of liberal nationalism of Jocelyne Couture, Will Kymlicka, Yael Tamir, David Miller, Michel Seymour, Avishai Margaliti, and Joseph Raz. It is not evident that this is all or even principally dross; that what is defended is not 'real' nationalism – real nationalism being only the bad kind – or a genuine contender for a plausible nationalism.

Perhaps Brock would say that while liberal nationalism is not inconsistent or incoherent or even morally untoward, it is *impossible*, or at least we have good reason to believe that it is impossible, for it has never been exemplified or approximated anywhere. It is just an unrealizable utopian model – not even a Rawlsian realistic utopia – in the heads of some theoreticians. It has not been instantiated or even approximated anywhere. But that is just false. Scottish, Welsh, Catalanian, Flemish, and Quebec nationalisms, like the nationalisms of Iceland and Norway when they seceded – Iceland from Denmark and Norway from Sweden – were and are liberal nationalisms. Iceland and Norway did not become illiberal nation-states after they seceded (Nielsen, 1998b). And the states they seceded from were and remain liberal societies. When secession occurs in liberal societies, the nationalism tends to be liberal and the resulting states tend to be liberal. When the secession is from illiberal societies, the resulting states tend to be illiberal. When secession is from insecurely liberal societies, the resulting state is likely to be insecurely liberal. There should be nothing surprising in that (Nielsen, 1998a).

That in all liberal nationalist movements there are a few loose cannons that propound illiberal views does not prove anything. There are always loose cannons everywhere, even in the most primitive societies and the most liberal societies. There is cause for concern only if the loose cannons begin to get something of a following. But in secure liberal societies where national minorities have made secessionist claims or even just indulged in nationalist agitation the results, whether successful or not, have remained largely non-violent, and where new nation-states and new multi-nation-states have emerged, they have remained states committed to liberalism. Whatever is actual is possible. There is no good reason at all to believe that liberal nationalisms are impossible or generally untoward or even problematic.

Conclusion

The title of my paper may be both pretentious and bombastic. But possible pretension and bombast aside, what I claim and argue is this. While nationalisms are often vicious, sometimes even extremely vicious, there are nationalisms that are benign and non-self-congratulatory. And they are no more ethnocentric than are the liberal societies which are non-nationalistic. Scotland is no more ethnocentric than England. Where a people's nationhood is threatened or insecure, where they have not been able to achieve or securely sustain it, then nationalism is to be commended. But *only* if they are liberal nationalisms properly reiteratable and defending liberal nations embedded in liberal nation-states or multi-nation-states which, I argue, can be thoroughly socialist states. But in all cases the states must be liberal states. Much as I admire John Rawls, we should have no truck with his decent authoritarian hierarchical states. Perhaps we must tolerate them for a time as a *modus vivendi*, but, as committed democrats, liberals, and cosmopolitans, we must work for their demise, helping their citizens to undermine them and to replace them with democratic regimes. (I am not suggesting use of an army, except in extreme cases (for example, Rwanda in the face of the massacres) to right things and put in place – that is, impose – a liberal state. Among other things, that would be counter-productive.) But (*pace* Rawls) we should not accord even decent illiberal hierarchical authoritarian states legitimacy and respectability. That not only runs against liberalism, but runs against cosmopolitanism as well. I would go further and say that we should not even cooperate with them where that can reasonably be avoided and not put even worse burdens on their citizens.

A major problem, with which this article is much concerned, is to show *that* and *how* nationalists can be liberals and how cosmopolitans can also be nationalists. The main thrust of this article was to establish these two things.

There is, however, a subtext too; it is very much in the background here, but in the forefront of my *Globalization and Justice* (2002). The message of my subtext is that while some incautious defenders of neo-liberal forms of globalization have prophesied the demise of the nation-state, nothing like that is happening. But what is happening with *capitalist* globalization is that nation-states and multi-nation-states as well are being so transformed that they are losing not just absolute sovereignty (something they probably never had anyway), but any meaningful sovereignty. They are increasingly losing control over fiscal policy, health policy, cultural policy, education policy, taxation policy, and the like. Citizens are increasingly losing say, even when working cooperatively with citizens of other states, concerning some of the most important aspects of their own lives (Schulte, 1997; Nielsen, 2002). Our nations-states – to put it bluntly – are becoming procurers for global capitalism: for capitalist globalization. How to resist is a major – arguably the major – political and human problem of our lives.

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Notes

- 1 I prefer ‘Marxian’ to ‘Marxist’, for the former conveys a sense of difference from anything that suggests orthodoxy. Just as modern biologists strongly influenced by Darwin might call themselves Darwinians but not Darwinists, so we social scientists and other intellectuals strongly influenced by Marx should (if we use any labels at all) refer to ourselves as Marxians rather than Marxists. That is in the spirit of Marx himself. He did not want some smelly little orthodoxy, and he certainly did not want a big one either. ‘Marxian’ does not suggest some doctrine that must be followed. To speak of ‘orthodox Marxism’, as Georg Lukács did, sounds too much like church.
- 2 This moral individualism is sometimes thought to be mistaken (Seymour and Taylor) or at least problematical (Couture). It is, of course, compatible with regarding human beings as social beings, as they plainly are, with espousing methodological non-individualism, with the rejection of an atomistic picture of human life and the espousal of holism, with a rejection of market society, with a belief in classes and in the importance of group and national identities, and indeed their inescapability. *But a moral individualist believes that social entities have no inherent or intrinsic value or worth.* It is what individuals reflectively endorse with adequate information and coolly which finally determines what should be done and what has value. If there were no sentient creatures valuing things in the world, there would be no values. I am a Quebec Sovereigntist and think that it would be a terrible thing if the French language in Quebec and the culture that goes with it disappeared. While I do not believe for a moment that Québécois would assimilate on their own, still, if that is the way things started to go, I would try my best to talk them out of it. I would recognize fully that, while cultural preservation is important, if the Quebec people took an assimilationist path, that would be their right as long as there was an open and informed debate

and a clear decision was made (perhaps shown in what they consciously did) by them and not by the working of some invisible hand such as demographics catching up with us without our understanding what is happening. Finally, what is desirable is determined (though not defined) by what is knowledgably and reflectively desired. Mill was right here. There are just we individuals (social animals that we are) 'out there', and the 'ultimate unit of value' resides in what we individuals, through deliberating together, reflectively endorse, where each individual counts for one and none counts for more than one. There is no social ontology or ontology of values. Let metaphysics die of neglect: the preservation of the French language has no *inherent* value such that if no one wanted (reflectively and knowledgably wanted) to speak it any more it would still remain valuable that it be preserved. But that is not, as a matter of empirical fact, how languages die out. Think of how Gaelic all but disappeared from Ireland.

- 3 This seems to me somehow right, but still it is not unproblematic. It is not clear how (or even that) we can split reasoning about justificatory structures from the institutions (the forms of life, the social practices, the language-games) in which they are embedded. To what extent, and how, if at all, can we individuals 'stand free' of all social practices? Is such a notion even intelligible? Brandom's and Rorty's historicism surely puts this in question. But still we can 'distance ourselves' from some of *our* social practices (perhaps over time, though surely not all at once, from all of them). Moreover, we should at least sometimes so distance ourselves. How else could we ever escape sexism or racism or homophobia? Here again issues concerning moral individualism arise, and an important part of what divides Hegel and Kant hoves into sight. I ask myself, and you, is note 3 (this note) in conflict with note 2? If it is, something must give. Yet what I say in note 2 sounds right (to me at least), but what Brandom and Rorty say about social practices, something also implicit in Wittgenstein, also sounds right (to me at least). Can they – moral individualism and the social practice way of viewing things – be felicitously or even coherently combined? *Perhaps* the answer runs something like this: all human beings are socially stamped, though putting it like this sounds too fatalistic. After all, we do repair and sometimes transform the ship at sea. But while we can, after some prolonged distancing, sometimes stand free of some of our particular social practices, which are also our linguistic practices, the language-games just go with our enculturation. We cannot stand free of all of them at once and still understand and evaluate things for ourselves as solitary Cartesian thinkers free of all social practices. We cannot be such monads and still be individual persons. Wittgenstein, Davidson, Rorty, and Brandom have powerfully taught us that. But, while never being able to stand free of all our social practices (at least all at once), we still, as individuals, using those practices (operating with them), reflect with them, on them (though not all at once), and on how we should best to transform them, if indeed transform them at all. And we make, as individuals, reflectively endorsements or rejections of parts of them. It is what we as individuals reflectively endorse that has, for a time, with us ultimate value, though even here, remembering John Dewey, we shall have trouble with the notion 'ultimate value'. But, though not without ambivalence, reflecting on Max Weber will reinforce what I have said in this note and in note 2 about 'ultimate value' and reflective endorsement.
- 4 W. D. Falk argued some years ago against something that might be called 'the Sartre fallacy'. Sartre rightly pointed out that there are *some* fundamental moral conflicts where we just have to decide what to do or try to be without having reasons or a rationale that will enable us to settle or rationalize such matters. There are no norms of practical reason in these situations which will lift the

burdens of stark decision from us. But then Sartre went on to conclude that *all* fundamental issues in morality just involved arbitrary decisions and that we will recognize this if we are clearheaded and not in bad faith. Over fundamental moral and other normative matters, Sartre believed, as did Camus, that *decision is king*. But, Falk points out that it does not follow from the fact that because *sometimes* there is no Santa Claus of practical reason and that we must just decide what to do or try to be that this is *always or even normally* so even for fundamental moral matters (Falk, 1986: pp. 256–60).

- 5 Brock misses here, where it is relevant to what she says, the critique Couture and I have made of Andrew Levine's subtle, nuanced, and sophisticated argument – an argument that is at the same time powerful and straightforward – that nationalism, while sometimes, and rightly so, politically unavoidable, still has an infantile side or at least not a fully mature side so that a thinker fully cognizant of what nationalism is and who is cognitively and emotionally mature would not accept nationalism as a fully satisfactory position as distinct from accepting it as a sometimes necessary expedient. See Levine in Couture *et al.*, 1996 and see Couture and Nielsen, 1996: pp. 524–663. I, on another note, speak of 'cultural and political nationalism' above. That is a redundancy deliberately employed above to make a point. It is important to see that so-called *civic* nationalism, popularly deployed as a contrast to ethnic nationalism, is itself incoherent. A nation, any nation, has not only a political aspect but a cultural aspect as well so that there could not be a purely civic (purely legal and political) *nation*. The proper contrast is between nations based on descent (ethnic nations) and those that are not. But both are cultural nations, though not *only* cultural nations. Being cultural is a *necessary condition* for being a nation. Hence the incoherence of a purely civic nation or a purely civic nationalism. See Nielsen, 1996–7 and Seymour, 1996, 2000.

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